Timothy Chen

到頭來，我有些質疑技術分析以及基本面分析的可靠度。技術分析的立論基礎，在於對過去資訊的解讀，相信歷史終將重演。基本面分析的立論基礎，則是基於對當下資訊的解讀，同時基於對未來資訊 (營收) 的預測 (DCF-based intrinsic value calculation)。多數情況下，基本面分析也需要參考過去歷史資訊，從過去績效預測未來績效。

兩者的相同之處在於「預測」這個動作。差別只在技術分析的信徒看起來像是拿者星座圖 (K 線圖) 唬爛的占星術士；基本面分析的信徒 (a la 華爾街分析師) 則想盡辦法讓自己看起來像是包裝在數字、模型、還有西裝之下的衣冠…專家。

預測之於機率遊戲，贏家都是事後定論。但我沒有其他更好的選擇了。

主要理由是 1) Display Ads (DoubleClick Ad Exchange) 與 2) Nexus One 能為 1Q 2010 帶來 2% 的 QoQ 成長。

另外分析師 James Mitchell 也提到，比起 Desktop Search，Display Ads、Nexus Phone、Mobile Search 的毛利較低。如果想維持 GOOG 股價成長，短期來說，營收成長比維持毛利率重要，長期來說，跨足 Desktop Search 以外的搜市場也比維持毛利率重要。

之前稍微瞭解到過去一二十年 IBD 與 Research 的利益衝突問題，所以看到後來心血來潮，乾脆把投資報告拉到最後的 disclosures 章節， 瞧瞧高盛和 GOOG 是否也有 IB 業務的往來。答案是：

• Goldman Sachs has received compensation for investment banking services in the past 12 months: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services in the next 3 months: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs has received compensation for non-investment banking services during the past 12 months: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs had an investment banking services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs had a non-investment banking securities-related services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs had a non-securities services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs makes a market in the securities or derivatives thereof: Google Inc. ($564.21)

投資銀行往往為了維護 IB 客戶關係，而傾向於給予 IB 客戶較佳的投資評等。就台灣市場來看，我們常說外資出的報告擺明就是請散戶幫忙抬轎，而比較少提到外資和本土企業之間的 IB 關係。我想這應該是個不錯的研究課題。

其實現在投銀內部都會築起一道 “Chinese Wall”，隔絕 corporate client department 和 investor client department 之間的訊息流通。經歷了半世紀的 IPO bubble，大多投銀也明文規範 IB 部門的營收，不得拿來 sponsor research 部門的 compensation。但檯面下如何運作，咱們就不得而之了。

The greatest of all gifts is the power to estimate things at their true worth.

- La Rochefoucauld, Reflexions; ou sentences et maximes morales

上回我們提到現金的時間價值，並瞭解到利率可以被拆解成實質利率、通膨率、與風險溢酬的總和。而本週 (好吧，其實是數週前…) 的 MBA Monday Series，我們來看「複利」在貨幣的時間價值中，所扮演的角色。

同樣舉上週的例子說明，如果小明投資 $900 元，年利率 11.1%，一年後可以連本帶利拿回 $1,000 元。假設小明想繼續投資，這時，會有兩種情況：

第一種情況，小明每年領出利息，入袋為安。本例中，假設經過了 5 年，每年都把 $100 元利息領出來包紅包，5 年後，小明連本帶利共得到了 $1,400 元。 ( $900 + $100 * 5 )

第二種情況，一樣經過 5 年，但小明把利息留著繼續投資，猜猜 5 年後，原本 $900 元的資本變成多少？答案是 $1,524 元。較第一種情況多了 $124 元。

此時，請特別注意，這兩種投資情境的年報酬率，都是 11.1% 。上面兩種情況的計算過程，可參考這份試算表。

看到這邊，應該也能馬上想起來，啊，第一種情境講的情況就等同於「單利，第二種情境講的就是「複利」。在情境一中，銀行仍可能是採用複利計息，只是「每年把利息抽出」，這樣的行為，所獲得的結果，和單利記息是一樣的。接下來再透過一個例子讓大家見識「複利」的威力。來看看如果把投資時間拉長，會變怎麼樣。

假設小明大學畢業後，把前 4 年辛苦打工賺來的 $100,000 元存入年利率 11.1% 的帳戶，如果採用情境一的方法，也就是每年把利息領出來，不繼續投資，則 45 年後，等小明退休時，這 $100,000 元將變成 $599,550 元。

如果小明心念一轉，把每年的利息都留在帳戶中再投資，那麼，45 年後，原先的 $100,000 元本金會變成多少呢？答案是 $11,400,000。是的，一千一百四十萬圓整。由此可見，時間是投資人的好朋友，時間會對複利造成很大的影響。本例詳細計算方式，請參考這份試算表。

現在讓我們回頭來看創投產業。一般來說，創投資本的投資期間約為 7 – 8 年。而資金在這段期間並不會滋生利息，因此，必須將初期投入資金採等同於「複利」的方式來計算投資報酬率。

從上述小明的例子可以得知，在一樣的年利率條件下。如果每年領走利息，45 年後連本帶利可得到的現金，是原資本的 6 倍。如果不領走利息，則 45 年後可獲得的現金，是原資本的 114 倍。

在風險創投的領域中，投資期間不至於到 45 年這麼誇張，一般來說，標的持有期間約 7 – 8 年，雖然短了些，但也足以產生夠大的複利效應。此外，大部分創投業者會希望投資組合能有個 40% –50% 的年報酬率才像話，若考量到風險，則相對要求的投資報酬率會更高。

假設你投資 $100,000 元在一間新公司，目標是 8 年後，得到 50% 的年複合報酬率，則在期末，你必須要能收回 $2,562,000 元，也就是投入資本的 25.6 倍，才能達成目標。詳細計算過程，請參考這份試算表。

聽起來似乎很難，然而事實上，大部份的風險創投不會第一年就把所有資本投入，而是採取逐期分批投資的策略，所以晚期投入的資金相對「滾」出來的複利就會比較少，也讓同樣報酬率的達成門檻降低。

從上例瞭解到複利在貨幣的時間價值中所扮演的角色後，我們學到兩件事：首先，身為一個投資人，應該盡量將利息再投資，而不是每回利息一發放，就急著領出來變現。再來，身為一個創業家，應該謹慎使用初期資金，資金存留期間越長，後續能產生的報酬就越多，也越容易達到金主們的期望報酬率。

While global Alpha and its investors suffered major losses, and investors in securities underwritten by the firm experienced seriously disappointing performance, the firm and its own investors enjoyed the substantial profits Goldman Sachs produced by taking an astute and almost unique short position in the subprime mortgage market. While some would question whether the firm did not have an overarching fiduciary responsibility to all clients and customers to share its expertise across all three areas, senior management was and is clear: Each business unit is responsible and accountable for doing its best to complete the mission of that particular business – period. No business is its brother’s keeper. Each tub on its own bottom.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.677

Buffett made his offer “Berkshire is ready to invest $5 billion today in a 10 percent preferred stock convertible at $110 with warrants to buy an additional $5 billion of common stock at $115 per share.” Buffett knew how important his investment would be and, having had real difficulties with his prior investment in Salomon Brothers, knew what term he wanted. Those terms included a unique provision: Each of the four senior executives of Goldman Sachs must sign a pledge that they and their families would not sell any shares of Goldman Sachs stock before Buffett sold his. The details were spelled out to Viniar in a late morning half-hour phone call that ended at noon. Buffett’s offer was firm until four that afternoon. So Goldman Sachs’ leadership had just four hours to decide.

 

They didn’t need four hours. Even with the personal lock-in provision, the answer was clear to everyone by three. Viniar called Buffett. “Sorry, Mr. Buffett is not available. He is away from the office and cannot be disturbed.” It was two O’clock in Omaha — and Buffett was still at lunch with his grandchildren.

 

At 3:30 Eastern Standard Time, Buffett called Viniar back. Goldman Sachs, without question, accepted Berkshire Hathaway’s terms. Done deal.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.699

 As Blankfein and his colleagues looked around the carnage on Wall Street, a few remarkable realities came into focus: Goldman Sachs was strong. It had more capital than it needed – and even more than it could put to use – and it had great liquidity. Even more important for Goldman Sachs’ long term strategy, every one of its competitors would be significantly less powerful. Lehman Brothers had been broken up and parts had gone into Barclays Bank. This would make Barclays stronger, but would it ever be as strong as Lehman Brothers had been? Merrill Lynch’s organization had been damaged and it had surely lost or would lose some of its best customers and its best businesspeople. Citigroup (including Salomon Bothers and Smith Barney) would mostly do “commodity” investment banking now. Its aspiration to be a formidable investment bank was, for now, just that – and aspiration. UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank would all refocus on their commercial banking business. Even Morgan Stanly was unsettled. Did it really intend to make a major commitment, as announced, to retail banking? Its leadership seemed uncertain about its basic strategy, which was surely not a good thing in such challenging times. Blankfien sees Goldman Sachs in good position to compete with commercial banks in providing credit.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.702

But Keynes was right too: ”Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.606

Stunning as it is that it took the firm’s management long decades to “get it” about investment management, GSAM’s history provides a crucial illustration of Goldman Sachs’s unrelenting “try and try and try again” approach to building each of it’s many enterprise businesses: Select one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. Point to a fair hill and say, “Congratulations! You are the Chosen One who can find a way to capture that hill. It will be hard – maybe very hard – but the firm expects great things of you. We know you can do it. Now, get going and… take… that… hill!” When success is achieved, congratulations are given to the successful young stars – and so is another, even more challenging hill. If success is not achieved, the firm selects another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. If success is again not achieved, the firm simply selects yet another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising young stars to take the hill. Eventually, the hill gets taken.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.622

One of Paulson’s great advantages in life is that he is always learning – partly through continuous observation of others, partly because he takes criticism easily with no defenses or resistance, and never personally. A weakness is that he is almost oblivious to office politics and for years had to fight the urge to speak his mind immediately, without caution or consideration.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.643

Paulson was a serious student of leaders, seeking to understand why some were so much more effective than others: “The more I observed the most effective leaders, the more I became convinced that the key is to have the right people in your own organization working for you and with you.” Within Goldman Sachs, he soon earned a reputation for having the best people working with him to serve his clients, and for identifying outstanding talent early.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.644

The concept of leadership at Goldman Sachs has changed completely over the past fifty years. Sidney Weinberg was a leader, but in many ways his firm was a proprietorship. While Gus Levy insistently expected many people to do all they could do to build the business, there was no question that he was the leader – in overall pace and direction and on dozens of transactions every day. Whitehead and Weinberg pushed decision responsibility and accountability out to the unit heads. Rubin and Freidman matched even more widely distributed authority and responsibility with centralized accountability to the management committee. Paulson continued the multiplication of decision-making leaders and increased the coordination of operating units through centralized disciplines: risk controls, business planning, and performance measurement at increasing numbers of smaller and smaller, more agile units that were closer to particular markets.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.648

As Bob Steel explains, “First-person singular is only used to describe a mistake, not an accomplishment. It may sound silly but little things like that are quite significant. I’ve never heard a boss at Goldman Sachs say, ‘I just did this.’ If I ever did, I’d be embarrassed.”

Paulson remembers getting his first Goldman Sachs memo back from Jim Gorter. “Good memo!” was written at the top – and every “I” was crossed out in favor of “we.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.659

There are only four ways to gain and keep a significant competitive advantage: more effective recruiting, a stronger culture, a better strategy, and greater intensity of commitment.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.554

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, few Wall Street firms interviewed MBAs, so Goldman Sachs had little direct competition. Determined to develop intense commitment within the Goldman Sachs system, Whitehead recruited “intensity” people who gave out clear signs of hungering for achievement. Selection was to be based on three equally weighted criteria: one-third on intelligence as measured by grades and SAT scores, one-third on leadership as shown by roles in extracurricular organizations, and one-third on ambition to achieve.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558

On purpose, the firm’s offer was – in  comparison to today’s $150,000-plus offers – stunningly small at $3,600, even if adjusted for inflation. Whitehead was determined never to pay more than other companies and preferred to be known to pay less, because if the firm could get the best for less, that sent a message that there must be something special about Goldman Sachs.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558

Goldman Sachs doesn’t look for top-quartile –- or even top-decile –  MBAs. Convinced that over the long term there is inevitably a major difference between the top 5 percent and the second 5 percent, the firm focuses on recruiting the very best young professionals, selecting carefully for such characteristics as leadership, drive, and appetite for hard work. Starting with the 5 percent most qualified and capable, the firm proceeds to sort out the most effective team-playing contributors – initially through fifteen to thirty interviews and then through actual work experience and direct observation to find the very best 1 or 2 percent.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.559

Always stressing the long-term opportunity of a career with Goldman Sachs, the firm wanted recruits to weigh other factors, believing that those who accept jobs because of salary were more inclined to leave later for a higher offer from somewhere else. The worst thing the firm could do was hire someone, train him for a few years, and then have him go elsewhere for more money.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.561

As J.P. Morgan famously observed, “A man always has two reasons for doing anything thing: a good reason and a real reason.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.577

Risk arbitrage is based on the simple idea that if there are two market prices for the same thing or two equivalent things, they will converge at some points as though pulled together by a rubber band. Arbitrageurs take disciplined actions to create profits by capturing differences in prices for the same item in different markets or of different but interchangeable items in the same market. The price differences they exploit are caused by market inefficiencies or mistakes caused by imbalances of supply and demand due to differences between uncertainty and risk, which differ in ways only experts usually care about. Arbitrageurs increase market efficiency and – indirectly and unintentionally, as Adam Smith famously explained in The Wealth of Nations – they increase the consistency and fairness of markets and therefore the confidence investors have in markets; that helps improve overall economic performance. Arbitrageurs are working in free, competitive markets that are open to everyone, so to earn profits they need to see what others do not see, to see more clearly than others do, or to take actions others would not have considered.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.464

Insurance companies earn profits by making a market between an individual’s uncertainty and a population’s true risk.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.465

Three factors are crucial for success in arbitrage: extraordinary, unemotional rationality or objectivity in all decisions and actions; superior access to information; and the ability to understand that information and the ability to think unconventionally and rigorously about it.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.466

The facts are king. You always start with the facts – all the facts you can possibly get – and then you develop a logical line of reasoning or argument, and then – and only then – do you develop a opinion. Opinions always come last. Facts, analysis, and logic matter. Ego has no role in analysis or in developing an opinion. Age and experience do not matter – once you’re on the team.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.475

Fife explains, “Leaders should always set the bar high – very high – and then find the way to meet that standard. Trust and consistent execution make you the preferred supplier. Any compromise on standards, and you’re sowing the seeds of your own destruction.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.516

“I learned a long time ago that when somebody spits in your face, if you’re really any good, you do three things: One, declare it must have been a rain drop. Two, wipe it off. And three, renew your determination and commitment.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.530

The CFO of Vickers told a partner, “If a British merchant banker were up all night working to complete a transaction, he would never tell anyone for fear he would look inadequately skillful. But if an American pulled an all-nighter, he would make certain to tell me – as proof of his commitment.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344

Thornton explains:”In a situation like this, at the very beginning, you, as an individual, are the ‘brand’.” You have nothing to carry you and nothing to fall back on. Going from an initial meeting and general discussion to specific, nuanced advice that is listened to and accepted is a transformation that’s completely dependent on you – what you say and do, how you develop each relationship, how you build up the prospect’s confidence – not just in your firm, not just in your advice, but in you. And that confidence has to be strong enough to prevail against the tide of general opinion and natural resistance to change, which is particularly strong in major financial transactions.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344

 

By not taking credit, you become more effective. If you do right by people, they win and you win. Frank, always go out of your way to share credit.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378

When Brosens had first been put in charge of arbitrage, he had one exciting talent in the division – Eric Mindich, a man in his early twenties whom he wanted to put in charge of risk arbitrage for the firm’s own account. Silfen and Zuckerberg wondered about assigning so much responsibility to such a young star. “Last year was a tough year in arbitrage. Shouldn’t you focus more on this area yourself?”

 

“I believe with a hundred percent of his time, he can do better than I can do with forty percent of my time.”

 

Rubin joined in: “Age is irrelevant. By expending his responsibilities now, you may keep a real star that you might otherwise lose.”

 

Mindich soon became the youngest-ever partner of Goldman Sachs, at age twenty-seven.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378

Rubin and Friedman were right about the risk that being wisely conservative can deteriorate into defensive caution and about the importance of the firm’s becoming more aggressive. John Whitehead had seen it, and it was an important factor in his decision to retire. But the obvious irony was that the cautious, conservative style Rubin and Friedman found so constraining had been at the core of the strong, team-centered culture, the reputation of integrity at every level, the consistent service to corporate and institutional clients, the strong earnings and solid financials, the persistent and skillful recruiting, the superior management, and the consistently disciplined execution upon which their more aggressive business strategies could now build.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.381

“What’s so fair about keeping tired older partners when that means blocking the best young people and violating our commitment to meritocracy?”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.385

“It’s harder to get a good idea accepted than it is to get a good idea.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.392

The problem Cooperman faced – in addition to the constrains imposed by the firm – was that while long-term investing is in theory what mutual-fund is all about, in practice, short-term performance dominates mutual-fund sales, particularly for organizations that are new to the business.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.429

 

… the real test of a risk-control system would be that it caught not only what you would not expect, but also what you would have thought not possible.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.460

While some other banking firms tried to manage and control with top-down rules, a rules-based management couldn’t possibly keep up with the speed of change in the securities business and couldn’t penetrate the complexities of many different lines of business in many different markets to address specific situations where value-based decisions might be needed. With a principles-base management, responsibility for decisions is pushed down to the men and women on the firing line. Since they know the concepts of the Principles and they know the detailed realities of their specific business, they can be held accountable for knowing and doing the right things in the right way.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.188

“Assuring professional ethics are really lived by is a bit like being a zoo-keeper,” says partner Roy Smith. “You need lions and tigers to have a really good zoo, but you must keep them under control – or reasonably so.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.197

“The two Johns saw nothing at all wrong with people working very hard and carrying a heavy load," recalls partner Roy Smith. “They were convinced it was better for you to carry more work responsibility – perhaps half again more than you normal capacity – because that meant you accumulated more experience and you would learn more and know more. You’d advance up the learning curve more swiftly and get to a higher level of performance.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.202

Each Analyst was expected and challenged to be an entrepreneur. For example, Joe Ellis made himself the leading retailing analyst on Wall Street. “We began the idea of conducting field trips for institutional analysts to visit retailers back in 1984,” recalls Ellis. ”Now other firms do similar things.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.289

The Analyst’s job is hard and requires many different skills. As Ellis says, “ You have to be very good on financial analysis and on interviewing and on business judgment and market judgment and able to work effectively with institutional investors and the sales force and with corporate executives and investment bankers. It’s complicated. And it’s very hard to serve all of them really well.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.291

Weinberg never took himself too seriously. “The boss needs to lose arguments – not all arguments, but enough to keep everybody honest and responsible for clear thinking. You can’t micromanage this business from headquarters.” About innovative ideas, of which there are great many, he tended to be conservative. But if the young bucks were pressing hard, he liked to give way, saying, “I’m just an old guy, so I don’t know all the ins and outs if this new stuff, so if you’re sure it’s right, let’s go!” He could then observing with a knowing smile, “I can’t lose now, If I was right, they’ll soon be saying, ‘Jesus, maybe the old guy knows the score,’ and if they are right, they’ll feel really good about themselves – and will work even harder.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.301

Weinberg kept a plaque inherited from his father that enumerated the many setbacks suffered by Abraham Lincoln on his way to becoming a great president, with the message that enormous success does not come without setbacks.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.303

With Whitehead’s persistent and cautious “prune losers, feed winners” style of management, the whole IBS [Investment Banking Service] organization became constructively infected with commitment: first to specific actions and transactions and later to an overall strategy – and eventually to a firmwide culture and x commitment to a new, organized way of doing business.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.161

As George Doty observed: “Goldman Sachs’s new business development organization was by no means an overnight success. For several years, it was a money loser. That’s one of the main reasons other firms did not duplicate it. Who wants to duplicate an experiment that is a radical departure from the tried and proven, and doesn’t seem to be working all that well?” It would take ten years and several false starts before Whitehead’s innovation worked out.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.163

Whitehead’s IBS organizational structure also made it possible for Goldman Sachs to follow a low-risk and high-impact “fast follower” strategy on new products and services. Let other firms be first with new ideas, absorbing the costs and pains of being on the “bleeding edge” of innovation. Study what worked and improve it if possible, sort quickly through more than a thousand client relationships to select the most likely prospects for the new services; then, using IBS as the delivery system, take the transaction specialist to all the most promising prospects; and finally, by outselling the innovating competitor, come from behind quickly to do the most business and become the recognized experts in the new service.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.175

In sustained pursuit of his strategic goals, Whitehead combined disciplined planning with reserved affability. He was quite unconcerned about being demanding of others. Smoothly rational rather than emotional, he never fraternized with the troops or had pals within the firm. Respected, but not loved or even particularly well liked, and often considered aloof from the others, who regularly socialized together, Whitehead was called, behind his back, the great white shark. He never cajoled or coddled and could be hard on investment bankers who sought praise or had a high need of ego celebration. Whitehead calmly obliged conformance in large matters and small.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.179

Whitehead not only designed and staffed his productive organization, he made it work, saying to one banker after another, “You can do it,” and always clearly implying, “and if I hold you to it, you will do it.” “John was almost regal in the way he acted,” says Smith. “I never met anyone else like that in my life. It’s really quite amazing. He tells you exactly what he wants you to do; gives you the clear understanding you have no alternative and must do it; then proceeds to encourage you to believe you might very well be able to do it; and then continues on to give you the feeling you might even enjoy doing it, particularly if you commit your every effort to be sure you’ll succeed.”

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180

If Goldman Sachs wanted to get into a business, it preferred to give the challenge to some of its own most promising young people. “When, as we rarely did, we decided to go outside the firm for talent, we avoided hiring whole groups or teams. Instead, we would identify the very best people, get to know them well, and bring them over individually. These new individuals would learn the Goldman Sachs culture and either blend into the firm or they would not make it at Goldman Sachs. We always tried to be creative with the new techniques and new financial products, but I never thought we had to be first with everything. I was perfectly happy to have another firm be first with a new idea because I was confident that with our superior marketing organization, we would improve the product and then achieve dominance through distribution, while those other firms put their reputation at risk if it didn’t work. We control our growth rather tightly so things don’t get away from us.”

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180

Weinberg’s stated secret of success: “Love of hard work, no fear of tackling anything – and like every minute of if.” He didn’t mention intimidation, but others certainly would.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 33

Since most of the people working at Goldman Sachs had no family wealth, they knew they’d have to work hard to make it, and as outsiders they had little to lose by taking risks or being “different”.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 77

 

When it became time in 1969 for Weinberg to turn over operations to a successor, Levy had to be made managing partner of Goldman Sachs. As the major rainmaker who commanded great personal loyalty within the firm, he was the obvious choice as the firm’s leader for a simple, compelling reason: He was already leading.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 79

 

… There was no idle chatter with Gus, ever. “ When he asked questions, Levy wanted answers that were short, direct, and specific. He abhorred ambivalence and uncertainty. When one of his colleagues offered tentatively, “We may be able to do something that may help,” Levy cut him off: “May is just a month between April and June. It has no place here at Goldman Sachs.”

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 81

Leadership authority and power in Goldman Sachs, as in all Wall Street firms, has to be earned over and over again every time the leader gets challenged – just as a male lion has to keep defending his pride of lionesses.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 95

Menshel hired salesmen carefully. His screening criteria were always the same: Candidates had to be very presentable and very bright. If a candidate made it past the first round, judgments centered on one key driver: How hungry was he, how much did he need to succeed? Having some family money –- in the sixties, still the first screening criterion at most firms – was not a positive at all: It was a real negative. Menshel wanted driven people, because he wanted a driven sales organization that would accept his strict discipline.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 123

Speaking of Levy, Young, and their sales team, Al Feld says, “They weren’t gods; they were only human. But when push came to shove, they were always do what was really right.” Leaders are known by two things: the people they hire and bring together and the beliefs they hold to when they really have to choose. You only know what a person really believes in when he chooses to do something even though it costs him –- because he really believes it’s the right thing to do.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 124

 

“In evaluating leaders,” says Dick Menshel, “the central question has to be ‘Who made a difference?’ and on the criterion, Gus Levy stands out as a real innovator in developing the business of block trading.” Levy and his key lieutenants had that unstoppable drive to build a major, very profitable business, and they build the organization that would do it.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 144

本週 MBA Monday Series，Fred Wilson 為我們解釋了「貨幣的時間價值 (the time value of money，)」，以及折現率還有利率 (discount rate / interest rate) 的組成。貨幣的時間價值可以說是所有財務學的基本觀念，任何人將這個觀念融入任督二脈後，對機會成本、沉沒成本的認知會有更深刻的體驗。修煉完成後，世界觀也會隨之改變。

首先我們要知道一個基本觀念：金錢的價值會隨著時間遞減。怎麼說呢？我問你，現在有兩個選擇，一個是我馬上給你一張 $1000 元大鈔，另一個選擇是 3 個月後，再給你這張 $1000 大鈔，請問你會選擇哪一個？很明顯，肯定是前者。

而利率，或是折現率，就是用來評估「現在」的錢，到底比「未來」的錢多了多少價值？再來一個例子。選項 1：我承諾一年後的今天，給你 $1000 元；選項 2：你可以當下就把錢拿走，條件是，要少拿 $100 元，也就是說，只能拿走 $900 元。你若是選擇後者，就代表接受了 11.1% 的折現率。

那麼，折現率 11.1% 是如何算出來的呢？

1) 將期末與期初金額相減，本例中，就是 $1000 – $900 = $100

2) 把相減得出的金額除以現在拿能拿走的金額，本例中，就是 $100 / $900 = 11.1%

反過來說，如果我今天「借」你 $900 元，而且你同意一年後償還我 $1000 元，這一來一往的年利息就是 $100，年利率就是 11.1%。( $900 * 11.1% = $100 )。也就是說，折現率和利率本質上是一樣的東西，只是計算方向恰好相反。

既然我們說折現率或利率可以拿來衡量金錢的時間價值，折現率或利率越高，當下手頭上握有的現金就越有價值，同理，隨著時間拉長，這筆現金的價值就會遞減。

有很多理由可以說明為什麼金錢的價值會隨著時間遞減，以下說明兩個最重要因素：

1) 通貨膨脹：用一句話來說，通膨就是「價格漲幅超越應有的漲幅」，造成超漲的因素也很多，但通常是市場上流動的資金供過於求。通膨會導致你手上握有的現金價值減少：如果你想買的房子今年報價一千萬元，明年預期報價一千兩百萬元，也就是說，年通膨率 20%。假設你一年來不吃不喝，也不領薪水，理論上，你的總財富和去年相比不變，但無形中，總財富的現金價值變少了，換個角度來看，就是你變窮了。所以你必須想辦法在今年多賺 20%，或從事 20% 年利率的投資。才能維持等同於去年的購買力。

2) 風險：你可以接受銀行給你的定存年利率 2%，但一樣的錢，投資到朋友新創立的公司，你還能接受 2% 的年報酬率嗎？恐怕不行，你應該會要求 100%，甚至更高的投資報酬率。為什麼？差異就在於「風險」的大小。你知道存在銀行的錢一定拿得回來 (如果銀行有投保)，但不確定投入朋友新公司的錢是否有辦法回收，這種不確定性，就是「風險」。

透過以上因素，我們可以來拆解利率的組成：

我們假設一年到期的美國國庫券利率為 3%，由於債券發行者為美國政府，在一般情況下倒債違約的機率微乎其微，因此我們可以把 3% 的年利率看作是「無風險利率 (Risk Free Interest Rate)」。

現在再把通貨膨脹率納入考量，假設消費者物價指數 (CPI) 一年後上升 2.5%，我們可以說年通膨率為 2.5%。實際上通膨率的計算沒這麼簡單，但由於房地產租賃市場大多以 CPI 作為指標，這邊我們也以此作為計算標準。如果你把無風險利率減掉通膨率，可以得到所謂的「實質利率 (Real Interest Rate)」，本例中，就是 0.5% (3% – 2.5%)。我們偶爾也把這 3% 稱作「名目利率 (Nominal Rate)」。

接著再把風險納入考量。假設你能找到一張市價 $900，一年後到期，屆時發行人將以 $1000 買回的債券。從最早的例子可知，這張債券目前是以 11.1% 的折現率在市場上交易。現在我們把折現率減去無風險利率 (11.1% – 3%)，就會得到 8.1% 的「風險溢酬 (Risk Premium)」。也就是說，相較於把錢拿去買最安全的國庫券，輕鬆賺取 3% 利率，市場上的投資人預期這張債券應該要產生額外 8.1% 的投資報酬率，來抵銷買了這張債券後，所需額外承擔的風險。

到了這邊，你能看出利率或是折現率是由哪些成份組成了嗎？綜合前兩段，我們可求出利率或是折現率是由「實質無風險利率」加上「通膨率」加上「風險溢酬」組成，也就是 11.1% = 0.5% + 2.5% + 8.1%。

從上例可以知道，銀行或政府都無法單方面決定折現率或利率。當然銀行和政府還是能發揮部份影響力。但終究來說，折現率與利率，是你、是我，是市場上的短期投機者、長期投資人的「共識」。「市場先生」不斷問大家以下兩個問題：你願意接受多少折現率來換取當下擁有現金的保障呢？你願意接受多少利息來換取等待兌現的時間成本呢？把所有人的答案和行動加總起來，就是市場力量，而折現率和利率，就是由「市場」來決定的。

The Startup Visa Act of 2010 would create a two year visa for immigrant entrepreneurs who are able to raise a minimum of $250,000, with $100,000 coming from a qualified U.S. angel or venture investor. After two years, if the immigrant entrepreneur is able to create five or more jobs (not including their children or spouse), attract an additional $1 million in investment, or produce $1 million in revenues, he or she will become a legal resident. (source)

美國民主黨國會議員 John Kerry 以及共和黨國會議員 Richard Lugar 日前提出一個新的移民創業法案：1) 找到至少 $250,000 美元資金挹注，其中 $100,000 美元來自美國天使投資人或創投，就能申請 2 年期限的居留 Visa。2) 兩年後，如果這名海外創業家能至少創造 5 個工作機會 (不含小孩與配偶)，並且 a) 獲得額外一百萬美金資本挹注，或 b) 公司營收達一百萬美金，就能成為美國公民。

這種法案就是美國能持續吸引人才的原因啊。

阿四，我記得你以前跟我說過，每天晚上只要一閉上眼，夢到的全是阿純，我閉上眼，是中國的明天。

昨天和同事聊到十月圍城，我說，最讓我感動的，就是上頭這段對話。對我來說，理想、堅持、犧牲，還有改變世界的格局，是有能之士存在的理由。

也許有人會說：陳少白這個角色很不負責任，真自私，文人專送別人去慷慨赴義。我則要說，歧視文人，才是現代社會最大的問題。追求實際，取笑理想，也是現代社會之所以平凡人充斥的原因。在太平盛事大家講求什麼？講求生活 (請稍歇會兒，跟著 Steve Jobs 一起歌頌 life style)、講求享樂，而給你們生活，給你們享樂的，就是商人。也就是說，現代社會講求重商主義，士農工商，很遺憾，請反過來寫。平民百姓的認知中，現代文人若不是窩在學校教書，就是在淌在政治圈裡搞利益輸送。前者是不經世事的井底之蛙，後者是掠奪民脂民膏的米蟲。

但，就算有一鍋老鼠屎，也無法抹滅一粒米的存在。想想一百年前，若沒有文人散布思想，起身號招，很多事情永遠不會有人去做。平凡百姓會繼續活在「夠好」的生活型態。而當革命已成歷史教材，壓力退去，文人也退縮了。時至今日，已沒有太多文人想改變世界。畢竟大平盛事，文人沒有舞台，沒有苦難百姓需要拯救。

若要替文人論斤兩，我們先捫心自問：這個世界，到底是 thinker 重要，還是 doer 重要？

There is a big hurdle here that Steve Jobs has not faced even with his other successes, which is this is the first time he is going to have to make a market for a size and type of product that has simply not existed or not succeeded before.

 

- Walt Mossberg

前微軟 VP Dick Brass 投了一篇專欄到 NY Times，強調微軟不夠創新，而且根源是 internal competition。先不論這個原因，至少我覺得 internal competition 是每間成熟的大公司都會有的問題。倒是被 Dick Brass 點名「不創新」的例子： music, e-books, phone, online, search, tablet, clear type font, etc.，喚起了我心中醞釀已久的想法，而這想法，在微軟阿宅的噗中出現：

大家覺得 IBM、Oracle 創新嗎？不少人心目中對「創新」的認知，侷限在消費性電子科技領域、或是外觀、互動方式等「看得到、摸得到」的介面創新；但在企業 IT 領域，還是有很多創新，是一般大眾沒興趣，或是不瞭解的 (所以記者也不愛寫)。久而久之，一些大公司就給人 LKK 的觀感了…

微軟並非不創新，只是它正在 enterprise software 和 consumer application 的路上迂迴前進。而合作夥伴生態、過去歷史包袱，以及投資人的壓力 (請準時交出短期成績單)，讓它的推進路線，更偏向 enterprise 一點。

enterprise software 這條路，本來就難走，寫熱門報導給大眾看的記者與部落客不懂此領域；懂此領域的記者縱使寫出精闢好文，刊載其報導的媒體又只有少數圈內人關心。微軟沒錯、Dick Brass 沒錯 、記者沒錯、媒體沒錯、一般大眾沒錯，錯的只是我們對微軟不正確的期望，以及人類容易受到膚淺事物刺激的天性。(可能要問問腦科學先生，人類大腦理解創新的部位，和狗狗大腦理解骨頭好吃的部位，是不是在同一個位置。)

說得含蓄點，就是大眾只對「貼近自己」、「容易理解」的創新有感覺，有反應，有記憶。至於讓 fortune 500 企業 LOB 效率增加 75% 的創新？讓 fortune 500 企業 IT 總支出減少 75% 的創新？省省吧，大眾沒興趣，別期望這些創新會有 pop momentum。

你不會因為 Apple 遲遲無法開發出適合企業使用的 mail server 就罵它不創新，不會因為 Google 遲遲尚未進軍 ERP 市場就罵它不創新。所以拿 lack of consumer technology innovation 來 challenge 當前將經營重心放在 enterprise technology innovation 的公司，有失公允。如果你是見識的菁英，如果你是有見識的記者，你會如何看待？

I was taught, and I believe with all my head and heart, that companies are worth the "present value" of "future cash flows.

Fred Wilson 開了一個 MBA Mondays Series。內容淺顯易懂，適合一般父老鄉親，如此棒的內容，就順手給它翻譯分享。第一章：valuation 的觀念。假如我打算買下隔壁公寓，並把房子租出去。我知道出租的行情為 $1000/month，每個月的維護成本為 $200/month，則能產生的現金流為 $800/month。一年下來，我能收到 $9,600 ($800 * 12)。如果我期望的投資報酬率為 10%，那麼，我應該花多少錢買下隔壁公寓，才能獲得理想中的 10% 年報酬率呢？答案是 $96,000。很簡單吧，我在年初投入 $96,000現 金，在年末共收到 $9,600 的現金，這不就是 10% 投資報酬率嗎？所以如果把這間公寓當成投資標的，此標合理的買價是 $96,000，也就是說，我能給它 $96,000 的 valuation。

當然，這是為了介紹觀念，而極度簡化的範例，在現實世界的企業現值評估中，還有許多外部因素，例如企業每個月能產生的現金流量都會變化，對於折現率過度樂觀或悲觀的預估，也會影響到現值計算結果。

總結來說，我覺得有個基本觀念，是長線投資人都該具備的：「現在」你願意付出多少，換來這個投資標的「未來」能產生的現金流總和？

查詢「折現」的相關資料時，發現相對於基於理性假設的 exponential discounting，還有一個摻入行為因素的 hyperbolic discounting 理論：

Given two similar rewards humans show a preference for one that arrives sooner rather than later. Humans are said to discount the value of the later reward, by a factor that increases with the length of the delay. In behavioral economics, hyperbolic discounting is a particular mathematical model thought to approximate this discounting process; that is, it models how humans actually make such valuations. Hyperbolic discounting is sharply different in form than exponential discounting, a rational function used in finance used in the analysis of choice over time. Hyperbolic discounting has been observed in humans and animals. (source)

人在市場中的行為有時候相當地動物本能。

In hyperbolic discounting, valuations fall very rapidly for small delay periods, but then fall slowly for longer delay periods. This contrasts with exponential discounting, in which valuation falls by a constant factor per unit delay, regardless of the total length of the delay. The standard experiment used to reveal a test subject’s discounting curve is to ask: "Would you prefer A today or B tomorrow?" and then, "Would you prefer A or B in one year, or in one year and one day?" (source)

A subject using hyperbolic discounting reveal a strong tendency to make choices that are inconsistent over time. In other words, they make choices today that their future self would prefer not to make, despite using the same reasoning. This dynamic inconsistency^[2] happens because hyperbolic discounts value future rewards much more than exponential discounting. (source)

The Lehmans liked to described themselves as merchants of money, intermediaries between men who wanted to produce goods and men looking for something to do with their surplus funds.

 

- Charles Ellis, The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.18

A truly professional firm has certain characteristics: The most capable professionals agree it is the best firm to work for and that it recruits and keeps the best people. The most discriminating and significant clients agree that the firm consistently delivers the best service value. And the great firms are, sometimes grudgingly, recognized by competitors as the real leaders in their field over many years. On occasion, challenger firms rise to prominence – usually on the strength of one existing and compelling service capability – but do not sustain excellence. 

 

- Charles Ellis, The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, Introduction, p.10

 

Recruit the best people 是不夠的，keep the best people 才是關鍵。公司文化、獎勵制度、發展空間都要有辦法留下這些人。不然何必幫競爭對手養兵呢？

上週五 MSFT 2Q FY10 (2009 年第 4 季) 財報出爐，拜遞延認列 Windows 7 收益之賜，總營收成長 14% yoy，營利成長 43% yoy，淨利成長 60% yoy。扣掉 Win 7 營收遞延認列的部份，則營收成長縮減為 4% yoy。

只和去年比較有失準頭，因此我也把過去 5 年 2Q 的營運成績翻出來瞧瞧：

Microsoft

Revenue (in millions)

Operating Income (in millions)

Net Income (in millions)

若和 2Q FY05 比較，2Q FY10 的營收、營利、淨利分別成長了 75.8%、79.2%、92.3%。5 年來的年復合成長率分別為 12.0%、12.4%、14.0% 。以一間成立 35 年，市值超過 200 ~ 250 bn 的企業來說，算是相當好的表現。但和 enterprise software 領域的競爭對手比一比，這張成績單，只能算是伯仲之間。請看 IBM 過去 5 年的表現：

IBM

Revenue (in billions)

Net Income From Continuing Operations (in billions)

IBM 2009 年第 4 季營收比 2004 年第 4 季減少 0.2%。但 2009 年第 4 季營利則比 2004 年第 4 季增加 54.8%，年復合成長率 9.1%。雖然營收沒有增加太多，但 5 年內營業利益率大幅上升，經營團隊的策略布局和內部管控能力相當令人驚艷。再來看看 Oracle

Oracle

Revenue (in billions)

Operating Income (in billions)

Net Income (in billions)

Oracle 2009 年第 4 季營收比 5 年前增加 111%、營利增加 100%、淨利增加 88%。年復合成長率分別為 16.1%、14.9%、13.4%。雖然營利率不像 IBM 那樣大幅爬升，但獲利成長曲線平滑，不失為一個穩健企業的範例。

最後，以 2009 年第 4 季來看，MSFT、IBM、ORCL 的營利率分別為 44.6%、 17.6%、37.3%。論商業模式「精明」的程度，MSFT 還是略勝一籌。精明的投資人，當然要支持精明的公司啊，哈哈。

理論上，股價反應未來，不是過去，但這張 5 年期走勢圖可真是道盡 MSFT 的委屈啊！

記得去年回顧 AllTHingsD Bill Gates 和 Steve Jobs 同台對談，Gates 提到消費性電子產品會從 dedicated purposed 匯聚成 general purposed；我心得則是，消費性電產品會在 general & dedicated purpose 之間來回循環演化，像鐘擺一樣，兩極都有個磁場，把創新的趨勢吸引過去，這個磁場，我們叫它市場力量。不過最早發表這個看法的，是我們的老祖宗，陳壽，他在三國誌就預見：天下大勢，合久必分，分久必合。

Apple 從 dedicated purpose 產品東山再起 (a.k.a. iPod)，到現在 iPad 搶盡媒體風采，Jobs Co.想往 general purpose device 發展的痕跡越來越明顯，iPad 也顯然被賦予了 multiple function 的期望。那麼，我們有沒有想過一個問題：比 iPad 大台的，叫做筆電或桌機，被拿來當 general purpose device 使用；比 iPad 小台的，叫做 smartphone，也逐漸被拿來當 general purpose device 使用。那 iPad 到底要如何在夾縫中生存呢？

iPad 如果把 OS X 裝進去，會咬到 Mac 的市場；做陽春一點兒，會咬到 iPhone / iPod Touch / iPod 市場。只做 e-reader，只做 gaming device，或只做 web browsing device，又不符合 Apple 的 content platform (paid + ads) + apps ecosystem 策略。做廣還是做深？這間公司到底如何定位自己呢？

“We offer people the best way to be entertained?”

無法回答的問題，就統統把它歸類到 “lifestyle” 吧！

Investors Didn’t Like The iPad Until They Heard Its $499 Price (source)

昨晚 Apple Tablet 宣佈大會上，一開始 AAPL 股價跌了 3.7%，直到 Steve Jobs 登台，宣佈 iPad 價格從 $499 USD 開始起跳，股價瞬間變成向上噴出 1.8%。

他真是位扭轉利多出盡的傳奇人物。

值得一提的還有 iBook 和 iBook Store。依照 Apple 過去經營線上商店的紀錄，Amazon 可以暫時忘掉 Nook，但是要小心 Jobs 呀！

還有這個，Apple 最新的 value proposition？

As Jobs declared today, “Apple is now the largest mobile device company in the world”.

But note this important fact: The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.

- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, p.203

A fourth business rule is more positive: “Have the courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have formed a conclusion from the facts and you know your judgment is sound, act on it – even though others may hesitate or differ.” ( You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right. ) Similarly, in the world of securities, courage becomes a supreme virtue after adequate knowledge and a tested judgment are at hand.

 

- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, p.524

又到了 GOOG 交成績單的時候。營收、淨利都有進步，但仍不敵市場預期外加大盤修正，股價跌到今年新低。不過我相信，短期來看，分析師的 KPI 決定股價；中期來看，公司股價的漲「勢」或跌「勢」影響分析師對 KPI 的制定；長期來看，公司內部的 KPI 才是真的，其他都是幻覺。

Revenue

CEO Eric Schmidt 在 earnings call 說，”This was an extraordinary end to the year.” 他可不是在打官腔，比對 2009 1Q – 4Q 的年營收成長與季營收成長就知道：

但再考古一下，會發現 2008 年 1Q – 4Q 的年營收成長分別為 42%、39%、31%、18%。雖然說基期大小和景氣好壞會影響到年成率，平心而論，4Q 2009 的營收增幅只能算是回到「正常軌跡」。

GAAP Income and EPS

Non-GAAP Income and EPS

乍看之下，2008 年第 4 季的 GAAP 淨利、EPS 相當低，導致帳面數字看來， 2009 年第 4 季淨利、EPS 瞬間增加 415.7%、406.6% YoY。但 None-GAAP 就只增加 35.2%、33.1% YoY。結果新聞紛紛依據 GAAP 版本，拋出「EPS 暴增 n 倍，但股價不漲反跌」這類標題。回去翻官方釋出的說明，原來是 “In the fourth quarter of 2008, we recognized $1.09 billion in asset impairment charges related primarily to our investments in AOL and Clearwire. ”。

廣告點擊成長

成本的部份，TAC 較去年同期增加 16.2%，佔營收 27% (flat YoY)。機房、無形資產折舊、內容取得、信用卡交易費用等成本，較去年同期減少 2.7%，佔營收 10% (-2% YY)。營運費用較去年同期增加 7.9%，佔營收 27% (-2% YoY)。

GAAP Operating Margin 37%，較去年同期增加 4%。Non-GAAP Operating Margin 41%，較去年同期增加 3%。第四季員工增加 170 人。

2009 年第 4 季，GOOG 推出了一系列 “Gone Google” marketing campaign。也因此引發了我的好奇心，特別把全年度行銷費用拿來做比較。2009 前 3 季縮衣節食，行銷費用都比 2008 年還低。但 2009 第 4 季行銷支出首度出現正成長，多了 $77.2 mn。可以視為景氣回春，公司對未來展望有信心的具體表現。假設第 4 季行銷費用和 2008 年持平，那 GAAP Operating Margin 可以多 1 個百分點。 (38.2% v.s. 37.2%)；None-GAAP Operating Margin 也可以多 1 個百分點 (42.4% v.s. 41.4%)。

業務與行銷支出

最後，是我最喜歡觀察的 CFO 財務操作。2009 第 4 季買入有價證券金額較去年同期增加 26.7%；2009 全年買入有價證券金額較去年增加 89.8%。2009 年第 4 季實現的獲利較去年同期減少 17.0%；2009 全年實現的獲利較去年增加 39.6%。上回把 MSFT 過去 4 季的投資部位現金流量拿出來比較，發現大企業 CFO 的業外投資多寡往往是市場多空的領先指標。這是個很有趣的問題，你要相信分析師的功力，還是 CFO 的功力？

有價證券買賣

整體來說，營收沒有打破高盛、瑞士信貸等投銀的預期，但因為成本管控得宜，margin 和 EPS 皆超出預期。高盛和瑞士信貸維持 $670 和 $700 目標價不變。

I like the subscription model the FT has been using for some time now. I may get the exact details wrong but its the idea that’s important anyway. You can visit the ft.com domain something like nine times per month for free. They cookie you and when you stop by the tenth time in a month, they ask you to pay. And many do. (昨天 NT Times 也宣佈採用這種模式)

 

This model recognizes a few fundamental facts about the internet. First, you need to make your content available for search engines and social media linking….

The other thing I like about the FT’s model is that its an elegant implementation of freemium. The best freemium models allow anyone to use the service for free and then convert the most serious/frequent/power users to paying customers…. (source)

等不到 GS 的報告，CS 的 Spencer Wang 倒是又出了一份。這次直接把 GOOG 目標價上調至 $700。理由：全球 search marketing 支出年復合成長率 12% – 13%。2015 年，全球 search rev. share 將達到 85%、未來 5 年營收年復合成長率 15%，而中國市場到 2015 年為止，只會有 ~2.5% 的營收貢獻 (?!)，意思就是：免驚。

另外預期 CY Q409 CPC 會有 5% 成長，營收增加 21% YoY，17% QoQ。

研究方法採 bottoms up，推動成長的動力主要有二 1) 全球ads spending 擴張、2) 全球 search engine share 擴張。每次看到分析師預估 GOOG 的金牛還會繼續長大，就讓我想起 MSFT 已經 20 歲的 Windows & Office 老金牛。他們都已經長到體型的 90%+，所以…只能每季用力擠牛奶…。但我還是看好 server & tools、online service、entertainment 這三隻強褓中長大的小牛。尤其是第一隻，正逢青春期啊！

難得看到一篇批判 Google / Nexus One 的文章。十五年來，雖然資訊載體的形式一直推陳出新，但人受到媒體的影響程度 (或控制程度) 也同步加深。除了少數菁英，一般人不願或不配或無法成為能「獨立思考的考動物」。媒體 (as a whole) 會繼續扮演老大哥的角色，只是老大哥會逐漸把權利下放給你我身邊的堂主。

所以，有沒有想過，the power of media v.s. the superior product portfolio，你心目中的企業品牌，有多少成份是靠前者建立起來的，有多少是靠後者？

如果從今天開始，全世界的記者都被下蠱，全部只寫 Microsoft 好話，猜會怎麼樣？

馬雲表示，阿里巴巴堅持，客戶第一、員工第二、股東第三；上市前股東曾對他承諾，股票永遠不賣，但金融危機來，「跑得最快是股東，留在最後是我的同事」。

有趣，股東價值也的確是鞏固客戶和員工價值後「順便」創造出來的。

每年 Forbes 都會公佈一份 Midas List ，榜上列出當年 ”the best dealmakers in high-tech and life science venture capital.”。KPCB 的 John Doerr 拿下 2008 年第一名，07, 06 年則排名第二，僅次於 Sequoia Capital 的 Michael Moritz。John Doerr 目前也是 Google 和 Amazon 的董事會成員：

Eric Schmidt calls John "one of Google’s best board members." And Jeff Bezos says, "Doerr (and Kleiner) is the center of gravity in the Internet.(source)

2009 年 7 月他到 Standford 商學院演講，主題為“Entrepreneurs as ‘Missionaries’  但內容其實是圍繞在 Green Tech / Health / Education。最後保留十分鐘和台下同學分享 career advise。說真的，這類勵志內容人人都會講，聽得人也常覺得順耳好理解，(因為你早就知道了)，不過我相信 John Doerr 還是會幫忙過濾幾個比較有用的 practical wisdom。

身為一名 arguably the best VC in silicon valley， John Doerr 仍不忘和台下的 Standford MBAs 建立關係。最後一張 slide，他推薦了四本書，還表示：如果有任何 idea，或畢業後想到 start-up / venture-backed companies 工作，歡迎寫信給我。如果你也在信裡面分享三本你最喜歡的書，我會把這份投影片寄給你。

其中 Startup. A Silicon Valley Adventure 這本書是由 GO Corp. 創辦人親自撰寫，講的是這間紅及一時的公司，由盛而衰最終失敗的歷史。GO Corp. 在 1987 年就提出了手持式平板電腦的願景，比 Apple 的 Newton 還早。只是中間經歷過大大小小的問題 (too early? poor execution? too much money? 看了才知道)，最後還是於 1994 年走上關門一途。有趣的是，John Doerr 也自嘲說這也是一本關於他投資失敗的故事。

再過一個多月，平板電腦就要被媒體拿來炒作了。屆時搭配這本書服用正是時候。

原本要查 1995/12/7 MSFT 召開分析師大會，宣佈新 IE 策略的相關資訊。結果沒找到相關會議記錄，倒是找到了 Channel 9 早些時候製作的 Microsoft History 系列影片。

1995 - 1996 年的微軟，如日中天。

1. Windows 95 released

2. Bill Gates published The Road Ahead

3. MSNBC joint venture formed (1996)

…但基本內涵並沒有改變，您仍須遵守四個步驟：找到一個好的管理團隊、一個高成長市場、毛利高的產品，再加上正確的時機。…

- William Egan

我經常告訴別人，如果你的興趣是賺錢，那就做一個創業家，如果你的目標是認識這類有趣的人，並且能賺很多的錢，那就要做一個創投家。

- William Egan

 

創投業者和創業家在建立策略夥伴時，最容易犯的第一個錯誤是案子的談判通常都以成功的結果為基礎，未曾考慮當不可預期的事情發生時，應該如何管理雙方的關係。而真網 (RealNetworks) 和 UU 網 (UUNET) 的結果就正好相反。微軟在這兩家公司都是策略性投資合夥人。就 UU 網的情況來說，這個案子簡直就像喜從天降。因為微軟貢獻了相當多的資本和時間，協助 UU 網三年之內成為數十億美元的企業。可是就真網來說，案子一開始，微軟和真網就知道這段共同的旅程遲早會有衝突發生，只是沒有人想到衝突會來得那麼快。但是雙方遲早會成為競爭對手卻是預料中的事。… 在創投業裡我們常說，當草長到某一個高度時，策略夥伴通常會重新檢視這個市場，並且決定該做什麼。

- James Breyer, Accel Partners

 

昇陽最初的營運計劃書由寇斯拉 (Vinod Khosla) 執筆，簡直可以拿來作為營運計劃書的範本，它總共只有七頁，內容包括了企業任務、四個月的目標、暫時擬定的兩年計畫、產品、市場、競爭對手及人才。一般來說，短的營運計畫書都是最好的。

- John, Doerr, KPCB

全錄帕拉‧奧圖研究中心的一位科學家凱 (Alan Key) 曾經說過：「預測未來的最好方式是創造未來。」如果以無法創造它，可以投資它或從旁協助。

- John, Doerr, KPCB

谷歌霹靂火繼續上演。WSJ 提到 CEO Eric Schmidt 支持 Google 繼續留在中國市場，但 Sergey Brin 則是堅持不能繼續向中國妥協。(推測多少和他小時候生活在蘇聯的背景有關)。看到一位網友認為，Google 就是因為 “startup mentality”，才會做出這麼「幼稚」的決定。如果換成 IBM 或 Microsoft 等 “matured” 之流，一定會選擇在檯面下把事情橋定。

差在哪裡？Google 是一間屬於創辦人的公司。IBM 和 Microsoft 是一間屬於管理階層的公司。

好在我們還有一間市值超國 1800 億美金的幼稚公司，仍然保有 “startup mentality”。站在股東立場，我不贊同 Google 片面撤出中國市場。股東，就是要賺錢。但今天如果我是創辦人，我也會希望能 leverage 這個位置的力量，做一點除了賺錢之外，有理想的事。

給個示範吧！

     (source: Bloomberg News)

結果是 Credit Suisse 的 Spencer Wang 搶先放出分析報告。話說回來，30% 市占率從市調公司公開的資料就能查到。~ 1.5% 營收貢獻從過去的 ARPU 乘以大陸使用人口再除以總營收就能得到。到底要怎樣才能成為一名偉大的分析師呢？

■ Investment Case: In our view, Google is attempting to balance the business opportunity in China vs. its view on the larger issue of "freedom of speech" and appears willing to sacrifice the former for the latter on principle.

■ Catalysts: In the near term, a possible withdrawal from the China market would have a fairly negligible impact on Google’s financials. We estimate that GOOG has ~30% share in China and that China accounts for ~1.5% of Google’s revenues. However, in this scenario, the longer term risk is that Google cedes too much market share in China to competitors, which it may find difficult to recoup, thus limiting its long run opportunity in the high growth Chinese market, both in core search as well as mobile.

■ Valuation: While our target price is essentially in line with current trading levels, we believe our target price reflects the potential for near term weakness on the China news.  However, we maintain our Outperform rating as we do not view Google’s exit from China as a fait d’accompli and believe there is room for GOOG to work out a mutually beneficial arrangement with the Chinese government given political sensitivities.

 

- Spencer Wang, Credit Suisse

不需要年輕人有判斷力和批判力。只要給他們汽車、摩托車、美麗的明星、刺激的音樂、流行的服飾，以及對同伴的競爭意識就行了。

這是一位大陸網友為 Google 事件聲援，引用自希特勒說過的話。很可怕吧，但是有效。

不知道我可不可這樣改：

不需要年輕人有判斷力和批判力。只要給他們汽車、摩托車、美麗的明星、刺激的音樂、流行的服飾，噗浪、推特、和臉書，以及對同伴的競爭意識就行了。

Google 想當烈士，你也拿它沒辦法。

今早看到新聞，Google 表示為了人權和言論自由 (a.k.a. no more search results censoring / filtering)，「考慮」終止在中國的營運。「激活點」是上個月源自中國的駭客攻擊事件，駭客鎖定的目標又恰好是中國人權鬥士們的帳號。無獨有偶，美國其他大企業也遭到類似攻擊。

In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google.

…we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted.

…we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.

These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.

每個人看待這件事的角度不同。人權對我來說還好，我更關心如果 Google 真的 shutdown 中國 office，會對投資人造成何種程度的信心衝擊，及其後對財報的影響。記得李開復老師在自傳中提到，2006 年創建 Google.cn，過了很長一段時間才損益兩平，在他離開前，已經開始獲利。照「只賺一點點錢」來看，如果結束中國營運，清算掉資產，說不定短期還能提高 EPS？不過長期來看，少了中國市場，總是醜事一樁。畢竟流失人才，鞏固 Baidu 獨大的局面，都不是 Google 願意面對的。

相信高盛的 James Mitchell 會在這兩天為我們帶來深入的 financial implication analysis。

ps. 這篇 PR 看起來也像是想藉由網路輿論，引發外界重視，來產生和中國談判的籌碼 (over the next few weeks)。時間點選得也不錯。保留空間讓 Nexus-one 新聞燒一陣子。

MIT Sloan 學院的學生前幾天揪團到 Seattle 和 Silicon Valley 的知名科技公司參訪，也為之後的 summer intern 做準備。有些公司熱情款待這些同學，有些則是撳撳蔡蔡。Microsoft 看來是有用心在款待這些 MBAs：

… it sounds like the Redmond company has MBA internship slots open in product planning and product management, in its Server and Tools division, and others. And it certainly knew how to put on a show for the visiting students. “Microsoft was super interesting,” Wepfer says. “They took us through their ‘home of the future.’” (One other perk: Bill Gates used to have a gathering at his house for all the summer interns; now Steve Ballmer does it.)

On the plus side, several students singled out Microsoft, saying it “works really hard” to sponsor international students [Visas]. (source)

只希望巨龍巨龍你擦亮眼，這年頭不會/不肯做事的 MBA 不少。小心僱來變成 liability。

我很喜愛的一位 VC Blogger 昨天用「說」的方式 (via Nexus One )，寫了一篇文章。他堅持不做任何修改，讓大家看看目前辨識技術能達到什麼程度。原文大約有一到兩成文法或拼字錯誤，斷句也不是相當清楚。不過最重要的是 –  我看得懂整篇文章。其實這樣就夠了。

他的合夥人也認為，十年內，我們有機會讓鍵盤輸入走入歷史。嗯。商機。

語音輸入說了這麼多年，為什麼一直無法 take off？ 除總總技術障礙外，使用者沒有需求恐怕是最大原因。能坐在某個地方舒舒服服敲鍵盤 (說不定敲得還比說得快)，為什麼我還要對著螢幕亂噴口水呢？更何況說話所要耗費的能量可是比移動手指頭多呢。

現在總算有一個合適的平台，能喚起使用者的 “demand side awareness”。以前我們的生活型態很安分，到某個特定地點，才會從事那個特定地點適合的行為。但這幾年做啥都要 ”on-the-go” 的風氣興起，讓廠商有機會重新思考 dominate 人類數十年的輸入行為。

前天，一位女同事告訴才我，她想要「說」簡訊。

我準備來好好研究 Goldman Sachs 的 corporate history。研讀的磚塊書叫做: The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs 。這類書籍的作者通常是記者或學者居多，遇到不用功的，怎麼看都不覺得有搔到癢處。好在本書作者 Charles D. Ellis 是位貨真價值的內線人事，他為 GS 提供顧問服務的資歷超過 30 年，也和歷代重要合夥人有不錯的交情。我想內容的 insight 應該是掛保證了，如果還能以中立的眼光來看待 GS 曾經做對和做錯的事，那就值得真情推薦。

我看書通常不喜歡先看書評，總覺得會減低閱讀樂趣。然而路過 NY Times 的 Sunday Book Review，還是給它喵了幾眼。我試著努力滑過 spoiler ，但其中這段讓我停了幾秒：

… as he explains in his preface, he started out believing that Goldman Sachs had become Wall Street’s strongest and most enduring player because it had a better way of doing things.

His mission: to figure out Goldman’s edge. Success, he concludes, started with hiring ambitious people from working-class backgrounds. If their parents were postal clerks or groundskeepers, they were likely to work relentlessly to secure a better life — and help Goldman amass profits in the process.  (source)

酷。

我想去一個自由市場，而非以種族這類膚淺理由，或其他因素來判斷個人能力的地方。我覺得已上市公開市場可以不帶偏見地評估我的專業技能。我尤其希望能以買方的身份進入，因為相關的瑣碎事情比較少。

- Cleveland Christophe, Venture Capitalist Tell their Stories

沒錯，這也是我認為投資是 noble activity 的原因。放馬過來吧，這是一個不能用經歷、用年資、用學歷、用性別、用成見、用關係、用官僚來壓制任何一個人的競技場。這是一個純粹較量智力、心理、情緒的競技場。這是一個崇尚個人主義，不需要臣服於無效率團隊主義的競技場，人人為自己的每一次決策負最高責任，你不必為完成別人的目標而奉獻，別人無須為完成你的目標而奉獻。這是一個人才得以完全自主的競技場。

高盛 James Mitchell 燒燙燙的報告又出爐了。本回和同事 Robert Chen ( following HTC ) 討論後，認為 2010 全年 GOOG 能賣出 3 百 50 萬支 Nexus One，為營收帶來 9% 挹注， 0 – 2% EBIT 成長，但平均每支 Nexus One 和 HTC 拆帳後，恐怕只賺 55 元美金左右，大約是 10% 毛利率。所以跳進硬體遊戲，短期會衝擊到財報 margin。長期來看，則還是有助於 mobile ads/apps 策略布局。

VOLUME: We estimate Google may sell 3.5 mn Nexus Ones in 2010, based on first-year sales for other HTC Android models of 1.5-4.0 mn; we adjust up for Google’s brand and down for limited availability in retail outlets.

REVENUE: 3.5 mn units at $530 per unit add $1.9 bn, or 9%, to Google’s 2010 net revenue. Google will book the full unit sales price (including carrier subsidy on locked phones) to its “licensing and other” line item.

MARGIN: We estimate HTC’s component cost at $300 per unit, boosted by the OLED screen and CPU. We assume HTC bears warranty, after-sale service, & R&D expenses of $50, and retains a $75 profit. We estimate Google’s R&D & marketing expenses at $50 or more, for a margin to Google of up to $55 per unit, or up to 10%, and a boost to Google’s EBIT of up to $190 mn, or 0%-2%.

- James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs

目標價一樣是 $670 不變，24 倍 2010E 本益比。

那華爾街怎麼看呢？GOOG 錯了嗎？GOOG 錯了嗎？

…like to talk about the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 model in which 1/3 of the investments are wipeouts, 1/3 return capital but are underperformers, and 1/3 are winners that produce all of the returns. When you have an investment flow dynamic where the early rounds require very small amounts of capital but the later rounds in the winners can require a lot of capital (which is very much the case in the internet/web sector), then it behooves you to make lots of small investments, see which ones become the big winners, and then go "all in" on the winners.

 

The challenge all of this presents is how a VC should allocate his/her time. You can spend the majority of time hunting for deals (planting seeds) or you can spend the majority of your time working with the portfolio companies (tending the crop). Not all of the portfolio companies need a VC’s help. Many entrepreneurs are highly self sufficient. That’s a good thing. But every entrepreneur can use some help now and then and some need a lot. And the best VCs make it a point to be there when the entrepreneur needs you. And that is time consuming. It’s very time consuming if you have ten or more portfolio companies and you make it a point to be a "valued added" VC. (source)

不管路人怎麼解讀，我還是相當喜歡這句： 

“We don’t do things that where we don’t aim to be the No.1.”

– Steve Ballmer

這篇文章講到 GOOG 抱持著「開放」的態度，即便 Chrome Extension Gallery 裡頭出現 AdThwart、AdBlocker 這類檔廣告外掛，她們也是一概接受。

我承認之前倒是沒評估過，如果有一天，安裝瀏覽器檔廣告外掛一夕間蔚為風潮，那對 GOOG 與 publisher 的營收衝擊有多大？

現在 Google Ads 在使用者心目中就是「有點干擾，又不會太干擾」的平衡狀態。所以動手安裝外掛的心理成本仍然高於維持現狀。

所以就如同原文結尾說的；

Extensions like his, he said, will make “every one else change their ways, to make ads more useful. Everyone wins, that’s competition. The ideal result would be to retire this extension because the entire Web was covered with ads that people loved and no one wanted to block them.”

又一次集中投資寡占避險的價值體現。你無法預測未來市場走向，但你知道 mobile ads will be the next big thing。那怎麼辦？只好把市場上可能的 player 都撿到籃子裡。不管他們怎麼戰，你只需要搬張折凳泡杯茶，好好欣賞台上的 M&A 戲碼，因為，不論結局如何，你都會是贏家。

APPL 大概是看到 GOOG 收購 AdMob，手癢也想來介入 mobile ads network。這兩家目前都有完整的 app store，自己跳下去搞 ads 也挺說得過去。app developer 當下的主要收入來源還是付費下載，但未來也可能變成透過加入廣告聯播計畫來賺錢。消費者的接受度呢？我是覺得 ok，本身也用過一些 ads sponsored free app，廣告經過精美設計的話，不太會對瀏覽經驗造成影響 (way to go! ads innovation!)。例如 AdMob 提供的 banner 廣告常出現在螢幕最上方或最下方，設計感也會盡量和 iPhone 的 UI 一致，輪播時還會有 3D 翻轉效果。記得第一次看到時，不但不覺得煩，反倒是內心發出了讚嘆：啊，that’s it!

有時候，趨勢不是說了就算，還要有天時地利人和。天時就是 2010 年人人都想買智慧型手機，地利就是日趨成熟的 infra (app store + payment system + ads network)，人和嘛…人和就是常常亂調高目標價的分析師。

昨天晚上 MSN 彈出一個提示視窗，說我收到一封 INSEAD Knowledge 的信，說真的，我還從來沒打開過這些高級學府寄來的「廣告信」。昨天大概是起了念，就決定開來看看。嗯，還不錯，這是篇類似電子報的信件，裡面收錄上一季 INSEAD Knowledge  top 10 文章精選。這些文章都是由 INSEAD 的學者教授們發表。我點了其中一篇 “why MBAs should not sign the HBS oath”，講得是為了不要讓金童們再搞出一波金融海嘯，前陣子哈佛商學院發起了一個簽署運動，鼓吹優球全球頂尖 MBA 學生都要簽署這份「I’ll do no evil」誓言書。而 INSEAD 這位教授發表了一篇論述，站在反對立場。先講幾個發現這封信的感想：

1. 讓大學加入市場競爭機制果真是好事

2. 連 INSEAD 這種等級的學校都要發電子報來吸引一流學生了，台灣的頂尖學校在幹嘛

3. 教授沒有想像中那麼沒料，至少比成天「見微知著」的部落客好多了

The MBA Oath 原文如下

THE MBA OATH

As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing people and resources together to create value that no single individual can create alone. Therefore I will seek a course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over the long term. I recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that affect the well-being of individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in the future. As I reconcile the interests of different constituencies, I will face choices that are not easy for me and others.

Therefore I promise:

• I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner.
• I will safeguard the interests of my shareholders, co-workers, customers and the society in which we operate.
• I will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.
• I will understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own conduct and that of my enterprise.
• I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will represent the performance and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly.
• I will develop both myself and other managers under my supervision so that the profession continues to grow and contribute to the well-being of society.
• I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental prosperity worldwide.
• I will be accountable to my peers and they will be accountable to me for living by this oath.

This oath I make freely, and upon my honor.

INSEAD 教授 Theo Vermaelen 反對的立論有三點：

1. Some parts of the pledge are inconsistent with fiduciary duties and ethical standards.

2. The oath is a misplaced response to the financial crisis.

3. I don’t believe in pledges as an instrument to guide people’s behaviour.

雖然有幾個論點我不太認同，例如強調這份 pledge 和經理人的使命 — 保障股東利益，為股東負責衝突，但如果過度重視股東權益，因此卻犧牲客戶利益，最後還是會再度釀災。或是採用太薄弱、太果斷的事實來支持論點，例如拿報告指出，經理人買給自己的 MBS 中，有 81% 也屬於 AAA 評等，最後經理人自己也成為金融海嘯受害者。或是拿另一份報告指出，德過受傷最深的幾家金融機構，其董事會成員的財務背景知識是同一批調查中最薄弱的，因此操守不佳的 (前) MBA 學生不是釀災的主因。這兩個例子老實說都不太能說服我。然而其中還是有幾個支持論點值得參考，教授的論述結構也值得學習。

In many countries, board members and, as a consequence, managers have a fiduciary duty to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Even in countries where the corporate governance code is promoting maximising stakeholder value, none of these codes would accept that managers promote “social and environmental prosperity worldwide” as the HBS oath does.

I believe it is unethical to raise money from shareholders without telling them in advance that you are going to pursue causes that are destroying shareholder value. If you want to pursue other objectives, then you should tell them in advance, so that investors can incorporate these goals into stock prices, or simply refuse to buy the company stock.

First, Rene Stulz and Rudiger Fahlenbrach (“Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis” working paper, Ohio State University, 2009) show that banks where the CEO held a lot of stock were also the banks with the biggest losses. So they were not losing other people’s money, they lost their own money. They apparently believed in their strategy. 

People are not driven by pledges, but they are driven by incentives.

Signing the oath doesn’t cost anything and therefore not a credible commitment.

The current debate should focus on how to improve corporate governance and how to design compensation contracts that are maximising shareholder value, rather than profits, earnings per share, return on equity or other non risk-adjusted short-term measures of performance.

The HBS school oath aims to achieve exactly the opposite. It pushes the stakeholder value maximisation idea to its extreme by including the whole world as a stakeholder.

I would propose the following:

“I pledge to maximise the wealth of the people who pay my salary, i.e. the shareholders, unless the shareholders tell me in advance that they want me to do something else. I will do my best to learn how to do this by taking the relevant courses”

Fred Wilson 列出了 2010 他和 Union Square Ventures 的合夥人可能會投資的領域： mobile、gaming、commerce/currency、cloud platforms/APIs、eduction/energy/environment.

前天和朋友吃飯，我們也討論到各自看好的領域：mobile commerce、customized content distribution app。也覺得就 consumer Internet market 來說，台灣生態不適合開發 utility 類型的 web services / mobile apps，比較適合開發 content 層級的 application。

2009 年 11 月 12 日，巴菲特與蓋茲二度同台演講，地點在哥倫比亞大學，整場直接與 Wharton 的學生進行 Q&A 。若這場演講開放全球售票，我那時一定是在台下…

(開場的 standing ovation 熱血度百分之百！)

好在這個世界上有 broadband Inetnet + video streaming technology。當然，對我來說，沒有佳句摘要，就不算是吸收了一場完整的演講：

Announcer: …wealth is not about the money you amass, but the number of lives you enrich.

Gates: I was a huge beneficiary of this country’s unique willingness to take risk on a young person.  And, you know, I got to hire people who were older.  I got to sell to people who were older.  And it was kind of a dream come true. 

Buffett: Last September, only the government could have saved things.  The whole world wanted to deleverage.  And they were deleveraging under conditions of extreme haste and with guns to their head in some cases.  And the only entity that could possibly leverage up at the same time that everybody else wanted to deleverage was the Federal government. 

Gates: And business schools play a role in training people to think about value, leadership.  There’s wonderful skills that are taught at great schools like this.  And so the fact that, yes, we have had a crisis and we have dropped back, maybe we wasted two or three years net because of the things that were done wrong, that doesn’t say that business schools aren’t performing a great service, you know.  The case studies of this crisis will be taught here for decades to come. 

Buffett: The wonderful thing about it is in this country, is you can succeed magnificently with ethics.  It’s not a hindrance.  It’s a help sometimes.  It’s a neutral sometimes.  But it’s not a hindrance at all.  And to cut corners, you know, everybody here has a wonderful future.  I mean, this is an economy you’re going into that is so much — [APPLAUSE]  If you look back on the 19^th Century, we had seven great bank panics.  If you look back at the 20th Century, we had the Great Depression and world wars and flu epidemics.  This country doesn’t avoid problems.  It just solves them.  And in the next 100 years, our machine will sputter again, you know.  Maybe 15 years will be so-so years, but there will be 85 great years.  And during the 20th Century the Dow went from 66 to 11,400, so this is fertile soil that you’re working in and there’s no reasons to cut corners.

Buffett: I had a professor, Ben Graham, I offered to go to work for him for nothing.  He said, "You’re overpriced."  Nonetheless, I went into the business. [APPLAUSE]  I will guarantee, you will do well at whatever turns you on. 

Buffett: I don’t like to sound, you know, like a mortician during an epidemic or anything, but last fall was really quite exciting for me.  [LAUGHTER] I don’t wish it on anybody, but there were things being offered.  There are opportunities for us to do things that didn’t exist a year or two earlier. So I really don’t — I don’t want to be in a position where I am leveraged or something of the sort that does keep me up at night. I did not worry about the ultimate survival of our economic system.  We were messed up.  Wasn’t any question about that.  But the plants haven’t gone away.  The cornfields haven’t gone away.  The talent of the American people hasn’t gone away.  The innovativeness of the next Bill Gates hasn’t gone away.  This country was going to do fine.  I knew that.  We just had to get things straightened out.  And we’re well on the way to having that happen.

Buffett: …if you had a wonderful farm and you knew the next 50 years there would be five droughts but there would be 45 good years, I mean, you would not become paralyzed thinking about the five drought years.  You would recognize that you’ve got a system that works very well over time, and that’s our American economic system.

Buffett: Let me give you an illustration.  I bought my first stock in 1942.  I was 11.  I had been dillydallying up until then.  I got serious.  [LAUGHTER]  What do you think the best year for the market has been since 1942?  Best calendar year from 1942 to the present time.  Well, there’s no reason for you to know the answer.  The answer is 1954.  In 1954, the Dow … dividends was up 50%.  Now if you look at 1954, we were in a recession a good bit of that time.  The recession started in July of ‘53.  Unemployment peaked in September of ‘54.  So until November of ‘54 you hadn’t seen an uptick in the employment figure.  And the unemployment figure more than doubled during that period.  It was the best year there was for the market.  So it’s a terrible mistake to look at what’s going on in the economy today and then decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on it.  You should decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on how much you’re getting for your money, long-term value you’re getting for your money at any given time.  And next week doesn’t make any difference because next week, next week is going to be a week further away.  And the important thing is to have the right long-term outlook, evaluate the businesses you are buying.  And then a terrible market or a terrible economy is your friend.  I don’t care, in making a purchase of the Burlington Northern, I don’t care whether next week, or next month or even next year there is a big revival in car loadings or any of that sort of thing.  A period like this gives me a chance to do things.  It’s silly to wait.  I wrote an article.  If you wait until you see the robin, spring will be over.

Buffett: [APPLAUSE]  But let me add one point because — to the MBA situation.  Right now, I would pay $100,000 for 10% of the future earnings of any of you.  So anybody that wants to see me after this is over — [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE]  If that’s true, you are a million-dollar asset right now, right, if 10% of you is worth 100,000?  You could improve — many of you, and I certainly could have when I got out, just in terms of learning communication skills.  You know, it’s not something that is taught.  I actually went to a Dale Carnegie course later on in terms of public speaking.  But if you improve your value 50% by having better communication skills, that’s another $500,000 in terms of capital value.  See me after the class and I’ll pay you 150-thousand.  [APPLAUSE]

Gates: But I think I’d pick his desire to teach, his desire to teach things that are complex and put them in a simple form so that people can understand and get the benefit of all his experience, all his models of how the world works.  He loves to teach.  And he does it meeting with students.  He does it in his annual newsletter.  He does it when he’s talking to me on the phone.  It’s a real gift that I admire incredibly.

Buffett: First of all, I’d say marry the right person. [LAUGHTER]  And I’m serious about that.  [APPLAUSE] It will make more difference in your life.  It will change your aspiration, all kind of things.  It’s enormously important who you marry. … And then also go to work, if possible, for an organization or an individual that you admire.  I mean I offered to go to work for Ben Graham because there was nobody I admired more in the business than him.  I didn’t care what he paid me.  When he finally did hire me in 1954, I moved from Omaha to New York and I didn’t know what I was getting paid until I got my first paycheck.  But I knew I wanted to work for Ben Graham.  And I knew I would jump out of bed every morning and be excited about what I would do and I would go home at night smarter than I was in the morning.  Go to work at a job that turns you on and a person that turns you on and institution.  [APPLAUSE]

Buffett: The one thing I will tell you is the worst investment you can have is cash.  Everybody is talking about cash being king and all that sort of thing.  Most of you don’t look like you are overburdened with cash anyway.  [LAUGHTER] Cash is going to become worth less over time.  But good businesses are going to become worth more over time.  And you don’t want to pay too much for them so you have to have some discipline about what you pay.  But the thing to do is find a good business and stick with it.

Buffett: Don’t pass up something that’s attractive today because you think you will find something way more attractive tomorrow.

Buffett: But every year don’t measure it by the earnings in the quarter that year. Measure it by whether the moat around that business, what gives it competitive advantage over time has widened or narrowed.  If you keep doing that for 100 years, it’s going to work out very well.  Then I tell them basically if the reason for doing something is everybody else is doing it, it’s not good enough.  If you have to use that as a reason, forget it.  You don’t have a good reason for doing something.  Never use that.

Buffett: It’s always interesting when Bill and I appear together, they don’t figure they can do what Bill does, but they know they can do what I do.  [LAUGHTER]  [APPLAUSE] …

 

Buffett: And then basically I didn’t listen to anybody else.  I just look in the mirror every morning and the mirror always agrees with me.  And I go out and do what I believe I should be doing.  And I’m not influenced by what other people think.

Gates: Well, we talked about some of the basics, having great people around you, reading a lot, thinking long-term.  I also think, though, there become a few magic moments where you have to have confidence in yourself. You know, Warren when he set off on his own, he could have gone and taken a job as an analyst somewhere.  But he knew that he had the skill, that he was going to raise money and have his own partnership.  When I dropped out of Harvard and said to my friends, ‘Come work for me,’ there was a certain kind of brass self-confidence in that.  You have a few moments like that where trusting yourself and saying yes, this can come together — you have to seize on those because not many come along.

Gates: Well, they [Google] have some of the same problems we had.  [LAUGHTER]  [APPLAUSE]  It’s another fine competitor.  They are hiring a lot of smart people.  They have gotten into the lead position in search, which is incredibly profitable to be number one in that.  They may get a little competition as time goes forward.  But they are a great example of what can happen, you know, two young guys who got together, pursued an idea and created a success that’s absolutely gigantic.  And we all, you know, hopefully use search engines, maybe a variety.  [LAUGHTER]  And we benefit from that.

Buffett: … Well, that’s 50 years of preparation and five (minutes) of decision making.   [APPLAUSE]

"The people, who were trying to make this world worse… are not taking a day off. How can I?”