A truly professional firm has certain characteristics: The most capable professionals agree it is the best firm to work for and that it recruits and keeps the best people. The most discriminating and significant clients agree that the firm consistently delivers the best service value. And the great firms are, sometimes grudgingly, recognized by competitors as the real leaders in their field over many years. On occasion, challenger firms rise to prominence – usually on the strength of one existing and compelling service capability – but do not sustain excellence.
- Charles Ellis, The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, Introduction, p.10
Recruit the best people 是不夠的，keep the best people 才是關鍵。公司文化、獎勵制度、發展空間都要有辦法留下這些人。不然何必幫競爭對手養兵呢？
記得去年回顧 AllTHingsD Bill Gates 和 Steve Jobs 同台對談，Gates 提到消費性電子產品會從 dedicated purposed 匯聚成 general purposed；我心得則是，消費性電產品會在 general & dedicated purpose 之間來回循環演化，像鐘擺一樣，兩極都有個磁場，把創新的趨勢吸引過去，這個磁場，我們叫它市場力量。不過最早發表這個看法的，是我們的老祖宗，陳壽，他在三國誌就預見：天下大勢，合久必分，分久必合。
Apple 從 dedicated purpose 產品東山再起 (a.k.a. iPod)，到現在 iPad 搶盡媒體風采，Jobs Co.想往 general purpose device 發展的痕跡越來越明顯，iPad 也顯然被賦予了 multiple function 的期望。那麼，我們有沒有想過一個問題：比 iPad 大台的，叫做筆電或桌機，被拿來當 general purpose device 使用；比 iPad 小台的，叫做 smartphone，也逐漸被拿來當 general purpose device 使用。那 iPad 到底要如何在夾縫中生存呢？
iPad 如果把 OS X 裝進去，會咬到 Mac 的市場；做陽春一點兒，會咬到 iPhone / iPod Touch / iPod 市場。只做 e-reader，只做 gaming device，或只做 web browsing device，又不符合 Apple 的 content platform (paid + ads) + apps ecosystem 策略。做廣還是做深？這間公司到底如何定位自己呢？
But note this important fact: The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.
- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, p.203
A fourth business rule is more positive: “Have the courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have formed a conclusion from the facts and you know your judgment is sound, act on it – even though others may hesitate or differ.” ( You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right. ) Similarly, in the world of securities, courage becomes a supreme virtue after adequate knowledge and a tested judgment are at hand.
- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, p.524
I like the subscription model the FT has been using for some time now.I may get the exact details wrong but its the idea that’s important anyway. You can visit the ft.com domain something like nine times per month for free. They cookie you and when you stop by the tenth time in a month, they ask you to pay. And many do. (昨天 NT Times 也宣佈採用這種模式)
This model recognizes a few fundamental facts about the internet. First, you need to make your content available for search engines and social media linking….
The other thing I like about the FT’s model is that its an elegant implementation of freemium. The best freemium models allow anyone to use the service for free and then convert the most serious/frequent/power users to paying customers…. (source)
難得看到一篇批判 Google / Nexus One 的文章。十五年來，雖然資訊載體的形式一直推陳出新，但人受到媒體的影響程度 (或控制程度) 也同步加深。除了少數菁英，一般人不願或不配或無法成為能「獨立思考的考動物」。媒體 (as a whole) 會繼續扮演老大哥的角色，只是老大哥會逐漸把權利下放給你我身邊的堂主。
所以，有沒有想過，the power of media v.s. the superior product portfolio，你心目中的企業品牌，有多少成份是靠前者建立起來的，有多少是靠後者？
每年 Forbes 都會公佈一份 Midas List ，榜上列出當年 ”the best dealmakers in high-tech and life science venture capital.”。KPCB 的 John Doerr 拿下 2008 年第一名，07, 06 年則排名第二，僅次於 Sequoia Capital 的 Michael Moritz。John Doerr 目前也是 Google 和 Amazon 的董事會成員：
Eric Schmidt calls John "one of Google’s best board members." And Jeff Bezos says, "Doerr (and Kleiner) is the center of gravity in the Internet.(source)
2009 年 7 月他到 Standford 商學院演講，主題為“Entrepreneurs as ‘Missionaries’ 但內容其實是圍繞在 Green Tech / Health / Education。最後保留十分鐘和台下同學分享 career advise。說真的，這類勵志內容人人都會講，聽得人也常覺得順耳好理解，(因為你早就知道了)，不過我相信 John Doerr 還是會幫忙過濾幾個比較有用的 practical wisdom。
身為一名 arguably the best VC in silicon valley， John Doerr 仍不忘和台下的 Standford MBAs 建立關係。最後一張 slide，他推薦了四本書，還表示：如果有任何 idea，或畢業後想到 start-up / venture-backed companies 工作，歡迎寫信給我。如果你也在信裡面分享三本你最喜歡的書，我會把這份投影片寄給你。
其中 Startup. A Silicon Valley Adventure 這本書是由 GO Corp. 創辦人親自撰寫，講的是這間紅及一時的公司，由盛而衰最終失敗的歷史。GO Corp. 在 1987 年就提出了手持式平板電腦的願景，比 Apple 的 Newton 還早。只是中間經歷過大大小小的問題 (too early? poor execution? too much money? 看了才知道)，最後還是於 1994 年走上關門一途。有趣的是，John Doerr 也自嘲說這也是一本關於他投資失敗的故事。
谷歌霹靂火繼續上演。WSJ 提到 CEO Eric Schmidt 支持 Google 繼續留在中國市場，但 Sergey Brin 則是堅持不能繼續向中國妥協。(推測多少和他小時候生活在蘇聯的背景有關)。看到一位網友認為，Google 就是因為 “startup mentality”，才會做出這麼「幼稚」的決定。如果換成 IBM 或 Microsoft 等 “matured” 之流，一定會選擇在檯面下把事情橋定。
差在哪裡？Google 是一間屬於創辦人的公司。IBM 和 Microsoft 是一間屬於管理階層的公司。
好在我們還有一間市值超國 1800 億美金的幼稚公司，仍然保有 “startup mentality”。站在股東立場，我不贊同 Google 片面撤出中國市場。股東，就是要賺錢。但今天如果我是創辦人，我也會希望能 leverage 這個位置的力量，做一點除了賺錢之外，有理想的事。
■ Investment Case: In our view, Google is attempting to balance the business opportunity in China vs. its view on the larger issue of "freedom of speech" and appears willing to sacrifice the former for the latter on principle.
■ Catalysts: In the near term, a possible withdrawal from the China market would have a fairly negligible impact on Google’s financials. We estimate that GOOG has ~30% share in China and that China accounts for ~1.5% of Google’s revenues. However, in this scenario, the longer term risk is that Google cedes too much market share in China to competitors, which it may find difficult to recoup, thus limiting its long run opportunity in the high growth Chinese market, both in core search as well as mobile.
■ Valuation: While our target price is essentially in line with current trading levels, we believe our target price reflects the potential for near term weakness on the China news. However, we maintain our Outperform rating as we do not view Google’s exit from China as a fait d’accompli and believe there is room for GOOG to work out a mutually beneficial arrangement with the Chinese government given political sensitivities.
今早看到新聞，Google 表示為了人權和言論自由 (a.k.a. no more search results censoring / filtering)，「考慮」終止在中國的營運。「激活點」是上個月源自中國的駭客攻擊事件，駭客鎖定的目標又恰好是中國人權鬥士們的帳號。無獨有偶，美國其他大企業也遭到類似攻擊。
In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google.
…we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted.
…we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
每個人看待這件事的角度不同。人權對我來說還好，我更關心如果 Google 真的 shutdown 中國 office，會對投資人造成何種程度的信心衝擊，及其後對財報的影響。記得李開復老師在自傳中提到，2006 年創建 Google.cn，過了很長一段時間才損益兩平，在他離開前，已經開始獲利。照「只賺一點點錢」來看，如果結束中國營運，清算掉資產，說不定短期還能提高 EPS？不過長期來看，少了中國市場，總是醜事一樁。畢竟流失人才，鞏固 Baidu 獨大的局面，都不是 Google 願意面對的。
相信高盛的 James Mitchell 會在這兩天為我們帶來深入的 financial implication analysis。
ps. 這篇 PR 看起來也像是想藉由網路輿論，引發外界重視，來產生和中國談判的籌碼 (over the next few weeks)。時間點選得也不錯。保留空間讓 Nexus-one 新聞燒一陣子。
MIT Sloan 學院的學生前幾天揪團到 Seattle 和 Silicon Valley 的知名科技公司參訪，也為之後的 summer intern 做準備。有些公司熱情款待這些同學，有些則是撳撳蔡蔡。Microsoft 看來是有用心在款待這些 MBAs：
… it sounds like the Redmond company has MBA internship slots open in product planning and product management, in its Server and Tools division, and others. And it certainly knew how to put on a show for the visiting students. “Microsoft was super interesting,” Wepfer says. “They took us through their ‘home of the future.’” (One other perk: Bill Gates used to have a gathering at his house for all the summer interns; now Steve Ballmer does it.)
On the plus side, several students singled out Microsoft, saying it “works really hard” to sponsor international students [Visas]. (source)
我準備來好好研究 Goldman Sachs 的 corporate history。研讀的磚塊書叫做: The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs 。這類書籍的作者通常是記者或學者居多，遇到不用功的，怎麼看都不覺得有搔到癢處。好在本書作者 Charles D. Ellis 是位貨真價值的內線人事，他為 GS 提供顧問服務的資歷超過 30 年，也和歷代重要合夥人有不錯的交情。我想內容的 insight 應該是掛保證了，如果還能以中立的眼光來看待 GS 曾經做對和做錯的事，那就值得真情推薦。
我看書通常不喜歡先看書評，總覺得會減低閱讀樂趣。然而路過 NY Times 的 Sunday Book Review，還是給它喵了幾眼。我試著努力滑過 spoiler ，但其中這段讓我停了幾秒：
… as he explains in his preface, he started out believing that Goldman Sachs had become Wall Street’s strongest and most enduring player because it had a better way of doing things.
His mission: to figure out Goldman’s edge. Success, he concludes, started with hiring ambitious people from working-class backgrounds. If their parents were postal clerks or groundskeepers, they were likely to work relentlessly to secure a better life — and help Goldman amass profits in the process.(source)
高盛James Mitchell 燒燙燙的報告又出爐了。本回和同事 Robert Chen ( following HTC ) 討論後，認為 2010 全年 GOOG 能賣出 3 百 50 萬支 Nexus One，為營收帶來 9% 挹注， 0 – 2% EBIT 成長，但平均每支 Nexus One 和 HTC 拆帳後，恐怕只賺 55 元美金左右，大約是 10% 毛利率。所以跳進硬體遊戲，短期會衝擊到財報 margin。長期來看，則還是有助於 mobile ads/apps 策略布局。
VOLUME: We estimate Google may sell 3.5 mn Nexus Ones in 2010, based on first-year sales for other HTC Android models of 1.5-4.0 mn; we adjust up for Google’s brand and down for limited availability in retail outlets.
REVENUE: 3.5 mn units at $530 per unit add $1.9 bn, or 9%, to Google’s 2010 net revenue. Google will book the full unit sales price (including carrier subsidy on locked phones) to its “licensing and other” line item.
MARGIN: We estimate HTC’s component cost at $300 per unit, boosted by the OLED screen and CPU. We assume HTC bears warranty, after-sale service, & R&D expenses of $50, and retains a $75 profit. We estimate Google’s R&D & marketing expenses at $50 or more, for a margin to Google of up to $55 per unit, or up to 10%, and a boost to Google’s EBIT of up to $190 mn, or 0%-2%.
…like to talk about the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 model in which 1/3 of the investments are wipeouts, 1/3 return capital but are underperformers, and 1/3 are winners that produce all of the returns. When you have an investment flow dynamic where the early rounds require very small amounts of capital but the later rounds in the winners can require a lot of capital (which is very much the case in the internet/web sector), then it behooves you to make lots of small investments, see which ones become the big winners, and then go "all in" on the winners.
The challenge all of this presents is how a VC should allocate his/her time. You can spend the majority of time hunting for deals (planting seeds) or you can spend the majority of your time working with the portfolio companies (tending the crop). Not all of the portfolio companies need a VC’s help. Many entrepreneurs are highly self sufficient. That’s a good thing. But every entrepreneur can use some help now and then and some need a lot. And the best VCs make it a point to be there when the entrepreneur needs you. And that is time consuming. It’s very time consuming if you have ten or more portfolio companies and you make it a point to be a "valued added" VC. (source)
現在 Google Ads 在使用者心目中就是「有點干擾，又不會太干擾」的平衡狀態。所以動手安裝外掛的心理成本仍然高於維持現狀。
所以就如同原文結尾說的；
Extensions like his, he said, will make “every one else change their ways, to make ads more useful. Everyone wins, that’s competition. The ideal result would be to retire this extension because the entire Web was covered with ads that people loved and no one wanted to block them.”
又一次集中投資寡占避險的價值體現。你無法預測未來市場走向，但你知道 mobile ads will be the next big thing。那怎麼辦？只好把市場上可能的 player 都撿到籃子裡。不管他們怎麼戰，你只需要搬張折凳泡杯茶，好好欣賞台上的 M&A 戲碼，因為，不論結局如何，你都會是贏家。
昨天晚上 MSN 彈出一個提示視窗，說我收到一封 INSEAD Knowledge 的信，說真的，我還從來沒打開過這些高級學府寄來的「廣告信」。昨天大概是起了念，就決定開來看看。嗯，還不錯，這是篇類似電子報的信件，裡面收錄上一季 INSEAD Knowledge top 10 文章精選。這些文章都是由 INSEAD 的學者教授們發表。我點了其中一篇 “why MBAs should not sign the HBS oath”，講得是為了不要讓金童們再搞出一波金融海嘯，前陣子哈佛商學院發起了一個簽署運動，鼓吹優球全球頂尖 MBA 學生都要簽署這份「I’ll do no evil」誓言書。而 INSEAD 這位教授發表了一篇論述，站在反對立場。先講幾個發現這封信的感想：
1. 讓大學加入市場競爭機制果真是好事
2. 連 INSEAD 這種等級的學校都要發電子報來吸引一流學生了，台灣的頂尖學校在幹嘛
3. 教授沒有想像中那麼沒料，至少比成天「見微知著」的部落客好多了
The MBA Oath 原文如下
THE MBA OATH
As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing people and resources together to create value that no single individual can create alone. Therefore I will seek a course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over the long term.I recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that affect the well-being of individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in the future. As I reconcile the interests of different constituencies, I will face choices that are not easy for me and others.
Therefore I promise:
I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner.
I will safeguard the interests of my shareholders, co-workers, customers and the society in which we operate.
I will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.
I will understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own conduct and that of my enterprise.
I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will represent the performance and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly.
I will develop both myself and other managers under my supervision so that the profession continues to grow and contribute to the well-being of society.
I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental prosperity worldwide.
I will be accountable to my peers and they will be accountable to me for living by this oath.
This oath I make freely, and upon my honor.
INSEAD 教授 Theo Vermaelen 反對的立論有三點：
1. Some parts of the pledge are inconsistent with fiduciary duties and ethical standards.
2. The oath is a misplaced response to the financial crisis.
3. I don’t believe in pledges as an instrument to guide people’s behaviour.
In many countries, board members and, as a consequence, managers have a fiduciary duty to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Even in countries where the corporate governance code is promoting maximising stakeholder value, none of these codes would accept that managers promote “social and environmental prosperity worldwide” as the HBS oath does.
I believe it is unethical to raise money from shareholders without telling them in advance that you are going to pursue causes that are destroying shareholder value. If you want to pursue other objectives, then you should tell them in advance, so that investors can incorporate these goals into stock prices, or simply refuse to buy the company stock.
First, Rene Stulz and Rudiger Fahlenbrach (“Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis” working paper, Ohio State University, 2009) show that banks where the CEO held a lot of stock were also the banks with the biggest losses. So they were not losing other people’s money, they lost their own money. They apparently believed in their strategy.
People are not driven by pledges, but they are driven by incentives.
Signing the oath doesn’t cost anything and therefore not a credible commitment.
The current debate should focus on how to improve corporate governance and how to design compensation contracts that are maximising shareholder value, rather than profits, earnings per share, return on equity or other non risk-adjusted short-term measures of performance.
The HBS school oath aims to achieve exactly the opposite. It pushes the stakeholder value maximisation idea to its extreme by including the whole world as a stakeholder.
I would propose the following:
“I pledge to maximise the wealth of the people who pay my salary, i.e. the shareholders, unless the shareholders tell me in advance that they want me to do something else. I will do my best to learn how to do this by taking the relevant courses”
Fred Wilson 列出了 2010 他和 Union Square Ventures 的合夥人可能會投資的領域： mobile、gaming、commerce/currency、cloud platforms/APIs、eduction/energy/environment.
前天和朋友吃飯，我們也討論到各自看好的領域：mobile commerce、customized content distribution app。也覺得就 consumer Internet market 來說，台灣生態不適合開發 utility 類型的 web services / mobile apps，比較適合開發 content 層級的 application。
好在這個世界上有 broadband Inetnet + video streaming technology。當然，對我來說，沒有佳句摘要，就不算是吸收了一場完整的演講：
Announcer: …wealth is not about the money you amass, but the number of lives you enrich.
Gates: I was a huge beneficiary of this country’s unique willingness to take risk on a young person. And, you know, I got to hire people who were older. I got to sell to people who were older. And it was kind of a dream come true.
Buffett: Last September, only the government could have saved things. The whole world wanted to deleverage. And they were deleveraging under conditions of extreme haste and with guns to their head in some cases. And the only entity that could possibly leverage up at the same time that everybody else wanted to deleverage was the Federal government.
Gates: And business schools play a role in training people to think about value, leadership. There’s wonderful skills that are taught at great schools like this. And so the fact that, yes, we have had a crisis and we have dropped back, maybe we wasted two or three years net because of the things that were done wrong, that doesn’t say that business schools aren’t performing a great service, you know. The case studies of this crisis will be taught here for decades to come.
Buffett: The wonderful thing about it is in this country, is you can succeed magnificently with ethics. It’s not a hindrance. It’s a help sometimes.It’s a neutral sometimes. But it’s not a hindrance at all. And to cut corners, you know, everybody here has a wonderful future. I mean, this is an economy you’re going into that is so much — [APPLAUSE] If you look back on the 19th Century, we had seven great bank panics. If you look back at the 20th Century, we had the Great Depression and world wars and flu epidemics. This country doesn’t avoid problems. It just solves them. And in the next 100 years, our machine will sputter again, you know. Maybe 15 years will be so-so years, but there will be 85 great years. And during the 20th Century the Dow went from 66 to 11,400, so this is fertile soil that you’re working in and there’s no reasons to cut corners.
Buffett: I had a professor, Ben Graham, I offered to go to work for him for nothing. He said, "You’re overpriced." Nonetheless, I went into the business. [APPLAUSE] I will guarantee, you will do well at whatever turns you on.
Buffett: I don’t like to sound, you know, like a mortician during an epidemic or anything, but last fall was really quite exciting for me. [LAUGHTER] I don’t wish it on anybody, but there were things being offered. There are opportunities for us to do things that didn’t exist a year or two earlier. So I really don’t — I don’t want to be in a position where I am leveraged or something of the sort that does keep me up at night. I did not worry about the ultimate survival of our economic system. We were messed up. Wasn’t any question about that. But the plants haven’t gone away. The cornfields haven’t gone away. The talent of the American people hasn’t gone away. The innovativeness of the next Bill Gates hasn’t gone away. This country was going to do fine. I knew that. We just had to get things straightened out. And we’re well on the way to having that happen.
Buffett: …if you had a wonderful farm and you knew the next 50 years there would be five droughts but there would be 45 good years, I mean, you would not become paralyzed thinking about the five drought years. You would recognize that you’ve got a system that works very well over time, and that’s our American economic system.
Buffett: Let me give you an illustration. I bought my first stock in 1942. I was 11. I had been dillydallying up until then. I got serious. [LAUGHTER] What do you think the best year for the market has been since 1942? Best calendar year from 1942 to the present time. Well, there’s no reason for you to know the answer. The answer is 1954. In 1954, the Dow … dividends was up 50%. Now if you look at 1954, we were in a recession a good bit of that time. The recession started in July of ‘53. Unemployment peaked in September of ‘54. So until November of ‘54 you hadn’t seen an uptick in the employment figure. And the unemployment figure more than doubled during that period. It was the best year there was for the market. So it’s a terrible mistake to look at what’s going on in the economy today and then decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on it. You should decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on how much you’re getting for your money, long-term value you’re getting for your money at any given time. And next week doesn’t make any difference because next week, next week is going to be a week further away. And the important thing is to have the right long-term outlook, evaluate the businesses you are buying. And then a terrible market or a terrible economy is your friend. I don’t care, in making a purchase of the Burlington Northern, I don’t care whether next week, or next month or even next year there is a big revival in car loadings or any of that sort of thing. A period like this gives me a chance to do things. It’s silly to wait. I wrote an article. If you wait until you see the robin, spring will be over.
Buffett: [APPLAUSE] But let me add one point because — to the MBA situation. Right now, I would pay $100,000 for 10% of the future earnings of any of you. So anybody that wants to see me after this is over — [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] If that’s true, you are a million-dollar asset right now, right, if 10% of you is worth 100,000? You could improve — many of you, and I certainly could have when I got out, just in terms of learning communication skills. You know, it’s not something that is taught. I actually went to a Dale Carnegie course later on in terms of public speaking. But if you improve your value 50% by having better communication skills, that’s another $500,000 in terms of capital value. See me after the class and I’ll pay you 150-thousand. [APPLAUSE]
Gates: But I think I’d pick his desire to teach, his desire to teach things that are complex and put them in a simple form so that people can understand and get the benefit of all his experience, all his models of how the world works. He loves to teach. And he does it meeting with students. He does it in his annual newsletter. He does it when he’s talking to me on the phone. It’s a real gift that I admire incredibly.
Buffett: First of all, I’d say marry the right person. [LAUGHTER] And I’m serious about that. [APPLAUSE] It will make more difference in your life. It will change your aspiration, all kind of things. It’s enormously important who you marry.… And then also go to work, if possible, for an organization or an individual that you admire. I mean I offered to go to work for Ben Graham because there was nobody I admired more in the business than him. I didn’t care what he paid me. When he finally did hire me in 1954, I moved from Omaha to New York and I didn’t know what I was getting paid until I got my first paycheck. But I knew I wanted to work for Ben Graham. And I knew I would jump out of bed every morning and be excited about what I would do and I would go home at night smarter than I was in the morning. Go to work at a job that turns you on and a person that turns you on and institution. [APPLAUSE]
Buffett: The one thing I will tell you is the worst investment you can have is cash. Everybody is talking about cash being king and all that sort of thing. Most of you don’t look like you are overburdened with cash anyway. [LAUGHTER] Cash is going to become worth less over time. But good businesses are going to become worth more over time. And you don’t want to pay too much for them so you have to have some discipline about what you pay. But the thing to do is find a good business and stick with it.
Buffett: Don’t pass up something that’s attractive today because you think you will find something way more attractive tomorrow.
Buffett: But every year don’t measure it by the earnings in the quarter that year. Measure it by whether the moat around that business, what gives it competitive advantage over time has widened or narrowed. If you keep doing that for 100 years, it’s going to work out very well. Then I tell them basically if the reason for doing something is everybody else is doing it, it’s not good enough. If you have to use that as a reason, forget it. You don’t have a good reason for doing something. Never use that.
Buffett: It’s always interesting when Bill and I appear together, they don’t figure they can do what Bill does, but they know they can do what I do. [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] …
Buffett: And then basically I didn’t listen to anybody else. I just look in the mirror every morning and the mirror always agrees with me. And I go out and do what I believe I should be doing. And I’m not influenced by what other people think.
Gates: Well, we talked about some of the basics, having great people around you, reading a lot, thinking long-term. I also think, though, there become a few magic moments where you have to have confidence in yourself. You know, Warren when he set off on his own, he could have gone and taken a job as an analyst somewhere. But he knew that he had the skill, that he was going to raise money and have his own partnership. When I dropped out of Harvard and said to my friends, ‘Come work for me,’ there was a certain kind of brass self-confidence in that. You have a few moments like that where trusting yourself and saying yes, this can come together — you have to seize on those because not many come along.
Gates: Well, they [Google] have some of the same problems we had. [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] It’s another fine competitor. They are hiring a lot of smart people. They have gotten into the lead position in search, which is incredibly profitable to be number one in that. They may get a little competition as time goes forward. But they are a great example of what can happen, you know, two young guys who got together, pursued an idea and created a success that’s absolutely gigantic. And we all, you know, hopefully use search engines, maybe a variety. [LAUGHTER] And we benefit from that.
Buffett: … Well, that’s 50 years of preparation and five (minutes) of decision making. [APPLAUSE]
Morgan Stanley 在年終 publish 了 3 份 Mobile Internet 研究報告，一份厚達 424 頁，另一份厚達 659 頁，另外還有一份 104 頁的摘要。當看到這類型研究報告釋出時，要先戴上「本夢比」的 3D 眼鏡，才能通過「景深」，看出分析師喊多喊過頭的 bias。然而起初閱讀摘要前 1/3，發現只是拿既成事實來說嘴，有些失望，原本這篇 title 還是「令人失望的 Morgan Stanley Mobile Internet Report」。後來倒吃甘蔗，後半部圖表頗有代表性，也為我前陣子長線看好台灣電信三雄的推論背書。(電信三雄符合集中投資寡佔避險理論。)
