Timothy Chen

But Keynes was right too: ”Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.606

Stunning as it is that it took the firm’s management long decades to “get it” about investment management, GSAM’s history provides a crucial illustration of Goldman Sachs’s unrelenting “try and try and try again” approach to building each of it’s many enterprise businesses: Select one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. Point to a fair hill and say, “Congratulations! You are the Chosen One who can find a way to capture that hill. It will be hard – maybe very hard – but the firm expects great things of you. We know you can do it. Now, get going and… take… that… hill!” When success is achieved, congratulations are given to the successful young stars – and so is another, even more challenging hill. If success is not achieved, the firm selects another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. If success is again not achieved, the firm simply selects yet another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising young stars to take the hill. Eventually, the hill gets taken.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.622

One of Paulson’s great advantages in life is that he is always learning – partly through continuous observation of others, partly because he takes criticism easily with no defenses or resistance, and never personally. A weakness is that he is almost oblivious to office politics and for years had to fight the urge to speak his mind immediately, without caution or consideration.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.643

Paulson was a serious student of leaders, seeking to understand why some were so much more effective than others: “The more I observed the most effective leaders, the more I became convinced that the key is to have the right people in your own organization working for you and with you.” Within Goldman Sachs, he soon earned a reputation for having the best people working with him to serve his clients, and for identifying outstanding talent early.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.644

The concept of leadership at Goldman Sachs has changed completely over the past fifty years. Sidney Weinberg was a leader, but in many ways his firm was a proprietorship. While Gus Levy insistently expected many people to do all they could do to build the business, there was no question that he was the leader – in overall pace and direction and on dozens of transactions every day. Whitehead and Weinberg pushed decision responsibility and accountability out to the unit heads. Rubin and Freidman matched even more widely distributed authority and responsibility with centralized accountability to the management committee. Paulson continued the multiplication of decision-making leaders and increased the coordination of operating units through centralized disciplines: risk controls, business planning, and performance measurement at increasing numbers of smaller and smaller, more agile units that were closer to particular markets.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.648

As Bob Steel explains, “First-person singular is only used to describe a mistake, not an accomplishment. It may sound silly but little things like that are quite significant. I’ve never heard a boss at Goldman Sachs say, ‘I just did this.’ If I ever did, I’d be embarrassed.”

Paulson remembers getting his first Goldman Sachs memo back from Jim Gorter. “Good memo!” was written at the top – and every “I” was crossed out in favor of “we.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.659

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2. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part II
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4. The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs
5. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Introduction

There are only four ways to gain and keep a significant competitive advantage: more effective recruiting, a stronger culture, a better strategy, and greater intensity of commitment.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.554

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, few Wall Street firms interviewed MBAs, so Goldman Sachs had little direct competition. Determined to develop intense commitment within the Goldman Sachs system, Whitehead recruited “intensity” people who gave out clear signs of hungering for achievement. Selection was to be based on three equally weighted criteria: one-third on intelligence as measured by grades and SAT scores, one-third on leadership as shown by roles in extracurricular organizations, and one-third on ambition to achieve.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558

On purpose, the firm’s offer was – in  comparison to today’s $150,000-plus offers – stunningly small at $3,600, even if adjusted for inflation. Whitehead was determined never to pay more than other companies and preferred to be known to pay less, because if the firm could get the best for less, that sent a message that there must be something special about Goldman Sachs.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558

Goldman Sachs doesn’t look for top-quartile –- or even top-decile –  MBAs. Convinced that over the long term there is inevitably a major difference between the top 5 percent and the second 5 percent, the firm focuses on recruiting the very best young professionals, selecting carefully for such characteristics as leadership, drive, and appetite for hard work. Starting with the 5 percent most qualified and capable, the firm proceeds to sort out the most effective team-playing contributors – initially through fifteen to thirty interviews and then through actual work experience and direct observation to find the very best 1 or 2 percent.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.559

Always stressing the long-term opportunity of a career with Goldman Sachs, the firm wanted recruits to weigh other factors, believing that those who accept jobs because of salary were more inclined to leave later for a higher offer from somewhere else. The worst thing the firm could do was hire someone, train him for a few years, and then have him go elsewhere for more money.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.561

As J.P. Morgan famously observed, “A man always has two reasons for doing anything thing: a good reason and a real reason.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.577

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2. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs VIII
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4. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part II
5. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs VII

Risk arbitrage is based on the simple idea that if there are two market prices for the same thing or two equivalent things, they will converge at some points as though pulled together by a rubber band. Arbitrageurs take disciplined actions to create profits by capturing differences in prices for the same item in different markets or of different but interchangeable items in the same market. The price differences they exploit are caused by market inefficiencies or mistakes caused by imbalances of supply and demand due to differences between uncertainty and risk, which differ in ways only experts usually care about. Arbitrageurs increase market efficiency and – indirectly and unintentionally, as Adam Smith famously explained in The Wealth of Nations – they increase the consistency and fairness of markets and therefore the confidence investors have in markets; that helps improve overall economic performance. Arbitrageurs are working in free, competitive markets that are open to everyone, so to earn profits they need to see what others do not see, to see more clearly than others do, or to take actions others would not have considered.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.464

Insurance companies earn profits by making a market between an individual’s uncertainty and a population’s true risk.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.465

Three factors are crucial for success in arbitrage: extraordinary, unemotional rationality or objectivity in all decisions and actions; superior access to information; and the ability to understand that information and the ability to think unconventionally and rigorously about it.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.466

The facts are king. You always start with the facts – all the facts you can possibly get – and then you develop a logical line of reasoning or argument, and then – and only then – do you develop a opinion. Opinions always come last. Facts, analysis, and logic matter. Ego has no role in analysis or in developing an opinion. Age and experience do not matter – once you’re on the team.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.475

Fife explains, “Leaders should always set the bar high – very high – and then find the way to meet that standard. Trust and consistent execution make you the preferred supplier. Any compromise on standards, and you’re sowing the seeds of your own destruction.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.516

“I learned a long time ago that when somebody spits in your face, if you’re really any good, you do three things: One, declare it must have been a rain drop. Two, wipe it off. And three, renew your determination and commitment.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.530

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3. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part IV
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5. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part III

The CFO of Vickers told a partner, “If a British merchant banker were up all night working to complete a transaction, he would never tell anyone for fear he would look inadequately skillful. But if an American pulled an all-nighter, he would make certain to tell me – as proof of his commitment.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344

Thornton explains:”In a situation like this, at the very beginning, you, as an individual, are the ‘brand’.” You have nothing to carry you and nothing to fall back on. Going from an initial meeting and general discussion to specific, nuanced advice that is listened to and accepted is a transformation that’s completely dependent on you – what you say and do, how you develop each relationship, how you build up the prospect’s confidence – not just in your firm, not just in your advice, but in you. And that confidence has to be strong enough to prevail against the tide of general opinion and natural resistance to change, which is particularly strong in major financial transactions.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344

 

By not taking credit, you become more effective. If you do right by people, they win and you win. Frank, always go out of your way to share credit.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378

When Brosens had first been put in charge of arbitrage, he had one exciting talent in the division – Eric Mindich, a man in his early twenties whom he wanted to put in charge of risk arbitrage for the firm’s own account. Silfen and Zuckerberg wondered about assigning so much responsibility to such a young star. “Last year was a tough year in arbitrage. Shouldn’t you focus more on this area yourself?”

 

“I believe with a hundred percent of his time, he can do better than I can do with forty percent of my time.”

 

Rubin joined in: “Age is irrelevant. By expending his responsibilities now, you may keep a real star that you might otherwise lose.”

 

Mindich soon became the youngest-ever partner of Goldman Sachs, at age twenty-seven.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378

Rubin and Friedman were right about the risk that being wisely conservative can deteriorate into defensive caution and about the importance of the firm’s becoming more aggressive. John Whitehead had seen it, and it was an important factor in his decision to retire. But the obvious irony was that the cautious, conservative style Rubin and Friedman found so constraining had been at the core of the strong, team-centered culture, the reputation of integrity at every level, the consistent service to corporate and institutional clients, the strong earnings and solid financials, the persistent and skillful recruiting, the superior management, and the consistently disciplined execution upon which their more aggressive business strategies could now build.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.381

“What’s so fair about keeping tired older partners when that means blocking the best young people and violating our commitment to meritocracy?”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.385

“It’s harder to get a good idea accepted than it is to get a good idea.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.392

The problem Cooperman faced – in addition to the constrains imposed by the firm – was that while long-term investing is in theory what mutual-fund is all about, in practice, short-term performance dominates mutual-fund sales, particularly for organizations that are new to the business.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.429

 

… the real test of a risk-control system would be that it caught not only what you would not expect, but also what you would have thought not possible.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.460

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4. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs VIII
5. 本日佳句 - The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part VI

While some other banking firms tried to manage and control with top-down rules, a rules-based management couldn’t possibly keep up with the speed of change in the securities business and couldn’t penetrate the complexities of many different lines of business in many different markets to address specific situations where value-based decisions might be needed. With a principles-base management, responsibility for decisions is pushed down to the men and women on the firing line. Since they know the concepts of the Principles and they know the detailed realities of their specific business, they can be held accountable for knowing and doing the right things in the right way.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.188

“Assuring professional ethics are really lived by is a bit like being a zoo-keeper,” says partner Roy Smith. “You need lions and tigers to have a really good zoo, but you must keep them under control – or reasonably so.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.197

“The two Johns saw nothing at all wrong with people working very hard and carrying a heavy load," recalls partner Roy Smith. “They were convinced it was better for you to carry more work responsibility – perhaps half again more than you normal capacity – because that meant you accumulated more experience and you would learn more and know more. You’d advance up the learning curve more swiftly and get to a higher level of performance.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.202

Each Analyst was expected and challenged to be an entrepreneur. For example, Joe Ellis made himself the leading retailing analyst on Wall Street. “We began the idea of conducting field trips for institutional analysts to visit retailers back in 1984,” recalls Ellis. ”Now other firms do similar things.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.289

The Analyst’s job is hard and requires many different skills. As Ellis says, “ You have to be very good on financial analysis and on interviewing and on business judgment and market judgment and able to work effectively with institutional investors and the sales force and with corporate executives and investment bankers. It’s complicated. And it’s very hard to serve all of them really well.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.291

Weinberg never took himself too seriously. “The boss needs to lose arguments – not all arguments, but enough to keep everybody honest and responsible for clear thinking. You can’t micromanage this business from headquarters.” About innovative ideas, of which there are great many, he tended to be conservative. But if the young bucks were pressing hard, he liked to give way, saying, “I’m just an old guy, so I don’t know all the ins and outs if this new stuff, so if you’re sure it’s right, let’s go!” He could then observing with a knowing smile, “I can’t lose now, If I was right, they’ll soon be saying, ‘Jesus, maybe the old guy knows the score,’ and if they are right, they’ll feel really good about themselves – and will work even harder.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.301

Weinberg kept a plaque inherited from his father that enumerated the many setbacks suffered by Abraham Lincoln on his way to becoming a great president, with the message that enormous success does not come without setbacks.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.303

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2. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs VII
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5. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part II

With Whitehead’s persistent and cautious “prune losers, feed winners” style of management, the whole IBS [Investment Banking Service] organization became constructively infected with commitment: first to specific actions and transactions and later to an overall strategy – and eventually to a firmwide culture and x commitment to a new, organized way of doing business.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.161

As George Doty observed: “Goldman Sachs’s new business development organization was by no means an overnight success. For several years, it was a money loser. That’s one of the main reasons other firms did not duplicate it. Who wants to duplicate an experiment that is a radical departure from the tried and proven, and doesn’t seem to be working all that well?” It would take ten years and several false starts before Whitehead’s innovation worked out.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.163

Whitehead’s IBS organizational structure also made it possible for Goldman Sachs to follow a low-risk and high-impact “fast follower” strategy on new products and services. Let other firms be first with new ideas, absorbing the costs and pains of being on the “bleeding edge” of innovation. Study what worked and improve it if possible, sort quickly through more than a thousand client relationships to select the most likely prospects for the new services; then, using IBS as the delivery system, take the transaction specialist to all the most promising prospects; and finally, by outselling the innovating competitor, come from behind quickly to do the most business and become the recognized experts in the new service.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.175

In sustained pursuit of his strategic goals, Whitehead combined disciplined planning with reserved affability. He was quite unconcerned about being demanding of others. Smoothly rational rather than emotional, he never fraternized with the troops or had pals within the firm. Respected, but not loved or even particularly well liked, and often considered aloof from the others, who regularly socialized together, Whitehead was called, behind his back, the great white shark. He never cajoled or coddled and could be hard on investment bankers who sought praise or had a high need of ego celebration. Whitehead calmly obliged conformance in large matters and small.

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.179

Whitehead not only designed and staffed his productive organization, he made it work, saying to one banker after another, “You can do it,” and always clearly implying, “and if I hold you to it, you will do it.” “John was almost regal in the way he acted,” says Smith. “I never met anyone else like that in my life. It’s really quite amazing. He tells you exactly what he wants you to do; gives you the clear understanding you have no alternative and must do it; then proceeds to encourage you to believe you might very well be able to do it; and then continues on to give you the feeling you might even enjoy doing it, particularly if you commit your every effort to be sure you’ll succeed.”

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180

If Goldman Sachs wanted to get into a business, it preferred to give the challenge to some of its own most promising young people. “When, as we rarely did, we decided to go outside the firm for talent, we avoided hiring whole groups or teams. Instead, we would identify the very best people, get to know them well, and bring them over individually. These new individuals would learn the Goldman Sachs culture and either blend into the firm or they would not make it at Goldman Sachs. We always tried to be creative with the new techniques and new financial products, but I never thought we had to be first with everything. I was perfectly happy to have another firm be first with a new idea because I was confident that with our superior marketing organization, we would improve the product and then achieve dominance through distribution, while those other firms put their reputation at risk if it didn’t work. We control our growth rather tightly so things don’t get away from us.”

 

- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180

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5. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part IV

Weinberg’s stated secret of success: “Love of hard work, no fear of tackling anything – and like every minute of if.” He didn’t mention intimidation, but others certainly would.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 33

Since most of the people working at Goldman Sachs had no family wealth, they knew they’d have to work hard to make it, and as outsiders they had little to lose by taking risks or being “different”.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 77

 

When it became time in 1969 for Weinberg to turn over operations to a successor, Levy had to be made managing partner of Goldman Sachs. As the major rainmaker who commanded great personal loyalty within the firm, he was the obvious choice as the firm’s leader for a simple, compelling reason: He was already leading.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 79

 

… There was no idle chatter with Gus, ever. “ When he asked questions, Levy wanted answers that were short, direct, and specific. He abhorred ambivalence and uncertainty. When one of his colleagues offered tentatively, “We may be able to do something that may help,” Levy cut him off: “May is just a month between April and June. It has no place here at Goldman Sachs.”

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 81

Leadership authority and power in Goldman Sachs, as in all Wall Street firms, has to be earned over and over again every time the leader gets challenged – just as a male lion has to keep defending his pride of lionesses.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 95

Menshel hired salesmen carefully. His screening criteria were always the same: Candidates had to be very presentable and very bright. If a candidate made it past the first round, judgments centered on one key driver: How hungry was he, how much did he need to succeed? Having some family money –- in the sixties, still the first screening criterion at most firms – was not a positive at all: It was a real negative. Menshel wanted driven people, because he wanted a driven sales organization that would accept his strict discipline.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 123

Speaking of Levy, Young, and their sales team, Al Feld says, “They weren’t gods; they were only human. But when push came to shove, they were always do what was really right.” Leaders are known by two things: the people they hire and bring together and the beliefs they hold to when they really have to choose. You only know what a person really believes in when he chooses to do something even though it costs him –- because he really believes it’s the right thing to do.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 124

 

“In evaluating leaders,” says Dick Menshel, “the central question has to be ‘Who made a difference?’ and on the criterion, Gus Levy stands out as a real innovator in developing the business of block trading.” Levy and his key lieutenants had that unstoppable drive to build a major, very profitable business, and they build the organization that would do it.

 

- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 144

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5. 本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part II

本週 MBA Monday Series，Fred Wilson 為我們解釋了「貨幣的時間價值 (the time value of money，)」，以及折現率還有利率 (discount rate / interest rate) 的組成。貨幣的時間價值可以說是所有財務學的基本觀念，任何人將這個觀念融入任督二脈後，對機會成本、沉沒成本的認知會有更深刻的體驗。修煉完成後，世界觀也會隨之改變。

首先我們要知道一個基本觀念：金錢的價值會隨著時間遞減。怎麼說呢？我問你，現在有兩個選擇，一個是我馬上給你一張 $1000 元大鈔，另一個選擇是 3 個月後，再給你這張 $1000 大鈔，請問你會選擇哪一個？很明顯，肯定是前者。

而利率，或是折現率，就是用來評估「現在」的錢，到底比「未來」的錢多了多少價值？再來一個例子。選項 1：我承諾一年後的今天，給你 $1000 元；選項 2：你可以當下就把錢拿走，條件是，要少拿 $100 元，也就是說，只能拿走 $900 元。你若是選擇後者，就代表接受了 11.1% 的折現率。

那麼，折現率 11.1% 是如何算出來的呢？

1) 將期末與期初金額相減，本例中，就是 $1000 – $900 = $100

2) 把相減得出的金額除以現在拿能拿走的金額，本例中，就是 $100 / $900 = 11.1%

反過來說，如果我今天「借」你 $900 元，而且你同意一年後償還我 $1000 元，這一來一往的年利息就是 $100，年利率就是 11.1%。( $900 * 11.1% = $100 )。也就是說，折現率和利率本質上是一樣的東西，只是計算方向恰好相反。

既然我們說折現率或利率可以拿來衡量金錢的時間價值，折現率或利率越高，當下手頭上握有的現金就越有價值，同理，隨著時間拉長，這筆現金的價值就會遞減。

有很多理由可以說明為什麼金錢的價值會隨著時間遞減，以下說明兩個最重要因素：

1) 通貨膨脹：用一句話來說，通膨就是「價格漲幅超越應有的漲幅」，造成超漲的因素也很多，但通常是市場上流動的資金供過於求。通膨會導致你手上握有的現金價值減少：如果你想買的房子今年報價一千萬元，明年預期報價一千兩百萬元，也就是說，年通膨率 20%。假設你一年來不吃不喝，也不領薪水，理論上，你的總財富和去年相比不變，但無形中，總財富的現金價值變少了，換個角度來看，就是你變窮了。所以你必須想辦法在今年多賺 20%，或從事 20% 年利率的投資。才能維持等同於去年的購買力。

2) 風險：你可以接受銀行給你的定存年利率 2%，但一樣的錢，投資到朋友新創立的公司，你還能接受 2% 的年報酬率嗎？恐怕不行，你應該會要求 100%，甚至更高的投資報酬率。為什麼？差異就在於「風險」的大小。你知道存在銀行的錢一定拿得回來 (如果銀行有投保)，但不確定投入朋友新公司的錢是否有辦法回收，這種不確定性，就是「風險」。

透過以上因素，我們可以來拆解利率的組成：

我們假設一年到期的美國國庫券利率為 3%，由於債券發行者為美國政府，在一般情況下倒債違約的機率微乎其微，因此我們可以把 3% 的年利率看作是「無風險利率 (Risk Free Interest Rate)」。

現在再把通貨膨脹率納入考量，假設消費者物價指數 (CPI) 一年後上升 2.5%，我們可以說年通膨率為 2.5%。實際上通膨率的計算沒這麼簡單，但由於房地產租賃市場大多以 CPI 作為指標，這邊我們也以此作為計算標準。如果你把無風險利率減掉通膨率，可以得到所謂的「實質利率 (Real Interest Rate)」，本例中，就是 0.5% (3% – 2.5%)。我們偶爾也把這 3% 稱作「名目利率 (Nominal Rate)」。

接著再把風險納入考量。假設你能找到一張市價 $900，一年後到期，屆時發行人將以 $1000 買回的債券。從最早的例子可知，這張債券目前是以 11.1% 的折現率在市場上交易。現在我們把折現率減去無風險利率 (11.1% – 3%)，就會得到 8.1% 的「風險溢酬 (Risk Premium)」。也就是說，相較於把錢拿去買最安全的國庫券，輕鬆賺取 3% 利率，市場上的投資人預期這張債券應該要產生額外 8.1% 的投資報酬率，來抵銷買了這張債券後，所需額外承擔的風險。

到了這邊，你能看出利率或是折現率是由哪些成份組成了嗎？綜合前兩段，我們可求出利率或是折現率是由「實質無風險利率」加上「通膨率」加上「風險溢酬」組成，也就是 11.1% = 0.5% + 2.5% + 8.1%。

從上例可以知道，銀行或政府都無法單方面決定折現率或利率。當然銀行和政府還是能發揮部份影響力。但終究來說，折現率與利率，是你、是我，是市場上的短期投機者、長期投資人的「共識」。「市場先生」不斷問大家以下兩個問題：你願意接受多少折現率來換取當下擁有現金的保障呢？你願意接受多少利息來換取等待兌現的時間成本呢？把所有人的答案和行動加總起來，就是市場力量，而折現率和利率，就是由「市場」來決定的。

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The Startup Visa Act of 2010 would create a two year visa for immigrant entrepreneurs who are able to raise a minimum of $250,000, with $100,000 coming from a qualified U.S. angel or venture investor. After two years, if the immigrant entrepreneur is able to create five or more jobs (not including their children or spouse), attract an additional $1 million in investment, or produce $1 million in revenues, he or she will become a legal resident. (source)

美國民主黨國會議員 John Kerry 以及共和黨國會議員 Richard Lugar 日前提出一個新的移民創業法案：1) 找到至少 $250,000 美元資金挹注，其中 $100,000 美元來自美國天使投資人或創投，就能申請 2 年期限的居留 Visa。2) 兩年後，如果這名海外創業家能至少創造 5 個工作機會 (不含小孩與配偶)，並且 a) 獲得額外一百萬美金資本挹注，或 b) 公司營收達一百萬美金，就能成為美國公民。

這種法案就是美國能持續吸引人才的原因啊。

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阿四，我記得你以前跟我說過，每天晚上只要一閉上眼，夢到的全是阿純，我閉上眼，是中國的明天。

昨天和同事聊到十月圍城，我說，最讓我感動的，就是上頭這段對話。對我來說，理想、堅持、犧牲，還有改變世界的格局，是有能之士存在的理由。

也許有人會說：陳少白這個角色很不負責任，真自私，文人專送別人去慷慨赴義。我則要說，歧視文人，才是現代社會最大的問題。追求實際，取笑理想，也是現代社會之所以平凡人充斥的原因。在太平盛事大家講求什麼？講求生活 (請稍歇會兒，跟著 Steve Jobs 一起歌頌 life style)、講求享樂，而給你們生活，給你們享樂的，就是商人。也就是說，現代社會講求重商主義，士農工商，很遺憾，請反過來寫。平民百姓的認知中，現代文人若不是窩在學校教書，就是在淌在政治圈裡搞利益輸送。前者是不經世事的井底之蛙，後者是掠奪民脂民膏的米蟲。

但，就算有一鍋老鼠屎，也無法抹滅一粒米的存在。想想一百年前，若沒有文人散布思想，起身號招，很多事情永遠不會有人去做。平凡百姓會繼續活在「夠好」的生活型態。而當革命已成歷史教材，壓力退去，文人也退縮了。時至今日，已沒有太多文人想改變世界。畢竟大平盛事，文人沒有舞台，沒有苦難百姓需要拯救。

若要替文人論斤兩，我們先捫心自問：這個世界，到底是 thinker 重要，還是 doer 重要？

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There is a big hurdle here that Steve Jobs has not faced even with his other successes, which is this is the first time he is going to have to make a market for a size and type of product that has simply not existed or not succeeded before.

 

- Walt Mossberg

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前微軟 VP Dick Brass 投了一篇專欄到 NY Times，強調微軟不夠創新，而且根源是 internal competition。先不論這個原因，至少我覺得 internal competition 是每間成熟的大公司都會有的問題。倒是被 Dick Brass 點名「不創新」的例子： music, e-books, phone, online, search, tablet, clear type font, etc.，喚起了我心中醞釀已久的想法，而這想法，在微軟阿宅的噗中出現：

大家覺得 IBM、Oracle 創新嗎？不少人心目中對「創新」的認知，侷限在消費性電子科技領域、或是外觀、互動方式等「看得到、摸得到」的介面創新；但在企業 IT 領域，還是有很多創新，是一般大眾沒興趣，或是不瞭解的 (所以記者也不愛寫)。久而久之，一些大公司就給人 LKK 的觀感了…

微軟並非不創新，只是它正在 enterprise software 和 consumer application 的路上迂迴前進。而合作夥伴生態、過去歷史包袱，以及投資人的壓力 (請準時交出短期成績單)，讓它的推進路線，更偏向 enterprise 一點。

enterprise software 這條路，本來就難走，寫熱門報導給大眾看的記者與部落客不懂此領域；懂此領域的記者縱使寫出精闢好文，刊載其報導的媒體又只有少數圈內人關心。微軟沒錯、Dick Brass 沒錯 、記者沒錯、媒體沒錯、一般大眾沒錯，錯的只是我們對微軟不正確的期望，以及人類容易受到膚淺事物刺激的天性。(可能要問問腦科學先生，人類大腦理解創新的部位，和狗狗大腦理解骨頭好吃的部位，是不是在同一個位置。)

說得含蓄點，就是大眾只對「貼近自己」、「容易理解」的創新有感覺，有反應，有記憶。至於讓 fortune 500 企業 LOB 效率增加 75% 的創新？讓 fortune 500 企業 IT 總支出減少 75% 的創新？省省吧，大眾沒興趣，別期望這些創新會有 pop momentum。

你不會因為 Apple 遲遲無法開發出適合企業使用的 mail server 就罵它不創新，不會因為 Google 遲遲尚未進軍 ERP 市場就罵它不創新。所以拿 lack of consumer technology innovation 來 challenge 當前將經營重心放在 enterprise technology innovation 的公司，有失公允。如果你是見識的菁英，如果你是有見識的記者，你會如何看待？

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I was taught, and I believe with all my head and heart, that companies are worth the "present value" of "future cash flows.

Fred Wilson 開了一個 MBA Mondays Series。內容淺顯易懂，適合一般父老鄉親，如此棒的內容，就順手給它翻譯分享。第一章：valuation 的觀念。假如我打算買下隔壁公寓，並把房子租出去。我知道出租的行情為 $1000/month，每個月的維護成本為 $200/month，則能產生的現金流為 $800/month。一年下來，我能收到 $9,600 ($800 * 12)。如果我期望的投資報酬率為 10%，那麼，我應該花多少錢買下隔壁公寓，才能獲得理想中的 10% 年報酬率呢？答案是 $96,000。很簡單吧，我在年初投入 $96,000現 金，在年末共收到 $9,600 的現金，這不就是 10% 投資報酬率嗎？所以如果把這間公寓當成投資標的，此標合理的買價是 $96,000，也就是說，我能給它 $96,000 的 valuation。

當然，這是為了介紹觀念，而極度簡化的範例，在現實世界的企業現值評估中，還有許多外部因素，例如企業每個月能產生的現金流量都會變化，對於折現率過度樂觀或悲觀的預估，也會影響到現值計算結果。

總結來說，我覺得有個基本觀念，是長線投資人都該具備的：「現在」你願意付出多少，換來這個投資標的「未來」能產生的現金流總和？

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查詢「折現」的相關資料時，發現相對於基於理性假設的 exponential discounting，還有一個摻入行為因素的 hyperbolic discounting 理論：

Given two similar rewards humans show a preference for one that arrives sooner rather than later. Humans are said to discount the value of the later reward, by a factor that increases with the length of the delay. In behavioral economics, hyperbolic discounting is a particular mathematical model thought to approximate this discounting process; that is, it models how humans actually make such valuations. Hyperbolic discounting is sharply different in form than exponential discounting, a rational function used in finance used in the analysis of choice over time. Hyperbolic discounting has been observed in humans and animals. (source)

人在市場中的行為有時候相當地動物本能。

In hyperbolic discounting, valuations fall very rapidly for small delay periods, but then fall slowly for longer delay periods. This contrasts with exponential discounting, in which valuation falls by a constant factor per unit delay, regardless of the total length of the delay. The standard experiment used to reveal a test subject’s discounting curve is to ask: "Would you prefer A today or B tomorrow?" and then, "Would you prefer A or B in one year, or in one year and one day?" (source)

A subject using hyperbolic discounting reveal a strong tendency to make choices that are inconsistent over time. In other words, they make choices today that their future self would prefer not to make, despite using the same reasoning. This dynamic inconsistency^[2] happens because hyperbolic discounts value future rewards much more than exponential discounting. (source)

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The Lehmans liked to described themselves as merchants of money, intermediaries between men who wanted to produce goods and men looking for something to do with their surplus funds.

 

- Charles Ellis, The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.18

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