Investment is the noblest activity for an ideal manPosts RSS
Posted in Investment on Mar 9th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
到頭來，我有些質疑技術分析以及基本面分析的可靠度。技術分析的立論基礎，在於對過去資訊的解讀，相信歷史終將重演。基本面分析的立論基礎，則是基於對當下資訊的解讀，同時基於對未來資訊 (營收) 的預測 (DCF-based intrinsic value calculation)。多數情況下，基本面分析也需要參考過去歷史資訊，從過去績效預測未來績效。
兩者的相同之處在於「預測」這個動作。差別只在技術分析的信徒看起來像是拿者星座圖 (K 線圖) 唬爛的占星術士；基本面分析的信徒 (a la 華爾街分析師) 則想盡辦法讓自己看起來像是包裝在數字、模型、還有西裝之下的衣冠…專家。
預測之於機率遊戲，贏家都是事後定論。但我沒有其他更好的選擇了。
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Posted in Investment on Mar 8th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
主要理由是 1) Display Ads (DoubleClick Ad Exchange) 與 2) Nexus One 能為 1Q 2010 帶來 2% 的 QoQ 成長。
另外分析師 James Mitchell 也提到，比起 Desktop Search，Display Ads、Nexus Phone、Mobile Search 的毛利較低。如果想維持 GOOG 股價成長，短期來說，營收成長比維持毛利率重要，長期來說，跨足 Desktop Search 以外的搜市場也比維持毛利率重要。
之前稍微瞭解到過去一二十年 IBD 與 Research 的利益衝突問題，所以看到後來心血來潮，乾脆把投資報告拉到最後的 disclosures 章節， 瞧瞧高盛和 GOOG 是否也有 IB 業務的往來。答案是：
投資銀行往往為了維護 IB 客戶關係，而傾向於給予 IB 客戶較佳的投資評等。就台灣市場來看，我們常說外資出的報告擺明就是請散戶幫忙抬轎，而比較少提到外資和本土企業之間的 IB 關係。我想這應該是個不錯的研究課題。
其實現在投銀內部都會築起一道 “Chinese Wall”，隔絕 corporate client department 和 investor client department 之間的訊息流通。經歷了半世紀的 IPO bubble，大多投銀也明文規範 IB 部門的營收，不得拿來 sponsor research 部門的 compensation。但檯面下如何運作，咱們就不得而之了。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Mar 7th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
The greatest of all gifts is the power to estimate things at their true worth.
- La Rochefoucauld, Reflexions; ou sentences et maximes morales
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Posted in Investment on Mar 4th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
上回我們提到現金的時間價值，並瞭解到利率可以被拆解成實質利率、通膨率、與風險溢酬的總和。而本週 (好吧，其實是數週前…) 的 MBA Monday Series，我們來看「複利」在貨幣的時間價值中，所扮演的角色。
同樣舉上週的例子說明，如果小明投資 $900 元，年利率 11.1%，一年後可以連本帶利拿回 $1,000 元。假設小明想繼續投資，這時，會有兩種情況：
第一種情況，小明每年領出利息，入袋為安。本例中，假設經過了 5 年，每年都把 $100 元利息領出來包紅包，5 年後，小明連本帶利共得到了 $1,400 元。 ( $900 + $100 * 5 )
第二種情況，一樣經過 5 年，但小明把利息留著繼續投資，猜猜 5 年後，原本 $900 元的資本變成多少？答案是 $1,524 元。較第一種情況多了 $124 元。
此時，請特別注意，這兩種投資情境的年報酬率，都是 11.1% 。上面兩種情況的計算過程，可參考這份試算表。
看到這邊，應該也能馬上想起來，啊，第一種情境講的情況就等同於「單利，第二種情境講的就是「複利」。在情境一中，銀行仍可能是採用複利計息，只是「每年把利息抽出」，這樣的行為，所獲得的結果，和單利記息是一樣的。接下來再透過一個例子讓大家見識「複利」的威力。來看看如果把投資時間拉長，會變怎麼樣。
假設小明大學畢業後，把前 4 年辛苦打工賺來的 $100,000 元存入年利率 11.1% 的帳戶，如果採用情境一的方法，也就是每年把利息領出來，不繼續投資，則 45 年後，等小明退休時，這 $100,000 元將變成 $599,550 元。
如果小明心念一轉，把每年的利息都留在帳戶中再投資，那麼，45 年後，原先的 $100,000 元本金會變成多少呢？答案是 $11,400,000。是的，一千一百四十萬圓整。由此可見，時間是投資人的好朋友，時間會對複利造成很大的影響。本例詳細計算方式，請參考這份試算表。
現在讓我們回頭來看創投產業。一般來說，創投資本的投資期間約為 7 – 8 年。而資金在這段期間並不會滋生利息，因此，必須將初期投入資金採等同於「複利」的方式來計算投資報酬率。
從上述小明的例子可以得知，在一樣的年利率條件下。如果每年領走利息，45 年後連本帶利可得到的現金，是原資本的 6 倍。如果不領走利息，則 45 年後可獲得的現金，是原資本的 114 倍。
在風險創投的領域中，投資期間不至於到 45 年這麼誇張，一般來說，標的持有期間約 7 – 8 年，雖然短了些，但也足以產生夠大的複利效應。此外，大部分創投業者會希望投資組合能有個 40% –50% 的年報酬率才像話，若考量到風險，則相對要求的投資報酬率會更高。
假設你投資 $100,000 元在一間新公司，目標是 8 年後，得到 50% 的年複合報酬率，則在期末，你必須要能收回 $2,562,000 元，也就是投入資本的 25.6 倍，才能達成目標。詳細計算過程，請參考這份試算表。
聽起來似乎很難，然而事實上，大部份的風險創投不會第一年就把所有資本投入，而是採取逐期分批投資的策略，所以晚期投入的資金相對「滾」出來的複利就會比較少，也讓同樣報酬率的達成門檻降低。
從上例瞭解到複利在貨幣的時間價值中所扮演的角色後，我們學到兩件事：首先，身為一個投資人，應該盡量將利息再投資，而不是每回利息一發放，就急著領出來變現。再來，身為一個創業家，應該謹慎使用初期資金，資金存留期間越長，後續能產生的報酬就越多，也越容易達到金主們的期望報酬率。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Mar 4th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
While global Alpha and its investors suffered major losses, and investors in securities underwritten by the firm experienced seriously disappointing performance, the firm and its own investors enjoyed the substantial profits Goldman Sachs produced by taking an astute and almost unique short position in the subprime mortgage market. While some would question whether the firm did not have an overarching fiduciary responsibility to all clients and customers to share its expertise across all three areas, senior management was and is clear: Each business unit is responsible and accountable for doing its best to complete the mission of that particular business – period. No business is its brother’s keeper. Each tub on its own bottom.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.677
Buffett made his offer “Berkshire is ready to invest $5 billion today in a 10 percent preferred stock convertible at $110 with warrants to buy an additional $5 billion of common stock at $115 per share.” Buffett knew how important his investment would be and, having had real difficulties with his prior investment in Salomon Brothers, knew what term he wanted. Those terms included a unique provision: Each of the four senior executives of Goldman Sachs must sign a pledge that they and their families would not sell any shares of Goldman Sachs stock before Buffett sold his. The details were spelled out to Viniar in a late morning half-hour phone call that ended at noon. Buffett’s offer was firm until four that afternoon. So Goldman Sachs’ leadership had just four hours to decide.
They didn’t need four hours. Even with the personal lock-in provision, the answer was clear to everyone by three. Viniar called Buffett. “Sorry, Mr. Buffett is not available. He is away from the office and cannot be disturbed.” It was two O’clock in Omaha — and Buffett was still at lunch with his grandchildren.
At 3:30 Eastern Standard Time, Buffett called Viniar back. Goldman Sachs, without question, accepted Berkshire Hathaway’s terms. Done deal.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.699
As Blankfein and his colleagues looked around the carnage on Wall Street, a few remarkable realities came into focus: Goldman Sachs was strong. It had more capital than it needed – and even more than it could put to use – and it had great liquidity. Even more important for Goldman Sachs’ long term strategy, every one of its competitors would be significantly less powerful. Lehman Brothers had been broken up and parts had gone into Barclays Bank. This would make Barclays stronger, but would it ever be as strong as Lehman Brothers had been? Merrill Lynch’s organization had been damaged and it had surely lost or would lose some of its best customers and its best businesspeople. Citigroup (including Salomon Bothers and Smith Barney) would mostly do “commodity” investment banking now. Its aspiration to be a formidable investment bank was, for now, just that – and aspiration. UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank would all refocus on their commercial banking business. Even Morgan Stanly was unsettled. Did it really intend to make a major commitment, as announced, to retail banking? Its leadership seemed uncertain about its basic strategy, which was surely not a good thing in such challenging times. Blankfien sees Goldman Sachs in good position to compete with commercial banks in providing credit.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.702
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 28th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
But Keynes was right too: ”Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.606
Stunning as it is that it took the firm’s management long decades to “get it” about investment management, GSAM’s history provides a crucial illustration of Goldman Sachs’s unrelenting “try and try and try again” approach to building each of it’s many enterprise businesses: Select one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. Point to a fair hill and say, “Congratulations! You are the Chosen One who can find a way to capture that hill. It will be hard – maybe very hard – but the firm expects great things of you. We know you can do it. Now, get going and… take… that… hill!” When success is achieved, congratulations are given to the successful young stars – and so is another, even more challenging hill. If success is not achieved, the firm selects another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. If success is again not achieved, the firm simply selects yet another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising young stars to take the hill. Eventually, the hill gets taken.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.622
One of Paulson’s great advantages in life is that he is always learning – partly through continuous observation of others, partly because he takes criticism easily with no defenses or resistance, and never personally. A weakness is that he is almost oblivious to office politics and for years had to fight the urge to speak his mind immediately, without caution or consideration.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.643
Paulson was a serious student of leaders, seeking to understand why some were so much more effective than others: “The more I observed the most effective leaders, the more I became convinced that the key is to have the right people in your own organization working for you and with you.” Within Goldman Sachs, he soon earned a reputation for having the best people working with him to serve his clients, and for identifying outstanding talent early.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.644
The concept of leadership at Goldman Sachs has changed completely over the past fifty years. Sidney Weinberg was a leader, but in many ways his firm was a proprietorship. While Gus Levy insistently expected many people to do all they could do to build the business, there was no question that he was the leader – in overall pace and direction and on dozens of transactions every day. Whitehead and Weinberg pushed decision responsibility and accountability out to the unit heads. Rubin and Freidman matched even more widely distributed authority and responsibility with centralized accountability to the management committee. Paulson continued the multiplication of decision-making leaders and increased the coordination of operating units through centralized disciplines: risk controls, business planning, and performance measurement at increasing numbers of smaller and smaller, more agile units that were closer to particular markets.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.648
As Bob Steel explains, “First-person singular is only used to describe a mistake, not an accomplishment. It may sound silly but little things like that are quite significant. I’ve never heard a boss at Goldman Sachs say, ‘I just did this.’ If I ever did, I’d be embarrassed.”
Paulson remembers getting his first Goldman Sachs memo back from Jim Gorter. “Good memo!” was written at the top – and every “I” was crossed out in favor of “we.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.659
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 24th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
There are only four ways to gain and keep a significant competitive advantage: more effective recruiting, a stronger culture, a better strategy, and greater intensity of commitment.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.554
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, few Wall Street firms interviewed MBAs, so Goldman Sachs had little direct competition. Determined to develop intense commitment within the Goldman Sachs system, Whitehead recruited “intensity” people who gave out clear signs of hungering for achievement. Selection was to be based on three equally weighted criteria: one-third on intelligence as measured by grades and SAT scores, one-third on leadership as shown by roles in extracurricular organizations, and one-third on ambition to achieve.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558
On purpose, the firm’s offer was – in comparison to today’s $150,000-plus offers – stunningly small at $3,600, even if adjusted for inflation. Whitehead was determined never to pay more than other companies and preferred to be known to pay less, because if the firm could get the best for less, that sent a message that there must be something special about Goldman Sachs.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558
Goldman Sachs doesn’t look for top-quartile –- or even top-decile – MBAs. Convinced that over the long term there is inevitably a major difference between the top 5 percent and the second 5 percent, the firm focuses on recruiting the very best young professionals, selecting carefully for such characteristics as leadership, drive, and appetite for hard work. Starting with the 5 percent most qualified and capable, the firm proceeds to sort out the most effective team-playing contributors – initially through fifteen to thirty interviews and then through actual work experience and direct observation to find the very best 1 or 2 percent.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.559
Always stressing the long-term opportunity of a career with Goldman Sachs, the firm wanted recruits to weigh other factors, believing that those who accept jobs because of salary were more inclined to leave later for a higher offer from somewhere else. The worst thing the firm could do was hire someone, train him for a few years, and then have him go elsewhere for more money.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.561
As J.P. Morgan famously observed, “A man always has two reasons for doing anything thing: a good reason and a real reason.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.577
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 21st, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Risk arbitrage is based on the simple idea that if there are two market prices for the same thing or two equivalent things, they will converge at some points as though pulled together by a rubber band. Arbitrageurs take disciplined actions to create profits by capturing differences in prices for the same item in different markets or of different but interchangeable items in the same market. The price differences they exploit are caused by market inefficiencies or mistakes caused by imbalances of supply and demand due to differences between uncertainty and risk, which differ in ways only experts usually care about. Arbitrageurs increase market efficiency and – indirectly and unintentionally, as Adam Smith famously explained in The Wealth of Nations – they increase the consistency and fairness of markets and therefore the confidence investors have in markets; that helps improve overall economic performance. Arbitrageurs are working in free, competitive markets that are open to everyone, so to earn profits they need to see what others do not see, to see more clearly than others do, or to take actions others would not have considered.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.464
Insurance companies earn profits by making a market between an individual’s uncertainty and a population’s true risk.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.465
Three factors are crucial for success in arbitrage: extraordinary, unemotional rationality or objectivity in all decisions and actions; superior access to information; and the ability to understand that information and the ability to think unconventionally and rigorously about it.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.466
The facts are king. You always start with the facts – all the facts you can possibly get – and then you develop a logical line of reasoning or argument, and then – and only then – do you develop a opinion. Opinions always come last. Facts, analysis, and logic matter. Ego has no role in analysis or in developing an opinion. Age and experience do not matter – once you’re on the team.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.475
Fife explains, “Leaders should always set the bar high – very high – and then find the way to meet that standard. Trust and consistent execution make you the preferred supplier. Any compromise on standards, and you’re sowing the seeds of your own destruction.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.516
“I learned a long time ago that when somebody spits in your face, if you’re really any good, you do three things: One, declare it must have been a rain drop. Two, wipe it off. And three, renew your determination and commitment.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.530
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 19th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
The CFO of Vickers told a partner, “If a British merchant banker were up all night working to complete a transaction, he would never tell anyone for fear he would look inadequately skillful. But if an American pulled an all-nighter, he would make certain to tell me – as proof of his commitment.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344
Thornton explains:”In a situation like this, at the very beginning, you, as an individual, are the ‘brand’.” You have nothing to carry you and nothing to fall back on. Going from an initial meeting and general discussion to specific, nuanced advice that is listened to and accepted is a transformation that’s completely dependent on you – what you say and do, how you develop each relationship, how you build up the prospect’s confidence – not just in your firm, not just in your advice, but in you. And that confidence has to be strong enough to prevail against the tide of general opinion and natural resistance to change, which is particularly strong in major financial transactions.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344
By not taking credit, you become more effective. If you do right by people, they win and you win. Frank, always go out of your way to share credit.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378
When Brosens had first been put in charge of arbitrage, he had one exciting talent in the division – Eric Mindich, a man in his early twenties whom he wanted to put in charge of risk arbitrage for the firm’s own account. Silfen and Zuckerberg wondered about assigning so much responsibility to such a young star. “Last year was a tough year in arbitrage. Shouldn’t you focus more on this area yourself?”
“I believe with a hundred percent of his time, he can do better than I can do with forty percent of my time.”
Rubin joined in: “Age is irrelevant. By expending his responsibilities now, you may keep a real star that you might otherwise lose.”
Mindich soon became the youngest-ever partner of Goldman Sachs, at age twenty-seven.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378
Rubin and Friedman were right about the risk that being wisely conservative can deteriorate into defensive caution and about the importance of the firm’s becoming more aggressive. John Whitehead had seen it, and it was an important factor in his decision to retire. But the obvious irony was that the cautious, conservative style Rubin and Friedman found so constraining had been at the core of the strong, team-centered culture, the reputation of integrity at every level, the consistent service to corporate and institutional clients, the strong earnings and solid financials, the persistent and skillful recruiting, the superior management, and the consistently disciplined execution upon which their more aggressive business strategies could now build.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.381
“What’s so fair about keeping tired older partners when that means blocking the best young people and violating our commitment to meritocracy?”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.385
“It’s harder to get a good idea accepted than it is to get a good idea.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.392
The problem Cooperman faced – in addition to the constrains imposed by the firm – was that while long-term investing is in theory what mutual-fund is all about, in practice, short-term performance dominates mutual-fund sales, particularly for organizations that are new to the business.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.429
… the real test of a risk-control system would be that it caught not only what you would not expect, but also what you would have thought not possible.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.460
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 18th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
While some other banking firms tried to manage and control with top-down rules, a rules-based management couldn’t possibly keep up with the speed of change in the securities business and couldn’t penetrate the complexities of many different lines of business in many different markets to address specific situations where value-based decisions might be needed. With a principles-base management, responsibility for decisions is pushed down to the men and women on the firing line. Since they know the concepts of the Principles and they know the detailed realities of their specific business, they can be held accountable for knowing and doing the right things in the right way.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.188
“Assuring professional ethics are really lived by is a bit like being a zoo-keeper,” says partner Roy Smith. “You need lions and tigers to have a really good zoo, but you must keep them under control – or reasonably so.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.197
“The two Johns saw nothing at all wrong with people working very hard and carrying a heavy load," recalls partner Roy Smith. “They were convinced it was better for you to carry more work responsibility – perhaps half again more than you normal capacity – because that meant you accumulated more experience and you would learn more and know more. You’d advance up the learning curve more swiftly and get to a higher level of performance.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.202
Each Analyst was expected and challenged to be an entrepreneur. For example, Joe Ellis made himself the leading retailing analyst on Wall Street. “We began the idea of conducting field trips for institutional analysts to visit retailers back in 1984,” recalls Ellis. ”Now other firms do similar things.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.289
The Analyst’s job is hard and requires many different skills. As Ellis says, “ You have to be very good on financial analysis and on interviewing and on business judgment and market judgment and able to work effectively with institutional investors and the sales force and with corporate executives and investment bankers. It’s complicated. And it’s very hard to serve all of them really well.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.291
Weinberg never took himself too seriously. “The boss needs to lose arguments – not all arguments, but enough to keep everybody honest and responsible for clear thinking. You can’t micromanage this business from headquarters.” About innovative ideas, of which there are great many, he tended to be conservative. But if the young bucks were pressing hard, he liked to give way, saying, “I’m just an old guy, so I don’t know all the ins and outs if this new stuff, so if you’re sure it’s right, let’s go!” He could then observing with a knowing smile, “I can’t lose now, If I was right, they’ll soon be saying, ‘Jesus, maybe the old guy knows the score,’ and if they are right, they’ll feel really good about themselves – and will work even harder.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.301
Weinberg kept a plaque inherited from his father that enumerated the many setbacks suffered by Abraham Lincoln on his way to becoming a great president, with the message that enormous success does not come without setbacks.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.303
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 16th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
With Whitehead’s persistent and cautious “prune losers, feed winners” style of management, the whole IBS [Investment Banking Service] organization became constructively infected with commitment: first to specific actions and transactions and later to an overall strategy – and eventually to a firmwide culture and x commitment to a new, organized way of doing business.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.161
As George Doty observed: “Goldman Sachs’s new business development organization was by no means an overnight success. For several years, it was a money loser. That’s one of the main reasons other firms did not duplicate it. Who wants to duplicate an experiment that is a radical departure from the tried and proven, and doesn’t seem to be working all that well?” It would take ten years and several false starts before Whitehead’s innovation worked out.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.163
Whitehead’s IBS organizational structure also made it possible for Goldman Sachs to follow a low-risk and high-impact “fast follower” strategy on new products and services. Let other firms be first with new ideas, absorbing the costs and pains of being on the “bleeding edge” of innovation. Study what worked and improve it if possible, sort quickly through more than a thousand client relationships to select the most likely prospects for the new services; then, using IBS as the delivery system, take the transaction specialist to all the most promising prospects; and finally, by outselling the innovating competitor, come from behind quickly to do the most business and become the recognized experts in the new service.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.175
In sustained pursuit of his strategic goals, Whitehead combined disciplined planning with reserved affability. He was quite unconcerned about being demanding of others. Smoothly rational rather than emotional, he never fraternized with the troops or had pals within the firm. Respected, but not loved or even particularly well liked, and often considered aloof from the others, who regularly socialized together, Whitehead was called, behind his back, the great white shark. He never cajoled or coddled and could be hard on investment bankers who sought praise or had a high need of ego celebration. Whitehead calmly obliged conformance in large matters and small.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.179
Whitehead not only designed and staffed his productive organization, he made it work, saying to one banker after another, “You can do it,” and always clearly implying, “and if I hold you to it, you will do it.” “John was almost regal in the way he acted,” says Smith. “I never met anyone else like that in my life. It’s really quite amazing. He tells you exactly what he wants you to do; gives you the clear understanding you have no alternative and must do it; then proceeds to encourage you to believe you might very well be able to do it; and then continues on to give you the feeling you might even enjoy doing it, particularly if you commit your every effort to be sure you’ll succeed.”
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180
If Goldman Sachs wanted to get into a business, it preferred to give the challenge to some of its own most promising young people. “When, as we rarely did, we decided to go outside the firm for talent, we avoided hiring whole groups or teams. Instead, we would identify the very best people, get to know them well, and bring them over individually. These new individuals would learn the Goldman Sachs culture and either blend into the firm or they would not make it at Goldman Sachs. We always tried to be creative with the new techniques and new financial products, but I never thought we had to be first with everything. I was perfectly happy to have another firm be first with a new idea because I was confident that with our superior marketing organization, we would improve the product and then achieve dominance through distribution, while those other firms put their reputation at risk if it didn’t work. We control our growth rather tightly so things don’t get away from us.”
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 10th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Weinberg’s stated secret of success: “Love of hard work, no fear of tackling anything – and like every minute of if.” He didn’t mention intimidation, but others certainly would.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 33
Since most of the people working at Goldman Sachs had no family wealth, they knew they’d have to work hard to make it, and as outsiders they had little to lose by taking risks or being “different”.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 77
When it became time in 1969 for Weinberg to turn over operations to a successor, Levy had to be made managing partner of Goldman Sachs. As the major rainmaker who commanded great personal loyalty within the firm, he was the obvious choice as the firm’s leader for a simple, compelling reason: He was already leading.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 79
… There was no idle chatter with Gus, ever. “ When he asked questions, Levy wanted answers that were short, direct, and specific. He abhorred ambivalence and uncertainty. When one of his colleagues offered tentatively, “We may be able to do something that may help,” Levy cut him off: “May is just a month between April and June. It has no place here at Goldman Sachs.”
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 81
Leadership authority and power in Goldman Sachs, as in all Wall Street firms, has to be earned over and over again every time the leader gets challenged – just as a male lion has to keep defending his pride of lionesses.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 95
Menshel hired salesmen carefully. His screening criteria were always the same: Candidates had to be very presentable and very bright. If a candidate made it past the first round, judgments centered on one key driver: How hungry was he, how much did he need to succeed? Having some family money –- in the sixties, still the first screening criterion at most firms – was not a positive at all: It was a real negative. Menshel wanted driven people, because he wanted a driven sales organization that would accept his strict discipline.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 123
Speaking of Levy, Young, and their sales team, Al Feld says, “They weren’t gods; they were only human. But when push came to shove, they were always do what was really right.” Leaders are known by two things: the people they hire and bring together and the beliefs they hold to when they really have to choose. You only know what a person really believes in when he chooses to do something even though it costs him –- because he really believes it’s the right thing to do.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 124
“In evaluating leaders,” says Dick Menshel, “the central question has to be ‘Who made a difference?’ and on the criterion, Gus Levy stands out as a real innovator in developing the business of block trading.” Levy and his key lieutenants had that unstoppable drive to build a major, very profitable business, and they build the organization that would do it.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 144
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Posted in Investment on Feb 9th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
本週 MBA Monday Series，Fred Wilson 為我們解釋了「貨幣的時間價值 (the time value of money，)」，以及折現率還有利率 (discount rate / interest rate) 的組成。貨幣的時間價值可以說是所有財務學的基本觀念，任何人將這個觀念融入任督二脈後，對機會成本、沉沒成本的認知會有更深刻的體驗。修煉完成後，世界觀也會隨之改變。
首先我們要知道一個基本觀念：金錢的價值會隨著時間遞減。怎麼說呢？我問你，現在有兩個選擇，一個是我馬上給你一張 $1000 元大鈔，另一個選擇是 3 個月後，再給你這張 $1000 大鈔，請問你會選擇哪一個？很明顯，肯定是前者。
而利率，或是折現率，就是用來評估「現在」的錢，到底比「未來」的錢多了多少價值？再來一個例子。選項 1：我承諾一年後的今天，給你 $1000 元；選項 2：你可以當下就把錢拿走，條件是，要少拿 $100 元，也就是說，只能拿走 $900 元。你若是選擇後者，就代表接受了 11.1% 的折現率。
那麼，折現率 11.1% 是如何算出來的呢？
1) 將期末與期初金額相減，本例中，就是 $1000 – $900 = $100
2) 把相減得出的金額除以現在拿能拿走的金額，本例中，就是 $100 / $900 = 11.1%
反過來說，如果我今天「借」你 $900 元，而且你同意一年後償還我 $1000 元，這一來一往的年利息就是 $100，年利率就是 11.1%。( $900 * 11.1% = $100 )。也就是說，折現率和利率本質上是一樣的東西，只是計算方向恰好相反。
既然我們說折現率或利率可以拿來衡量金錢的時間價值，折現率或利率越高，當下手頭上握有的現金就越有價值，同理，隨著時間拉長，這筆現金的價值就會遞減。
有很多理由可以說明為什麼金錢的價值會隨著時間遞減，以下說明兩個最重要因素：
1) 通貨膨脹：用一句話來說，通膨就是「價格漲幅超越應有的漲幅」，造成超漲的因素也很多，但通常是市場上流動的資金供過於求。通膨會導致你手上握有的現金價值減少：如果你想買的房子今年報價一千萬元，明年預期報價一千兩百萬元，也就是說，年通膨率 20%。假設你一年來不吃不喝，也不領薪水，理論上，你的總財富和去年相比不變，但無形中，總財富的現金價值變少了，換個角度來看，就是你變窮了。所以你必須想辦法在今年多賺 20%，或從事 20% 年利率的投資。才能維持等同於去年的購買力。
2) 風險：你可以接受銀行給你的定存年利率 2%，但一樣的錢，投資到朋友新創立的公司，你還能接受 2% 的年報酬率嗎？恐怕不行，你應該會要求 100%，甚至更高的投資報酬率。為什麼？差異就在於「風險」的大小。你知道存在銀行的錢一定拿得回來 (如果銀行有投保)，但不確定投入朋友新公司的錢是否有辦法回收，這種不確定性，就是「風險」。
透過以上因素，我們可以來拆解利率的組成：
我們假設一年到期的美國國庫券利率為 3%，由於債券發行者為美國政府，在一般情況下倒債違約的機率微乎其微，因此我們可以把 3% 的年利率看作是「無風險利率 (Risk Free Interest Rate)」。
現在再把通貨膨脹率納入考量，假設消費者物價指數 (CPI) 一年後上升 2.5%，我們可以說年通膨率為 2.5%。實際上通膨率的計算沒這麼簡單，但由於房地產租賃市場大多以 CPI 作為指標，這邊我們也以此作為計算標準。如果你把無風險利率減掉通膨率，可以得到所謂的「實質利率 (Real Interest Rate)」，本例中，就是 0.5% (3% – 2.5%)。我們偶爾也把這 3% 稱作「名目利率 (Nominal Rate)」。
接著再把風險納入考量。假設你能找到一張市價 $900，一年後到期，屆時發行人將以 $1000 買回的債券。從最早的例子可知，這張債券目前是以 11.1% 的折現率在市場上交易。現在我們把折現率減去無風險利率 (11.1% – 3%)，就會得到 8.1% 的「風險溢酬 (Risk Premium)」。也就是說，相較於把錢拿去買最安全的國庫券，輕鬆賺取 3% 利率，市場上的投資人預期這張債券應該要產生額外 8.1% 的投資報酬率，來抵銷買了這張債券後，所需額外承擔的風險。
到了這邊，你能看出利率或是折現率是由哪些成份組成了嗎？綜合前兩段，我們可求出利率或是折現率是由「實質無風險利率」加上「通膨率」加上「風險溢酬」組成，也就是 11.1% = 0.5% + 2.5% + 8.1%。
從上例可以知道，銀行或政府都無法單方面決定折現率或利率。當然銀行和政府還是能發揮部份影響力。但終究來說，折現率與利率，是你、是我，是市場上的短期投機者、長期投資人的「共識」。「市場先生」不斷問大家以下兩個問題：你願意接受多少折現率來換取當下擁有現金的保障呢？你願意接受多少利息來換取等待兌現的時間成本呢？把所有人的答案和行動加總起來，就是市場力量，而折現率和利率，就是由「市場」來決定的。
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Posted in Investment on Feb 8th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
The Startup Visa Act of 2010 would create a two year visa for immigrant entrepreneurs who are able to raise a minimum of $250,000, with $100,000 coming from a qualified U.S. angel or venture investor. After two years, if the immigrant entrepreneur is able to create five or more jobs (not including their children or spouse), attract an additional $1 million in investment, or produce $1 million in revenues, he or she will become a legal resident. (source)
美國民主黨國會議員 John Kerry 以及共和黨國會議員 Richard Lugar 日前提出一個新的移民創業法案：1) 找到至少 $250,000 美元資金挹注，其中 $100,000 美元來自美國天使投資人或創投，就能申請 2 年期限的居留 Visa。2) 兩年後，如果這名海外創業家能至少創造 5 個工作機會 (不含小孩與配偶)，並且 a) 獲得額外一百萬美金資本挹注，或 b) 公司營收達一百萬美金，就能成為美國公民。
這種法案就是美國能持續吸引人才的原因啊。
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Posted in Investment on Feb 2nd, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
I was taught, and I believe with all my head and heart, that companies are worth the "present value" of "future cash flows.
Fred Wilson 開了一個 MBA Mondays Series。內容淺顯易懂，適合一般父老鄉親，如此棒的內容，就順手給它翻譯分享。第一章：valuation 的觀念。假如我打算買下隔壁公寓，並把房子租出去。我知道出租的行情為 $1000/month，每個月的維護成本為 $200/month，則能產生的現金流為 $800/month。一年下來，我能收到 $9,600 ($800 * 12)。如果我期望的投資報酬率為 10%，那麼，我應該花多少錢買下隔壁公寓，才能獲得理想中的 10% 年報酬率呢？答案是 $96,000。很簡單吧，我在年初投入 $96,000現 金，在年末共收到 $9,600 的現金，這不就是 10% 投資報酬率嗎？所以如果把這間公寓當成投資標的，此標合理的買價是 $96,000，也就是說，我能給它 $96,000 的 valuation。
當然，這是為了介紹觀念，而極度簡化的範例，在現實世界的企業現值評估中，還有許多外部因素，例如企業每個月能產生的現金流量都會變化，對於折現率過度樂觀或悲觀的預估，也會影響到現值計算結果。
總結來說，我覺得有個基本觀念，是長線投資人都該具備的：「現在」你願意付出多少，換來這個投資標的「未來」能產生的現金流總和？
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Posted in Investment on Feb 1st, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
查詢「折現」的相關資料時，發現相對於基於理性假設的 exponential discounting，還有一個摻入行為因素的 hyperbolic discounting 理論：
Given two similar rewards humans show a preference for one that arrives sooner rather than later. Humans are said to discount the value of the later reward, by a factor that increases with the length of the delay. In behavioral economics, hyperbolic discounting is a particular mathematical model thought to approximate this discounting process; that is, it models how humans actually make such valuations. Hyperbolic discounting is sharply different in form than exponential discounting, a rational function used in finance used in the analysis of choice over time. Hyperbolic discounting has been observed in humans and animals. (source)
人在市場中的行為有時候相當地動物本能。
In hyperbolic discounting, valuations fall very rapidly for small delay periods, but then fall slowly for longer delay periods. This contrasts with exponential discounting, in which valuation falls by a constant factor per unit delay, regardless of the total length of the delay. The standard experiment used to reveal a test subject’s discounting curve is to ask: "Would you prefer A today or B tomorrow?" and then, "Would you prefer A or B in one year, or in one year and one day?" (source)
A subject using hyperbolic discounting reveal a strong tendency to make choices that are inconsistent over time. In other words, they make choices today that their future self would prefer not to make, despite using the same reasoning. This dynamic inconsistency[2] happens because hyperbolic discounts value future rewards much more than exponential discounting. (source)
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Posted in Investment, Microsoft on Jan 31st, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
上週五 MSFT 2Q FY10 (2009 年第 4 季) 財報出爐，拜遞延認列 Windows 7 收益之賜，總營收成長 14% yoy，營利成長 43% yoy，淨利成長 60% yoy。扣掉 Win 7 營收遞延認列的部份，則營收成長縮減為 4% yoy。
只和去年比較有失準頭，因此我也把過去 5 年 2Q 的營運成績翻出來瞧瞧：
Microsoft
Revenue (in millions)
| 2Q FY10 | 2Q FY09 | 2Q FY08 | 2Q FY07 | 2Q FY06 | 2Q FY05 |
| 19,022 | 16,629 | 16,367 | 12,542 | 11,837 | 10,818 |
Operating Income (in millions)
| 2Q FY10 | 2Q FY09 | 2Q FY08 | 2Q FY07 | 2Q FY06 | 2Q FY05 |
| 8,513 | 5,939 | 6,481 | 3,472 | 4,657 | 4,749 |
Net Income (in millions)
| 2Q FY10 | 2Q FY09 | 2Q FY08 | 2Q FY07 | 2Q FY06 | 2Q FY05 |
| 6,662 | 4,174 | 4,707 | 2,626 | 3,653 | 3,463 |
若和 2Q FY05 比較，2Q FY10 的營收、營利、淨利分別成長了 75.8%、79.2%、92.3%。5 年來的年復合成長率分別為 12.0%、12.4%、14.0% 。以一間成立 35 年，市值超過 200 ~ 250 bn 的企業來說，算是相當好的表現。但和 enterprise software 領域的競爭對手比一比，這張成績單，只能算是伯仲之間。請看 IBM 過去 5 年的表現：
IBM
Revenue (in billions)
| 4Q 2009 | 4Q 2008 | 4Q 2007 | 4Q 2006 | 4Q 2005 | 4Q 2004 |
| 27.2 | 27.0 | 28.9 | 26.3 | 24.4 | 27.7 |
Net Income From Continuing Operations (in billions)
| 4Q 2009 | 4Q 2008 | 4Q 2007 | 4Q 2006 | 4Q 2005 | 4Q 2004 |
| 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
IBM 2009 年第 4 季營收比 2004 年第 4 季減少 0.2%。但 2009 年第 4 季營利則比 2004 年第 4 季增加 54.8%，年復合成長率 9.1%。雖然營收沒有增加太多，但 5 年內營業利益率大幅上升，經營團隊的策略布局和內部管控能力相當令人驚艷。再來看看 Oracle
Oracle
Revenue (in billions)
| 2Q FY10 | 2Q FY09 | 2Q FY08 | 2Q FY07 | 2Q FY06 | 2Q FY05 |
| 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
Operating Income (in billions)
| 2Q FY10 | 2Q FY09 | 2Q FY08 | 2Q FY07 | 2Q FY06 | 2Q FY05 |
| 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
Net Income (in billions)
| 2Q FY10 | 2Q FY09 | 2Q FY08 | 2Q FY07 | 2Q FY06 | 2Q FY05 |
| 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
Oracle 2009 年第 4 季營收比 5 年前增加 111%、營利增加 100%、淨利增加 88%。年復合成長率分別為 16.1%、14.9%、13.4%。雖然營利率不像 IBM 那樣大幅爬升，但獲利成長曲線平滑，不失為一個穩健企業的範例。
最後，以 2009 年第 4 季來看，MSFT、IBM、ORCL 的營利率分別為 44.6%、 17.6%、37.3%。論商業模式「精明」的程度，MSFT 還是略勝一籌。精明的投資人，當然要支持精明的公司啊，哈哈。
理論上，股價反應未來，不是過去，但這張 5 年期走勢圖可真是道盡 MSFT 的委屈啊！
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Posted in Apple, Investment on Jan 27th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Investors Didn’t Like The iPad Until They Heard Its $499 Price (source)
昨晚 Apple Tablet 宣佈大會上，一開始 AAPL 股價跌了 3.7%，直到 Steve Jobs 登台，宣佈 iPad 價格從 $499 USD 開始起跳，股價瞬間變成向上噴出 1.8%。
他真是位扭轉利多出盡的傳奇人物。
值得一提的還有 iBook 和 iBook Store。依照 Apple 過去經營線上商店的紀錄，Amazon 可以暫時忘掉 Nook，但是要小心 Jobs 呀！
還有這個，Apple 最新的 value proposition？
As Jobs declared today, “Apple is now the largest mobile device company in the world”.
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Posted in Investment on Jan 23rd, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
But note this important fact: The true investor scarcely ever is forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons’ mistakes of judgment.
- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, p.203
A fourth business rule is more positive: “Have the courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have formed a conclusion from the facts and you know your judgment is sound, act on it – even though others may hesitate or differ.” ( You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right. ) Similarly, in the world of securities, courage becomes a supreme virtue after adequate knowledge and a tested judgment are at hand.
- Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, p.524
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Posted in Google, Investment on Jan 23rd, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
又到了 GOOG 交成績單的時候。營收、淨利都有進步，但仍不敵市場預期外加大盤修正，股價跌到今年新低。不過我相信，短期來看，分析師的 KPI 決定股價；中期來看，公司股價的漲「勢」或跌「勢」影響分析師對 KPI 的制定；長期來看，公司內部的 KPI 才是真的，其他都是幻覺。
Revenue
| 4Q 2009 Revenue | 4Q 2008 Revenue |
| $6.67 bn | $5.70 bn |
CEO Eric Schmidt 在 earnings call 說，”This was an extraordinary end to the year.” 他可不是在打官腔，比對 2009 1Q – 4Q 的年營收成長與季營收成長就知道：
| 2009 1Q Revenue | 2008 1Q Revenue | YoY % / QoQ % |
| $5.51 bn | $5.19 bn | +6%、–3% |
| 2009 2Q Revenue | 2008 2Q Revenue | YoY % / QoQ % |
| $5.52 bn | $5.37 bn | +3%、+0.2% |
| 2009 3Q Revenue | 2008 3Q Revenue | YoY % / QoQ % |
| $5.94 bn | $5.54 bn | +7%、+8% |
| 2009 4Q Revenue | 2008 4Q Revenue | YoY % / QoQ % |
| $6.67 bn | $5.70 bn | +17%、+12% |
但再考古一下，會發現 2008 年 1Q – 4Q 的年營收成長分別為 42%、39%、31%、18%。雖然說基期大小和景氣好壞會影響到年成率，平心而論，4Q 2009 的營收增幅只能算是回到「正常軌跡」。
GAAP Income and EPS
| 4Q 2009 Operating Income | 4Q 2008 Operating Income |
| $2.48 bn | 1.86 bn |
| 4Q 2009 Net Income | 4Q 2008 Net Income |
| $1.97 bn | $ 382 mn |
| 4Q 2009 EPS | 4Q 2008 EPS |
| $6.13 | $1.21 |
Non-GAAP Income and EPS
| 4Q 2009 Operating Income | 4Q 2008 Operating Income |
| $2.76 bn | $2.15 bn |
| 4Q 2009 Net Income | 4Q 2008 Net Income |
| $2.19 bn | $ 1.62 bn |
| 4Q 2009 EPS | 4Q 2008 EPS |
| $6.79 | $5.10 |
乍看之下，2008 年第 4 季的 GAAP 淨利、EPS 相當低，導致帳面數字看來， 2009 年第 4 季淨利、EPS 瞬間增加 415.7%、406.6% YoY。但 None-GAAP 就只增加 35.2%、33.1% YoY。結果新聞紛紛依據 GAAP 版本，拋出「EPS 暴增 n 倍，但股價不漲反跌」這類標題。回去翻官方釋出的說明，原來是 “In the fourth quarter of 2008, we recognized $1.09 billion in asset impairment charges related primarily to our investments in AOL and Clearwire. ”。
廣告點擊成長
| Paid Clicks 4Q 2009 YoY | Paid Clicks 4Q 2009 QoQ |
| +13% | +9% |
| CPC 4Q 2009 YoY | CPC 4Q 2009 QoQ |
| +5% | +2% |
成本的部份，TAC 較去年同期增加 16.2%，佔營收 27% (flat YoY)。機房、無形資產折舊、內容取得、信用卡交易費用等成本，較去年同期減少 2.7%，佔營收 10% (-2% YY)。營運費用較去年同期增加 7.9%，佔營收 27% (-2% YoY)。
GAAP Operating Margin 37%，較去年同期增加 4%。Non-GAAP Operating Margin 41%，較去年同期增加 3%。第四季員工增加 170 人。
2009 年第 4 季，GOOG 推出了一系列 “Gone Google” marketing campaign。也因此引發了我的好奇心，特別把全年度行銷費用拿來做比較。2009 前 3 季縮衣節食，行銷費用都比 2008 年還低。但 2009 第 4 季行銷支出首度出現正成長，多了 $77.2 mn。可以視為景氣回春，公司對未來展望有信心的具體表現。假設第 4 季行銷費用和 2008 年持平，那 GAAP Operating Margin 可以多 1 個百分點。 (38.2% v.s. 37.2%)；None-GAAP Operating Margin 也可以多 1 個百分點 (42.4% v.s. 41.4%)。
業務與行銷支出
| 4Q 2009 Sales and marketing Expenses | 4Q 2008 Sales and marketing Expenses |
| $583.149 mn | $505.993 mn |
| 3Q 2009 Sales and marketing Expenses | 3Q 2008 Sales and marketing Expenses |
| $497.812 mn | $508.801 mn |
| 2Q 2009 Sales and marketing Expenses | 2Q 2008 Sales and marketing Expenses |
| $469.039 mn | $484.552 mn |
| 1Q 2009 Sales and marketing Expenses | 1Q 2008 Sales and marketing Expenses |
| $433.941 mn | $446.898 mn |
最後，是我最喜歡觀察的 CFO 財務操作。2009 第 4 季買入有價證券金額較去年同期增加 26.7%；2009 全年買入有價證券金額較去年增加 89.8%。2009 年第 4 季實現的獲利較去年同期減少 17.0%；2009 全年實現的獲利較去年增加 39.6%。上回把 MSFT 過去 4 季的投資部位現金流量拿出來比較，發現大企業 CFO 的業外投資多寡往往是市場多空的領先指標。這是個很有趣的問題，你要相信分析師的功力，還是 CFO 的功力？
有價證券買賣
| Purchases of marketable securities 4Q 2009 | Purchases of marketable securities 4Q 2008 |
| ($9.552 bn) | ($7.542 bn) |
| Maturities and sales of marketable securities 4Q 2009 | Maturities and sales of marketable securities 4Q 2008 |
| $5.087 bn | $6.128 bn |
| Purchases of marketable securities FY 2009 | Purchases of marketable securities FY 2008 |
| ($29.139 bn) | ($15.356 bn) |
| Maturities and sales of marketable securities FY 2009 | Maturities and sales of marketable securities FY 2008 |
| $22.103 bn | $15.763 bn |
整體來說，營收沒有打破高盛、瑞士信貸等投銀的預期，但因為成本管控得宜，margin 和 EPS 皆超出預期。高盛和瑞士信貸維持 $670 和 $700 目標價不變。
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Posted in Google, Investment on Jan 20th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
等不到 GS 的報告，CS 的 Spencer Wang 倒是又出了一份。這次直接把 GOOG 目標價上調至 $700。理由：全球 search marketing 支出年復合成長率 12% – 13%。2015 年，全球 search rev. share 將達到 85%、未來 5 年營收年復合成長率 15%，而中國市場到 2015 年為止，只會有 ~2.5% 的營收貢獻 (?!)，意思就是：免驚。
另外預期 CY Q409 CPC 會有 5% 成長，營收增加 21% YoY，17% QoQ。
研究方法採 bottoms up，推動成長的動力主要有二 1) 全球ads spending 擴張、2) 全球 search engine share 擴張。每次看到分析師預估 GOOG 的金牛還會繼續長大，就讓我想起 MSFT 已經 20 歲的 Windows & Office 老金牛。他們都已經長到體型的 90%+，所以…只能每季用力擠牛奶…。但我還是看好 server & tools、online service、entertainment 這三隻強褓中長大的小牛。尤其是第一隻，正逢青春期啊！
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 17th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
每年 Forbes 都會公佈一份 Midas List ，榜上列出當年 ”the best dealmakers in high-tech and life science venture capital.”。KPCB 的 John Doerr 拿下 2008 年第一名，07, 06 年則排名第二，僅次於 Sequoia Capital 的 Michael Moritz。John Doerr 目前也是 Google 和 Amazon 的董事會成員：
Eric Schmidt calls John "one of Google’s best board members." And Jeff Bezos says, "Doerr (and Kleiner) is the center of gravity in the Internet.(source)
2009 年 7 月他到 Standford 商學院演講，主題為“Entrepreneurs as ‘Missionaries’ 但內容其實是圍繞在 Green Tech / Health / Education。最後保留十分鐘和台下同學分享 career advise。說真的，這類勵志內容人人都會講，聽得人也常覺得順耳好理解，(因為你早就知道了)，不過我相信 John Doerr 還是會幫忙過濾幾個比較有用的 practical wisdom。
身為一名 arguably the best VC in silicon valley， John Doerr 仍不忘和台下的 Standford MBAs 建立關係。最後一張 slide，他推薦了四本書，還表示：如果有任何 idea，或畢業後想到 start-up / venture-backed companies 工作，歡迎寫信給我。如果你也在信裡面分享三本你最喜歡的書，我會把這份投影片寄給你。
其中 Startup. A Silicon Valley Adventure 這本書是由 GO Corp. 創辦人親自撰寫，講的是這間紅及一時的公司，由盛而衰最終失敗的歷史。GO Corp. 在 1987 年就提出了手持式平板電腦的願景，比 Apple 的 Newton 還早。只是中間經歷過大大小小的問題 (too early? poor execution? too much money? 看了才知道)，最後還是於 1994 年走上關門一途。有趣的是，John Doerr 也自嘲說這也是一本關於他投資失敗的故事。
再過一個多月，平板電腦就要被媒體拿來炒作了。屆時搭配這本書服用正是時候。
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Posted in Investment on Jan 16th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
…但基本內涵並沒有改變，您仍須遵守四個步驟：找到一個好的管理團隊、一個高成長市場、毛利高的產品，再加上正確的時機。…
- William Egan
我經常告訴別人，如果你的興趣是賺錢，那就做一個創業家，如果你的目標是認識這類有趣的人，並且能賺很多的錢，那就要做一個創投家。
- William Egan
創投業者和創業家在建立策略夥伴時，最容易犯的第一個錯誤是案子的談判通常都以成功的結果為基礎，未曾考慮當不可預期的事情發生時，應該如何管理雙方的關係。而真網 (RealNetworks) 和 UU 網 (UUNET) 的結果就正好相反。微軟在這兩家公司都是策略性投資合夥人。就 UU 網的情況來說，這個案子簡直就像喜從天降。因為微軟貢獻了相當多的資本和時間，協助 UU 網三年之內成為數十億美元的企業。可是就真網來說，案子一開始，微軟和真網就知道這段共同的旅程遲早會有衝突發生，只是沒有人想到衝突會來得那麼快。但是雙方遲早會成為競爭對手卻是預料中的事。… 在創投業裡我們常說，當草長到某一個高度時，策略夥伴通常會重新檢視這個市場，並且決定該做什麼。
- James Breyer, Accel Partners
昇陽最初的營運計劃書由寇斯拉 (Vinod Khosla) 執筆，簡直可以拿來作為營運計劃書的範本，它總共只有七頁，內容包括了企業任務、四個月的目標、暫時擬定的兩年計畫、產品、市場、競爭對手及人才。一般來說，短的營運計畫書都是最好的。
- John, Doerr, KPCB
全錄帕拉‧奧圖研究中心的一位科學家凱 (Alan Key) 曾經說過：「預測未來的最好方式是創造未來。」如果以無法創造它，可以投資它或從旁協助。
- John, Doerr, KPCB
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Posted in Google, Investment on Jan 13th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
結果是 Credit Suisse 的 Spencer Wang 搶先放出分析報告。話說回來，30% 市占率從市調公司公開的資料就能查到。~ 1.5% 營收貢獻從過去的 ARPU 乘以大陸使用人口再除以總營收就能得到。到底要怎樣才能成為一名偉大的分析師呢？
■ Investment Case: In our view, Google is attempting to balance the business opportunity in China vs. its view on the larger issue of "freedom of speech" and appears willing to sacrifice the former for the latter on principle.
■ Catalysts: In the near term, a possible withdrawal from the China market would have a fairly negligible impact on Google’s financials. We estimate that GOOG has ~30% share in China and that China accounts for ~1.5% of Google’s revenues. However, in this scenario, the longer term risk is that Google cedes too much market share in China to competitors, which it may find difficult to recoup, thus limiting its long run opportunity in the high growth Chinese market, both in core search as well as mobile.
■ Valuation: While our target price is essentially in line with current trading levels, we believe our target price reflects the potential for near term weakness on the China news. However, we maintain our Outperform rating as we do not view Google’s exit from China as a fait d’accompli and believe there is room for GOOG to work out a mutually beneficial arrangement with the Chinese government given political sensitivities.
- Spencer Wang, Credit Suisse
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Posted in Google, Investment, Quote on Jan 12th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Google 想當烈士，你也拿它沒辦法。
今早看到新聞，Google 表示為了人權和言論自由 (a.k.a. no more search results censoring / filtering)，「考慮」終止在中國的營運。「激活點」是上個月源自中國的駭客攻擊事件，駭客鎖定的目標又恰好是中國人權鬥士們的帳號。無獨有偶，美國其他大企業也遭到類似攻擊。
In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google.
…we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted.
…we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
每個人看待這件事的角度不同。人權對我來說還好，我更關心如果 Google 真的 shutdown 中國 office，會對投資人造成何種程度的信心衝擊，及其後對財報的影響。記得李開復老師在自傳中提到，2006 年創建 Google.cn，過了很長一段時間才損益兩平，在他離開前，已經開始獲利。照「只賺一點點錢」來看，如果結束中國營運，清算掉資產，說不定短期還能提高 EPS？不過長期來看，少了中國市場，總是醜事一樁。畢竟流失人才，鞏固 Baidu 獨大的局面，都不是 Google 願意面對的。
相信高盛的 James Mitchell 會在這兩天為我們帶來深入的 financial implication analysis。
ps. 這篇 PR 看起來也像是想藉由網路輿論，引發外界重視，來產生和中國談判的籌碼 (over the next few weeks)。時間點選得也不錯。保留空間讓 Nexus-one 新聞燒一陣子。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 10th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
我準備來好好研究 Goldman Sachs 的 corporate history。研讀的磚塊書叫做: The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs 。這類書籍的作者通常是記者或學者居多，遇到不用功的，怎麼看都不覺得有搔到癢處。好在本書作者 Charles D. Ellis 是位貨真價值的內線人事，他為 GS 提供顧問服務的資歷超過 30 年，也和歷代重要合夥人有不錯的交情。我想內容的 insight 應該是掛保證了，如果還能以中立的眼光來看待 GS 曾經做對和做錯的事，那就值得真情推薦。
我看書通常不喜歡先看書評，總覺得會減低閱讀樂趣。然而路過 NY Times 的 Sunday Book Review，還是給它喵了幾眼。我試著努力滑過 spoiler ，但其中這段讓我停了幾秒：
… as he explains in his preface, he started out believing that Goldman Sachs had become Wall Street’s strongest and most enduring player because it had a better way of doing things.
His mission: to figure out Goldman’s edge. Success, he concludes, started with hiring ambitious people from working-class backgrounds. If their parents were postal clerks or groundskeepers, they were likely to work relentlessly to secure a better life — and help Goldman amass profits in the process. (source)
酷。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 9th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
我想去一個自由市場，而非以種族這類膚淺理由，或其他因素來判斷個人能力的地方。我覺得已上市公開市場可以不帶偏見地評估我的專業技能。我尤其希望能以買方的身份進入，因為相關的瑣碎事情比較少。
- Cleveland Christophe, Venture Capitalist Tell their Stories
沒錯，這也是我認為投資是 noble activity 的原因。放馬過來吧，這是一個不能用經歷、用年資、用學歷、用性別、用成見、用關係、用官僚來壓制任何一個人的競技場。這是一個純粹較量智力、心理、情緒的競技場。這是一個崇尚個人主義，不需要臣服於無效率團隊主義的競技場，人人為自己的每一次決策負最高責任，你不必為完成別人的目標而奉獻，別人無須為完成你的目標而奉獻。這是一個人才得以完全自主的競技場。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 7th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
高盛 James Mitchell 燒燙燙的報告又出爐了。本回和同事 Robert Chen ( following HTC ) 討論後，認為 2010 全年 GOOG 能賣出 3 百 50 萬支 Nexus One，為營收帶來 9% 挹注， 0 – 2% EBIT 成長，但平均每支 Nexus One 和 HTC 拆帳後，恐怕只賺 55 元美金左右，大約是 10% 毛利率。所以跳進硬體遊戲，短期會衝擊到財報 margin。長期來看，則還是有助於 mobile ads/apps 策略布局。
VOLUME: We estimate Google may sell 3.5 mn Nexus Ones in 2010, based on first-year sales for other HTC Android models of 1.5-4.0 mn; we adjust up for Google’s brand and down for limited availability in retail outlets.
REVENUE: 3.5 mn units at $530 per unit add $1.9 bn, or 9%, to Google’s 2010 net revenue. Google will book the full unit sales price (including carrier subsidy on locked phones) to its “licensing and other” line item.
MARGIN: We estimate HTC’s component cost at $300 per unit, boosted by the OLED screen and CPU. We assume HTC bears warranty, after-sale service, & R&D expenses of $50, and retains a $75 profit. We estimate Google’s R&D & marketing expenses at $50 or more, for a margin to Google of up to $55 per unit, or up to 10%, and a boost to Google’s EBIT of up to $190 mn, or 0%-2%.
- James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
目標價一樣是 $670 不變，24 倍 2010E 本益比。
那華爾街怎麼看呢？GOOG 錯了嗎？GOOG 錯了嗎？
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 7th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
…like to talk about the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 model in which 1/3 of the investments are wipeouts, 1/3 return capital but are underperformers, and 1/3 are winners that produce all of the returns. When you have an investment flow dynamic where the early rounds require very small amounts of capital but the later rounds in the winners can require a lot of capital (which is very much the case in the internet/web sector), then it behooves you to make lots of small investments, see which ones become the big winners, and then go "all in" on the winners.
The challenge all of this presents is how a VC should allocate his/her time. You can spend the majority of time hunting for deals (planting seeds) or you can spend the majority of your time working with the portfolio companies (tending the crop). Not all of the portfolio companies need a VC’s help. Many entrepreneurs are highly self sufficient. That’s a good thing. But every entrepreneur can use some help now and then and some need a lot. And the best VCs make it a point to be there when the entrepreneur needs you. And that is time consuming. It’s very time consuming if you have ten or more portfolio companies and you make it a point to be a "valued added" VC. (source)
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 4th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
昨天晚上 MSN 彈出一個提示視窗，說我收到一封 INSEAD Knowledge 的信，說真的，我還從來沒打開過這些高級學府寄來的「廣告信」。昨天大概是起了念，就決定開來看看。嗯，還不錯，這是篇類似電子報的信件，裡面收錄上一季 INSEAD Knowledge top 10 文章精選。這些文章都是由 INSEAD 的學者教授們發表。我點了其中一篇 “why MBAs should not sign the HBS oath”，講得是為了不要讓金童們再搞出一波金融海嘯，前陣子哈佛商學院發起了一個簽署運動，鼓吹優球全球頂尖 MBA 學生都要簽署這份「I’ll do no evil」誓言書。而 INSEAD 這位教授發表了一篇論述，站在反對立場。先講幾個發現這封信的感想：
1. 讓大學加入市場競爭機制果真是好事
2. 連 INSEAD 這種等級的學校都要發電子報來吸引一流學生了，台灣的頂尖學校在幹嘛
3. 教授沒有想像中那麼沒料，至少比成天「見微知著」的部落客好多了
The MBA Oath 原文如下
THE MBA OATH
As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing people and resources together to create value that no single individual can create alone. Therefore I will seek a course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over the long term. I recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that affect the well-being of individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in the future. As I reconcile the interests of different constituencies, I will face choices that are not easy for me and others.
Therefore I promise:
- I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner.
- I will safeguard the interests of my shareholders, co-workers, customers and the society in which we operate.
- I will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.
- I will understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own conduct and that of my enterprise.
- I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will represent the performance and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly.
- I will develop both myself and other managers under my supervision so that the profession continues to grow and contribute to the well-being of society.
- I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental prosperity worldwide.
- I will be accountable to my peers and they will be accountable to me for living by this oath.
This oath I make freely, and upon my honor.
INSEAD 教授 Theo Vermaelen 反對的立論有三點：
1. Some parts of the pledge are inconsistent with fiduciary duties and ethical standards.
2. The oath is a misplaced response to the financial crisis.
3. I don’t believe in pledges as an instrument to guide people’s behaviour.
雖然有幾個論點我不太認同，例如強調這份 pledge 和經理人的使命 — 保障股東利益，為股東負責衝突，但如果過度重視股東權益，因此卻犧牲客戶利益，最後還是會再度釀災。或是採用太薄弱、太果斷的事實來支持論點，例如拿報告指出，經理人買給自己的 MBS 中，有 81% 也屬於 AAA 評等，最後經理人自己也成為金融海嘯受害者。或是拿另一份報告指出，德過受傷最深的幾家金融機構，其董事會成員的財務背景知識是同一批調查中最薄弱的，因此操守不佳的 (前) MBA 學生不是釀災的主因。這兩個例子老實說都不太能說服我。然而其中還是有幾個支持論點值得參考，教授的論述結構也值得學習。
In many countries, board members and, as a consequence, managers have a fiduciary duty to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Even in countries where the corporate governance code is promoting maximising stakeholder value, none of these codes would accept that managers promote “social and environmental prosperity worldwide” as the HBS oath does.
I believe it is unethical to raise money from shareholders without telling them in advance that you are going to pursue causes that are destroying shareholder value. If you want to pursue other objectives, then you should tell them in advance, so that investors can incorporate these goals into stock prices, or simply refuse to buy the company stock.
First, Rene Stulz and Rudiger Fahlenbrach (“Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis” working paper, Ohio State University, 2009) show that banks where the CEO held a lot of stock were also the banks with the biggest losses. So they were not losing other people’s money, they lost their own money. They apparently believed in their strategy.
People are not driven by pledges, but they are driven by incentives.
Signing the oath doesn’t cost anything and therefore not a credible commitment.
The current debate should focus on how to improve corporate governance and how to design compensation contracts that are maximising shareholder value, rather than profits, earnings per share, return on equity or other non risk-adjusted short-term measures of performance.
The HBS school oath aims to achieve exactly the opposite. It pushes the stakeholder value maximisation idea to its extreme by including the whole world as a stakeholder.
I would propose the following:
“I pledge to maximise the wealth of the people who pay my salary, i.e. the shareholders, unless the shareholders tell me in advance that they want me to do something else. I will do my best to learn how to do this by taking the relevant courses”
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Posted in Investment on Jan 3rd, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Fred Wilson 列出了 2010 他和 Union Square Ventures 的合夥人可能會投資的領域： mobile、gaming、commerce/currency、cloud platforms/APIs、eduction/energy/environment.
前天和朋友吃飯，我們也討論到各自看好的領域：mobile commerce、customized content distribution app。也覺得就 consumer Internet market 來說，台灣生態不適合開發 utility 類型的 web services / mobile apps，比較適合開發 content 層級的 application。
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Posted in Apple, Google, Investment, Microsoft, Yahoo on Jan 1st, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
2010 年第一篇，來展望手機上網未來五年趨勢。
Morgan Stanley 在年終 publish 了 3 份 Mobile Internet 研究報告，一份厚達 424 頁，另一份厚達 659 頁，另外還有一份 104 頁的摘要。當看到這類型研究報告釋出時，要先戴上「本夢比」的 3D 眼鏡，才能通過「景深」，看出分析師喊多喊過頭的 bias。然而起初閱讀摘要前 1/3，發現只是拿既成事實來說嘴，有些失望，原本這篇 title 還是「令人失望的 Morgan Stanley Mobile Internet Report」。後來倒吃甘蔗，後半部圖表頗有代表性，也為我前陣子長線看好台灣電信三雄的推論背書。(電信三雄符合集中投資寡佔避險理論。)
大約是在 2009 年下班年，發現捷運上有越來越多人利用通勤時間把玩智慧型手機，有玩遊戲的、有看影片的、有看文件的、也有少部份人連上 FB 消磨時間。相信這會是個先行指標。未來電信業者有機會在暴漲的 3G data consumption 中海撈一筆。我唯一擔心的是為了應付頻寬需求，無可避免的硬體擴建資本支出，會沖淡營收效益。而這份報告也正巧提供 2G、3G、LTE 三個轉換過渡期的成本資出模型，可拿來與台灣電信三雄的支出情況交互檢驗。
以下是我認為具參考價值的幾張投影片。看得出來分析師偏好 APPL 和 GOOG。不過“iTouch” 這個字眼一直重複出現，著實讓我的心糾了幾下，開始擔心分析師到底是不是真的有在玩… (希望這只是省版面的縮寫)
(鴻海被分析師加入了我的最愛)
(宏達電和連發科則是被加入了分喜師有點愛，又不會太愛的最愛)
( MSN.com 的狀況也太慘了吧 )
(Microsoft 到底是抬轎的還是搭轎的？)
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Dec 29th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
這回主要理由是今年 11 月起， GOOG 在北美和英國地區試驗 Product Listing and Extension Ads，有機會帶來新的營收注益。但不論怎麼看，都有點像是眼見 GOOG 每股市價即將超越之前的目標價 ($635)，所以趕快塞個理由來調高營收展望和 EPS？
Based on economic trends, discussions with ad agencies, and uptake of
Product Listing Ads, we raise 4Q2009, 2010, and 2011 revenue and EPS by 2%-4%, and forecast 15% qoq consolidated gross revenue growth in 4Q (3% faster than consensus) and 2% qoq in 1Q (2% faster than consensus).
– James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
Product Listing and Extension Ads 圖解
We estimate that:
• The average AdWords CPC in the US is around $0.50, so 100 AdWords clicks on the average listing would generate revenue of $50.
• If the average item listed on Product Ads has a unit price of $40 (matching eBay’s average selling price, excluding automobiles) then at a 10% revenue share, Google would generate $4 per transaction.
• If the conversion rate from clicks to transactions is 10%, then Google would generate revenue of $40 from 100 Product Ads clicks, 20% lower than the $50 it might generate from 100 AdWords clicks.
• However, we assume that the appeal of photographs, plus their novelty in nonimage queries, may encourage users to click at twice the rate of traditional text ads, so that Google could generate $80 from 200 Product Ads clicks in the same space where it would otherwise generate $50 from 100 AdWords clicks. Put another way, 25% more clicks could generate a neutral revenue outcome if CPC is 20% lower for Product Ads than for AdWords, and we believe that Product Ads should generate an uplift in clicks substantially greater than 25%.
– James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
ps.這 estimation 的假設也太粗糙了吧…我不相信堂堂高盛會端出這麼像在玩模擬城市的 model…請告訴我這是庶民版分析報告才會這樣…
GOOG 做了很多好事，但是特別去注意它「做了哪些能產生直接賺錢機會」的事更加有趣。像這回的 Product Listing Ads 和之前的 Music Search。
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Posted in Google, Investment, Microsoft on Dec 10th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
之前 miss 掉一則人事新聞的 follow-up。日前網路上有不少聲量，責難 MSFT 資遣了BizSpark 的負責人 Don Dodge；此人在美國 (矽谷) 也算是想叮噹的人物 — 至少 Start-up 圈都還滿喜歡他的。TC 的 Michael Arrington 更是直接發文點出 MSFT 做了一個愚蠢的決定。而難能可貴的是，Don 在自己的 Blog 還是懷著感恩的心支持前公司做的決定。
接著，故事有了意想不到的發展。11 天之後，Google 向 Don 招手，他成了 Google 的員工。而 MSFT 也釋出了和 Don 的 JD 相當雷同的職缺。所以原先砍掉 Don，到底是策略改變，工作內容不再被需要呢？還是純粹為了省錢？總之就成了羅生門。
不過回歸到我的集中投資寡佔避險理論 — 同時持有 MSFT 和 GOOG 的股票，這時候效果就出來了。不論是那一方損失，不論人才最後往哪裡流，最後人才還是握在你手裡。potential earning power 還是留在系統中，沒有蒸發。
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Posted in Google, Investment on Dec 9th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
Well I think there will be more bubbles, not fewer bubbles in the future. The reason is that information market as what we have today tends to create bubbles. People get excited, they get over excited, they get too excited, prices go up, people get too much happens too quickly and of course all theses collapse as the truth comes out.
So I thick it’s incredibly important for people to recognize that we do need regulation in some of these markets. The financial markets are too easy to be manipulated by personal interests, special interests, people who are trying to make a buck, an unfair one.
- Eric Schmidt
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Posted in Investment on Nov 29th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
9) The NASDAQ’s Internet Index is up 128% over the past year suggesting that wall street loves the internet sector again. Can a vibrant Internet IPO market be far away? (source)
符合預期 ，APPL Q4 營收有機會比預期漂亮。AMZN 希望這次杜拜出包有機會介入。
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Posted in Google, Investment, Microsoft on Nov 23rd, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
剛剛又看了一篇分析報告。這兩天傳出 News Corp. 正在和 GOOG 協商三年前談定的 My Space 廣告合約續約問題。三年前的合約內容是，只要 MySpace 旗下的資產為 GOOG 帶來某個數字以上的流量，GOOG 就保證每年支付 300m 給 News Corp.。然而大家也看到恰好就是這兩年來，MySpace 被 Facebook 搶走了不少流量，外加後來 GOOG 內部評估後，發現 300m/y 的價位實在是過於高估，因此今年強勢表示要降價，不然就不續約了。(分析師認為，300m/y 讓 GOOG 的營利率減少了 100 bps。)
因此最近 News Corp. 吵著要全面禁止 GOOG access 到包含 MySpace 在內的旗下資產，就可能只是個恐嚇動作，為的是保住合約。實際情況不可能發生。另外謠傳的全美出版業聯合抵制 GOOG 則更不可能，因此這樣就讓國外的出版業競爭者有機可乘。畢竟消費者只希望能輕鬆搜尋到想看的新聞。
這時很有趣的事情發生了，市場開始揣測 MSFT 會不會趁勢介入，把這個 deal 吃下來，藉此來幫 Bing 和廣告事業搶市占率。但分析師認為可能性也不高，因為股東會反彈 xD。
我是支持啦，因為 MSFT 擁有 GOOG 尚未投入的娛樂市場，有 Xbox，有 Zune、Zune Marketplace；花 300m 買張入場券，讓這些資產和 MySpace (e.g. music streaming services) 多點緊密合作，其綜效是可以高過 GOOG 的。
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Posted in Google, Investment on Nov 23rd, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
拜 AdMob 併購案所賜，Goldman Sachs 又微幅調昇未來兩年 GOOG 的 rev. estimation。但 EPS 和 net income 略為調低 — 前者受到併購發行的 750m，約 5% 新增總流通股數稀釋影響，後者則是併購後，TAC 預估為 60%，衝擊到營業利益率。
我的確看到不少 iPhone 免費 (熱門) App 是採用 AdMob 的機制來遞送廣告。mobile search 和 mobile display advertising 這兩隻小金牛在 GOOG 的照料下應該很容易養大。
原先 Android 平台上的 Apps 和 mobile search ads 的獲利模式關係比較小，但現在有了 AdMob，應該也能加速 GOOG 在 mobile 領域投資的回收速度。
簡單來說，GOOG 算是一間運氣不錯的公司，當然也是有實力，這幾年做對決策的次數比做錯決策的次數多，這造就了大方向，也造就一大堆 startup。如果說 MSFT 的 ecosystem 圍繞在 partner / distributor 身上，那 GOOG 就算是把整個 web-based startup 都當成是自己的 ecosystem。
過去我曾跟著一堆「專家」認為，GOOG 的 98% 獲利來源都是廣告，這可是相風險相當高的結構，但這次金融風暴算是讓我們看清事實 — 事實就是，當你看對趨勢，就是要重壓。而未來五年，除非有「無法預料」的科技重大突破，線上產業的獲利機制仍然會以廣告為主，micro-payment 和 freemium model 為輔。(我認為只要多注意某個領域，則此領域之後會發生的重大突破其實都會在一堆 noise 中被看出端倪，例如 Twitter 在 2007 年初就已經被 Michael Arrington 還有 Robert Scoble 大書特書，那年冬天是我每天抱著 PDA 啃 news 的日子，印象相當深刻)。
如果 Internet as a whole 是 GOOG 鎖定的市場，那麼在 Internet 市場飽和之前，GOOG 仍然會繼續賺 easy money。相較於 MSFT 要面對已經飽和的 OS 和 Office Productivity 市場，這場仗，一開始就是建立在不對等的戰線之上。
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Posted in Investment on Nov 22nd, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
稍微碰過投資學的學生都知道，分散風險是最高指導原則。所以今天如果有人說，她買了 Google, Microsoft, Apple 的股票，此人大概是不懂風險管理。不過想想看，歐洲有三個國家在交戰，不論最後誰是贏家，戰勝國獲得的總體利益會大於戰敗國損失的總體利益，此時身為一個精明的投資 (機) 人，你想到最保險的獲利方式是什麼呢？
G.M.A. 三國志，就是一個讓商人發戰爭財的例子。大餅和創新會隨著戰情告急而不斷擴張。
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Posted in Investment on Nov 3rd, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
1) doesn’t rush to conclusions and doesn’t expect entrepreneurs to do so either
2) flows into a company based on the company’s needs, not the investor’s needs
3) starts small and grows with the company as it grows
4) has no set timetable for getting liquid: slow capital is patient capital
5) takes the time to understand the company and the people who make it up (source)
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Posted in Investment, Quote, Thought on Oct 27th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
應用在投資，我想就是以下四個簡單流程。堅信簡單公式，能幫助你過濾外界噪音：
Bonus Quote: “know everything you can about what you’re doing.”
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Posted in Investment, Microsoft on Oct 25th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
營收、營利、淨利、 EPS 分別衰退 14%、25%、18%、17% YoY，但把遞延認列的 Windows 7 營收加回去，則營收衰退縮小至 4%，EPS 甚至變成成長 8% YoY。有趣的是，市場反應和 Q1 2009 營收公佈時一樣，財報有些悲情，但股價卻是以大漲反應，看來以後投資學教科書要介紹「利空出盡」的概念時，一定要記得拿 MSFT 當範本。
另外從 cash flow statement 也看到一個有趣的小地方：過去三個月，MSFT 悄悄地在證券市場作多 。我個人推測 2010 上半年應該就能慢慢採收夏天種下的果實了。
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Posted in Investment, Yahoo on Oct 20th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
YAHOO 第三季淨利 YoY 增加 3 倍，EPS 0.13，打敗市場預期的 0.07。但淨利增加主要來自營運成本大幅削減，這代表 Carol Bartz 沒有辜負鐵娘子的名號，也沒有辜負股東的期望。要看一個企業領導人的經營能力，從成本面檢視績效，比從營收面檢視績效還準，畢竟營收受到太多外在因素的影響。但節流不能吃一輩子，Q4 top line 若仍然持平 ，我想投資人大概也可以考慮出脫持股了。
還是有個潛在風險，是我三個月前沒有看到的：前陣子比較常回 Facebook 晃，發現 FB 有越來越多的 Display Ads，原先投入 YAHOO 的行銷預算被 Facebook 分食的可能性很大。Search Ads Rev. Q3 仍是下滑，明年之前還看不出和 MSFT 合作後的優勢。我的理解是：如果投資人仍想間接投資整個 Search Ads 市場的未來發展，則在同時握有 G.Y.M. 持股的前提之下，可以繼續持有 YAHOO，畢竟這三間公司加起來，一兩年內壟斷內個 Search Ads 市場 (歐美) 的態勢不變。
最近 YAHOO 比較大的動作是在全球幾個比較大的 Sub 推出首頁改版，但行銷人的氛維已經逐漸轉向把時間和預算投入 New Media / Social Ads，YAHOO 不做些跨界的大動作，CFO 所謂”stabilized”的營收還能撐多久，我也不知道。
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Posted in Apple, Investment on Oct 19th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
Apple 營收破歷史新高，Mac 和 iPhone / iPod Touch 銷售表現 YoY 大量成長。相較於總體經濟仍較去年疲弱，有這樣的表現相當不容易。數字多少也在次證明 (美國) 學生喜歡開學前買台 Mac。
下一季會遇到聖誕節，今年 retialer 數字應該會比去年好看。也暗示了 “confident in new product pipeline”。但我不認為 Q4 還會有新產品上市，最快應該要等到明年一月。值得注意的是下一季開始，APPL 可能會採用 9 月份剛被核准的新會計準則，在舊制裡，原先算在 “subscription” devices 的營收，必須要分配在未來 2 年期間，但採用新制後，則可在當季立即認列。
APPL 主要靠 consumer market 賺錢，而依照過往經驗，consumer market 總比 enterprise market 提早反應復甦跡象，未來值得期待。
Highlights (source)
ps. iPhone 至今賣出約兩千一百萬支，App Store 販售的程式累計約八萬五千支。
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Posted in Google, Investment on Oct 18th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
P/E to normalized growth analysis yields $635 price target At $635, Google would trade at 23X 2010E EPS of $27.66, a PEG of 1.5X our 16% 2010 - 2013E EPS CAGR, 13X 2010E EBITDA, and a 4% 2010E FCF yield.
– James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
最近 GOOG 的表現算是令投資人滿意。我也一路看 James Mittchell 從 $400, $470 喊到現在的 $635。其實 GOOG 營收、獲利能力的確是令人驚喜，但我總覺得相較於獲利成長預期，本益比給得似乎太高了。往下一看，支撐步步高升 valuation 的 magic 就在於這句話：
Based on an after-market price of around $547, Google trades at a 2010E P/E of 20X and a PEG multiple of 1.3X, compared to the group medians of 23X and 1.2X, respectively.
其他不用看了，因為類股的本益比都提高了，所以我追蹤的也跟著提高。這就是投資的世界。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Oct 15th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
偉大投資者對問題的概念形成方式，與其他投資者不同。這些投資者的成功並非來自取得更好的資訊，而是使用資訊的方式不同於其他人。 — 麥克.莫伯辛
理查.丹尼斯心中存著在對政治理想的理性判斷：「如果有件每個人都討厭，但你覺得是正確的事，那就是重要且應該做的事，因為沒有其他人會去做。」
「一個現在就全力執行的好計畫，好過下星期的完美計畫。」 — 喬治.巴頓將軍
順勢交易就像民主政體，有時它看起來沒那麼好，但它比世上其他東西都好。我們要依賴「買進並持有」嗎？我看那應該叫做「買進並祈禱」(buy and hope)。我們虧損時還要加碼攤平嗎？世界太大，實在難以分析，基本面太廣大了。我們必須積極、堅持地推廣順勢交易，並且說明它的真實面貌：能夠在正確時間進入正確市場，限制災難影響程度的風險管控系統。 — 傑瑞.帕克
「關鍵不在於獨一無二的想法，而在於你獨一無二的實踐能力。」 — 無名氏
(source)
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Posted in Google, Investment on Oct 15th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
在 Earnings Call 當中，財務長提到 Mobile Search Q/Q 成長 30%，未來 Mobile Search 將是獲利成長的一大引擎。發展 Android 中長線來看到底是不是正確的策略呢？至少我已經在電視、戶外廣告看到不少 Android Phone 的廣告了，如果第一步是讓手機硬體廠商接受這款 OS，那麼這個初步目標已經達成。加上 Nokia Q3 財報挺慘的，消費者轉向擁抱 Smart Phone 的態勢已經非常明顯。
GOOG 財務長 Patrick Pichette 回應內容：
Again, we don’t give the detail numbers. On a quarter over quarter basis, mobile searches grew 30% on Google. It tells you something about the mobile space, the smartphones, and how they are transformative. They are basically transforming how people live on a mobile basis. If we move forward the adoption of these mobile phones by lowering the cost because it is open source, think of how many searches [that will produce].
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Posted in Investment, Thought on Oct 13th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
1983 年， Richard Dennis 展開了著名的海龜交易實驗，入選的這十多位海龜，在五年的期間創下績效可觀的交易成果。但十多年來，當初表現最好的海龜，卻不一定能在離開「水族箱」後，獲得財富上或事業上的耀眼成就。Baylor University 的 Nancy Uptopn 與 Don Sexton 教授指出日後成功的海龜，和表現平平的海龜，其差異的分水嶺就在於企業家特質：
(source)
我是覺得交易和企業營運需要的技能不太相同，但這兩件事能吸引到的人才都流著相同的血。
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Posted in Investment, Thought on Oct 12th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
- 損失趨避 (loss aversion)
- 沉沒成本效應 (sunk cost effect)
- 處分效應 (disposition effect)
- 結果偏差 (outcome bias)
- 近期偏差 (recency bias)
- 定錨效應 (anchoring)
- 跟風效應 (bandwagon effect)
- 相信少數法則 (belief in the law of small numbers)
(source: Way of the Turtle, Curtis Faith)
其中我最喜歡的是沉沒成本效應和近期偏差。好好檢討一下，我們每天做的決策，多少都有點被沉沒成本效應影響到。特別有趣的是，面對感情問題的時候，也很容易失焦在沉沒成本的陷阱當中。
從財務心理學來看，沉沒成本效應說的是「把已經投入或花費的金錢，看得比未來可能賺取的金錢還重要的傾向。」一段最終沒有結果的感情付出 (不論過程有沒有在一起)，也可以看成是沉沒成本的付出。而我們往往放縱自己去胡思亂想已經收不回來的事實。一段感情結束後，只因為我過去花在某位女生身上比較多金錢和心力，不代表我應該多思念她一點。多思念一點，和開始下一段感情，是兩個不相關的事件。
而近期偏差則是「偏重近期數據或經驗，而看輕早期數據或經驗的傾向」，在投資領域，這就是讓近期震盪影響你對中長期走勢的判斷，在工作上，就是假設自己一直在進步，總認為近期工作上的成果比過去做出來的東西好。感情上，就是放大和上一個男 (女) 朋友的生活經驗，而忘記把時間軸拉長，去想起那個更早之前，更貼近常態的真實自己。
在市場，因為大部分人的認知偏差，而讓你我有獲利機會；在情場，因為大部分人的認知偏差，而讓真正的好女 (男) 人失去機會。
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Posted in Investment, Quote on Aug 25th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
羅斯柴爾德家族的金融霸業已綿延超過 250 年，據傳該家族總資產曾一度高達 50 萬億美元，相當於 800 個比爾蓋茲所握有的財富…Orz…最近因為貨幣戰爭這本書開頭就拿羅斯柴爾德暖場，更強化了他們打神秘且低調的形象，搞的全球華人興致勃勃 (好吧我承認我也很有興趣)。順應潮流，電視台也特地請來第六代掌門人 - 大衛 · 羅斯柴爾德做了專訪。
節錄幾段話 (英譯)：
我見到過很多有錢的人，他們很有錢，但是他們並沒有任何的影響力。
我們 (家族) 有自己的原則，我們的原則就是團結、正直、和勤勞。
我們應該去做一個冷靜的旁觀者，而不是成為一個積極的演員。
我告訴你一些我個人的事情，我做生意已經 40 年了，今年我已經 66 歲了，我看到有些人，他們總是想：我要變得更富有，但是你要知道，這總是有個限度的，你是要有自己的野心，但這並不意謂著你不需要保守，這兩著並不矛盾。比如說我就很有野心，我希望我們的家族能夠一直傳承，我希望我們能變得更加全球化，更有影響力，更專業，更發達，但我並不是整天都在想如何變得更富有，因為一個人只能同時坐一把椅子，開一輛車，睡一張床，所以我覺得，財富是需要一個累積的過程，如果你每天都在想著，我要致富我要致富，可能反而會適得其反。保守並不意味著後退，而是謹慎地向前走。
扣掉這幾段話，其實整個訪談沒什麼內容。從回答的方式來看，也算是呼應了家族含蓄低調的風格吧。我相信，身為一名大絕招就是和政府攪和的金融大亨，其功力絕對不只如此。
順帶一提，羅斯柴爾德家徽 (coat of arm)，最下方以拉丁文寫著 “Concordia, Integritas, Industria, (Harmony, Integrity, Industry).” 也就是前面提到的「團結、正直、勤勞」。
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