本日佳句 – The Greatest Gift
Posted in Investment, Quote on Mar 7th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
The greatest of all gifts is the power to estimate things at their true worth.
- La Rochefoucauld, Reflexions; ou sentences et maximes morales
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Archive for the 'Quote' Category
本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs VIII
Posted in Investment, Quote on Mar 4th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
While global Alpha and its investors suffered major losses, and investors in securities underwritten by the firm experienced seriously disappointing performance, the firm and its own investors enjoyed the substantial profits Goldman Sachs produced by taking an astute and almost unique short position in the subprime mortgage market. While some would question whether the firm did not have an overarching fiduciary responsibility to all clients and customers to share its expertise across all three areas, senior management was and is clear: Each business unit is responsible and accountable for doing its best to complete the mission of that particular business – period. No business is its brother’s keeper. Each tub on its own bottom.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.677
Buffett made his offer “Berkshire is ready to invest $5 billion today in a 10 percent preferred stock convertible at $110 with warrants to buy an additional $5 billion of common stock at $115 per share.” Buffett knew how important his investment would be and, having had real difficulties with his prior investment in Salomon Brothers, knew what term he wanted. Those terms included a unique provision: Each of the four senior executives of Goldman Sachs must sign a pledge that they and their families would not sell any shares of Goldman Sachs stock before Buffett sold his. The details were spelled out to Viniar in a late morning half-hour phone call that ended at noon. Buffett’s offer was firm until four that afternoon. So Goldman Sachs’ leadership had just four hours to decide.
They didn’t need four hours. Even with the personal lock-in provision, the answer was clear to everyone by three. Viniar called Buffett. “Sorry, Mr. Buffett is not available. He is away from the office and cannot be disturbed.” It was two O’clock in Omaha — and Buffett was still at lunch with his grandchildren.
At 3:30 Eastern Standard Time, Buffett called Viniar back. Goldman Sachs, without question, accepted Berkshire Hathaway’s terms. Done deal.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.699
As Blankfein and his colleagues looked around the carnage on Wall Street, a few remarkable realities came into focus: Goldman Sachs was strong. It had more capital than it needed – and even more than it could put to use – and it had great liquidity. Even more important for Goldman Sachs’ long term strategy, every one of its competitors would be significantly less powerful. Lehman Brothers had been broken up and parts had gone into Barclays Bank. This would make Barclays stronger, but would it ever be as strong as Lehman Brothers had been? Merrill Lynch’s organization had been damaged and it had surely lost or would lose some of its best customers and its best businesspeople. Citigroup (including Salomon Bothers and Smith Barney) would mostly do “commodity” investment banking now. Its aspiration to be a formidable investment bank was, for now, just that – and aspiration. UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank would all refocus on their commercial banking business. Even Morgan Stanly was unsettled. Did it really intend to make a major commitment, as announced, to retail banking? Its leadership seemed uncertain about its basic strategy, which was surely not a good thing in such challenging times. Blankfien sees Goldman Sachs in good position to compete with commercial banks in providing credit.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.702
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本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs VII
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 28th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
But Keynes was right too: ”Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.606
Stunning as it is that it took the firm’s management long decades to “get it” about investment management, GSAM’s history provides a crucial illustration of Goldman Sachs’s unrelenting “try and try and try again” approach to building each of it’s many enterprise businesses: Select one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. Point to a fair hill and say, “Congratulations! You are the Chosen One who can find a way to capture that hill. It will be hard – maybe very hard – but the firm expects great things of you. We know you can do it. Now, get going and… take… that… hill!” When success is achieved, congratulations are given to the successful young stars – and so is another, even more challenging hill. If success is not achieved, the firm selects another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. If success is again not achieved, the firm simply selects yet another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising young stars to take the hill. Eventually, the hill gets taken.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.622
One of Paulson’s great advantages in life is that he is always learning – partly through continuous observation of others, partly because he takes criticism easily with no defenses or resistance, and never personally. A weakness is that he is almost oblivious to office politics and for years had to fight the urge to speak his mind immediately, without caution or consideration.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.643
Paulson was a serious student of leaders, seeking to understand why some were so much more effective than others: “The more I observed the most effective leaders, the more I became convinced that the key is to have the right people in your own organization working for you and with you.” Within Goldman Sachs, he soon earned a reputation for having the best people working with him to serve his clients, and for identifying outstanding talent early.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.644
The concept of leadership at Goldman Sachs has changed completely over the past fifty years. Sidney Weinberg was a leader, but in many ways his firm was a proprietorship. While Gus Levy insistently expected many people to do all they could do to build the business, there was no question that he was the leader – in overall pace and direction and on dozens of transactions every day. Whitehead and Weinberg pushed decision responsibility and accountability out to the unit heads. Rubin and Freidman matched even more widely distributed authority and responsibility with centralized accountability to the management committee. Paulson continued the multiplication of decision-making leaders and increased the coordination of operating units through centralized disciplines: risk controls, business planning, and performance measurement at increasing numbers of smaller and smaller, more agile units that were closer to particular markets.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.648
As Bob Steel explains, “First-person singular is only used to describe a mistake, not an accomplishment. It may sound silly but little things like that are quite significant. I’ve never heard a boss at Goldman Sachs say, ‘I just did this.’ If I ever did, I’d be embarrassed.”
Paulson remembers getting his first Goldman Sachs memo back from Jim Gorter. “Good memo!” was written at the top – and every “I” was crossed out in favor of “we.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.659
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本日佳句 - The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part VI
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 24th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
There are only four ways to gain and keep a significant competitive advantage: more effective recruiting, a stronger culture, a better strategy, and greater intensity of commitment.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.554
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, few Wall Street firms interviewed MBAs, so Goldman Sachs had little direct competition. Determined to develop intense commitment within the Goldman Sachs system, Whitehead recruited “intensity” people who gave out clear signs of hungering for achievement. Selection was to be based on three equally weighted criteria: one-third on intelligence as measured by grades and SAT scores, one-third on leadership as shown by roles in extracurricular organizations, and one-third on ambition to achieve.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558
On purpose, the firm’s offer was – in comparison to today’s $150,000-plus offers – stunningly small at $3,600, even if adjusted for inflation. Whitehead was determined never to pay more than other companies and preferred to be known to pay less, because if the firm could get the best for less, that sent a message that there must be something special about Goldman Sachs.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558
Goldman Sachs doesn’t look for top-quartile –- or even top-decile – MBAs. Convinced that over the long term there is inevitably a major difference between the top 5 percent and the second 5 percent, the firm focuses on recruiting the very best young professionals, selecting carefully for such characteristics as leadership, drive, and appetite for hard work. Starting with the 5 percent most qualified and capable, the firm proceeds to sort out the most effective team-playing contributors – initially through fifteen to thirty interviews and then through actual work experience and direct observation to find the very best 1 or 2 percent.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.559
Always stressing the long-term opportunity of a career with Goldman Sachs, the firm wanted recruits to weigh other factors, believing that those who accept jobs because of salary were more inclined to leave later for a higher offer from somewhere else. The worst thing the firm could do was hire someone, train him for a few years, and then have him go elsewhere for more money.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.561
As J.P. Morgan famously observed, “A man always has two reasons for doing anything thing: a good reason and a real reason.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.577
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本日佳句 - The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part V
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 21st, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Risk arbitrage is based on the simple idea that if there are two market prices for the same thing or two equivalent things, they will converge at some points as though pulled together by a rubber band. Arbitrageurs take disciplined actions to create profits by capturing differences in prices for the same item in different markets or of different but interchangeable items in the same market. The price differences they exploit are caused by market inefficiencies or mistakes caused by imbalances of supply and demand due to differences between uncertainty and risk, which differ in ways only experts usually care about. Arbitrageurs increase market efficiency and – indirectly and unintentionally, as Adam Smith famously explained in The Wealth of Nations – they increase the consistency and fairness of markets and therefore the confidence investors have in markets; that helps improve overall economic performance. Arbitrageurs are working in free, competitive markets that are open to everyone, so to earn profits they need to see what others do not see, to see more clearly than others do, or to take actions others would not have considered.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.464
Insurance companies earn profits by making a market between an individual’s uncertainty and a population’s true risk.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.465
Three factors are crucial for success in arbitrage: extraordinary, unemotional rationality or objectivity in all decisions and actions; superior access to information; and the ability to understand that information and the ability to think unconventionally and rigorously about it.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.466
The facts are king. You always start with the facts – all the facts you can possibly get – and then you develop a logical line of reasoning or argument, and then – and only then – do you develop a opinion. Opinions always come last. Facts, analysis, and logic matter. Ego has no role in analysis or in developing an opinion. Age and experience do not matter – once you’re on the team.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.475
Fife explains, “Leaders should always set the bar high – very high – and then find the way to meet that standard. Trust and consistent execution make you the preferred supplier. Any compromise on standards, and you’re sowing the seeds of your own destruction.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.516
“I learned a long time ago that when somebody spits in your face, if you’re really any good, you do three things: One, declare it must have been a rain drop. Two, wipe it off. And three, renew your determination and commitment.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.530
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本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part IV
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 19th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
The CFO of Vickers told a partner, “If a British merchant banker were up all night working to complete a transaction, he would never tell anyone for fear he would look inadequately skillful. But if an American pulled an all-nighter, he would make certain to tell me – as proof of his commitment.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344
Thornton explains:”In a situation like this, at the very beginning, you, as an individual, are the ‘brand’.” You have nothing to carry you and nothing to fall back on. Going from an initial meeting and general discussion to specific, nuanced advice that is listened to and accepted is a transformation that’s completely dependent on you – what you say and do, how you develop each relationship, how you build up the prospect’s confidence – not just in your firm, not just in your advice, but in you. And that confidence has to be strong enough to prevail against the tide of general opinion and natural resistance to change, which is particularly strong in major financial transactions.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344
By not taking credit, you become more effective. If you do right by people, they win and you win. Frank, always go out of your way to share credit.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378
When Brosens had first been put in charge of arbitrage, he had one exciting talent in the division – Eric Mindich, a man in his early twenties whom he wanted to put in charge of risk arbitrage for the firm’s own account. Silfen and Zuckerberg wondered about assigning so much responsibility to such a young star. “Last year was a tough year in arbitrage. Shouldn’t you focus more on this area yourself?”
“I believe with a hundred percent of his time, he can do better than I can do with forty percent of my time.”
Rubin joined in: “Age is irrelevant. By expending his responsibilities now, you may keep a real star that you might otherwise lose.”
Mindich soon became the youngest-ever partner of Goldman Sachs, at age twenty-seven.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378
Rubin and Friedman were right about the risk that being wisely conservative can deteriorate into defensive caution and about the importance of the firm’s becoming more aggressive. John Whitehead had seen it, and it was an important factor in his decision to retire. But the obvious irony was that the cautious, conservative style Rubin and Friedman found so constraining had been at the core of the strong, team-centered culture, the reputation of integrity at every level, the consistent service to corporate and institutional clients, the strong earnings and solid financials, the persistent and skillful recruiting, the superior management, and the consistently disciplined execution upon which their more aggressive business strategies could now build.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.381
“What’s so fair about keeping tired older partners when that means blocking the best young people and violating our commitment to meritocracy?”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.385
“It’s harder to get a good idea accepted than it is to get a good idea.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.392
The problem Cooperman faced – in addition to the constrains imposed by the firm – was that while long-term investing is in theory what mutual-fund is all about, in practice, short-term performance dominates mutual-fund sales, particularly for organizations that are new to the business.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.429
… the real test of a risk-control system would be that it caught not only what you would not expect, but also what you would have thought not possible.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.460
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本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part III
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 18th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
While some other banking firms tried to manage and control with top-down rules, a rules-based management couldn’t possibly keep up with the speed of change in the securities business and couldn’t penetrate the complexities of many different lines of business in many different markets to address specific situations where value-based decisions might be needed. With a principles-base management, responsibility for decisions is pushed down to the men and women on the firing line. Since they know the concepts of the Principles and they know the detailed realities of their specific business, they can be held accountable for knowing and doing the right things in the right way.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.188
“Assuring professional ethics are really lived by is a bit like being a zoo-keeper,” says partner Roy Smith. “You need lions and tigers to have a really good zoo, but you must keep them under control – or reasonably so.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.197
“The two Johns saw nothing at all wrong with people working very hard and carrying a heavy load," recalls partner Roy Smith. “They were convinced it was better for you to carry more work responsibility – perhaps half again more than you normal capacity – because that meant you accumulated more experience and you would learn more and know more. You’d advance up the learning curve more swiftly and get to a higher level of performance.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.202
Each Analyst was expected and challenged to be an entrepreneur. For example, Joe Ellis made himself the leading retailing analyst on Wall Street. “We began the idea of conducting field trips for institutional analysts to visit retailers back in 1984,” recalls Ellis. ”Now other firms do similar things.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.289
The Analyst’s job is hard and requires many different skills. As Ellis says, “ You have to be very good on financial analysis and on interviewing and on business judgment and market judgment and able to work effectively with institutional investors and the sales force and with corporate executives and investment bankers. It’s complicated. And it’s very hard to serve all of them really well.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.291
Weinberg never took himself too seriously. “The boss needs to lose arguments – not all arguments, but enough to keep everybody honest and responsible for clear thinking. You can’t micromanage this business from headquarters.” About innovative ideas, of which there are great many, he tended to be conservative. But if the young bucks were pressing hard, he liked to give way, saying, “I’m just an old guy, so I don’t know all the ins and outs if this new stuff, so if you’re sure it’s right, let’s go!” He could then observing with a knowing smile, “I can’t lose now, If I was right, they’ll soon be saying, ‘Jesus, maybe the old guy knows the score,’ and if they are right, they’ll feel really good about themselves – and will work even harder.”
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.301
Weinberg kept a plaque inherited from his father that enumerated the many setbacks suffered by Abraham Lincoln on his way to becoming a great president, with the message that enormous success does not come without setbacks.
The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.303
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本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part II
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 16th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
With Whitehead’s persistent and cautious “prune losers, feed winners” style of management, the whole IBS [Investment Banking Service] organization became constructively infected with commitment: first to specific actions and transactions and later to an overall strategy – and eventually to a firmwide culture and x commitment to a new, organized way of doing business.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.161
As George Doty observed: “Goldman Sachs’s new business development organization was by no means an overnight success. For several years, it was a money loser. That’s one of the main reasons other firms did not duplicate it. Who wants to duplicate an experiment that is a radical departure from the tried and proven, and doesn’t seem to be working all that well?” It would take ten years and several false starts before Whitehead’s innovation worked out.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.163
Whitehead’s IBS organizational structure also made it possible for Goldman Sachs to follow a low-risk and high-impact “fast follower” strategy on new products and services. Let other firms be first with new ideas, absorbing the costs and pains of being on the “bleeding edge” of innovation. Study what worked and improve it if possible, sort quickly through more than a thousand client relationships to select the most likely prospects for the new services; then, using IBS as the delivery system, take the transaction specialist to all the most promising prospects; and finally, by outselling the innovating competitor, come from behind quickly to do the most business and become the recognized experts in the new service.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.175
In sustained pursuit of his strategic goals, Whitehead combined disciplined planning with reserved affability. He was quite unconcerned about being demanding of others. Smoothly rational rather than emotional, he never fraternized with the troops or had pals within the firm. Respected, but not loved or even particularly well liked, and often considered aloof from the others, who regularly socialized together, Whitehead was called, behind his back, the great white shark. He never cajoled or coddled and could be hard on investment bankers who sought praise or had a high need of ego celebration. Whitehead calmly obliged conformance in large matters and small.
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.179
Whitehead not only designed and staffed his productive organization, he made it work, saying to one banker after another, “You can do it,” and always clearly implying, “and if I hold you to it, you will do it.” “John was almost regal in the way he acted,” says Smith. “I never met anyone else like that in my life. It’s really quite amazing. He tells you exactly what he wants you to do; gives you the clear understanding you have no alternative and must do it; then proceeds to encourage you to believe you might very well be able to do it; and then continues on to give you the feeling you might even enjoy doing it, particularly if you commit your every effort to be sure you’ll succeed.”
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180
If Goldman Sachs wanted to get into a business, it preferred to give the challenge to some of its own most promising young people. “When, as we rarely did, we decided to go outside the firm for talent, we avoided hiring whole groups or teams. Instead, we would identify the very best people, get to know them well, and bring them over individually. These new individuals would learn the Goldman Sachs culture and either blend into the firm or they would not make it at Goldman Sachs. We always tried to be creative with the new techniques and new financial products, but I never thought we had to be first with everything. I was perfectly happy to have another firm be first with a new idea because I was confident that with our superior marketing organization, we would improve the product and then achieve dominance through distribution, while those other firms put their reputation at risk if it didn’t work. We control our growth rather tightly so things don’t get away from us.”
- The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.180
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本日佳句 – The Making of Goldman Sachs, Part I
Posted in Investment, Quote on Feb 10th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Weinberg’s stated secret of success: “Love of hard work, no fear of tackling anything – and like every minute of if.” He didn’t mention intimidation, but others certainly would.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 33
Since most of the people working at Goldman Sachs had no family wealth, they knew they’d have to work hard to make it, and as outsiders they had little to lose by taking risks or being “different”.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 77
When it became time in 1969 for Weinberg to turn over operations to a successor, Levy had to be made managing partner of Goldman Sachs. As the major rainmaker who commanded great personal loyalty within the firm, he was the obvious choice as the firm’s leader for a simple, compelling reason: He was already leading.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 79
… There was no idle chatter with Gus, ever. “ When he asked questions, Levy wanted answers that were short, direct, and specific. He abhorred ambivalence and uncertainty. When one of his colleagues offered tentatively, “We may be able to do something that may help,” Levy cut him off: “May is just a month between April and June. It has no place here at Goldman Sachs.”
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 81
Leadership authority and power in Goldman Sachs, as in all Wall Street firms, has to be earned over and over again every time the leader gets challenged – just as a male lion has to keep defending his pride of lionesses.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 95
Menshel hired salesmen carefully. His screening criteria were always the same: Candidates had to be very presentable and very bright. If a candidate made it past the first round, judgments centered on one key driver: How hungry was he, how much did he need to succeed? Having some family money –- in the sixties, still the first screening criterion at most firms – was not a positive at all: It was a real negative. Menshel wanted driven people, because he wanted a driven sales organization that would accept his strict discipline.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 123
Speaking of Levy, Young, and their sales team, Al Feld says, “They weren’t gods; they were only human. But when push came to shove, they were always do what was really right.” Leaders are known by two things: the people they hire and bring together and the beliefs they hold to when they really have to choose. You only know what a person really believes in when he chooses to do something even though it costs him –- because he really believes it’s the right thing to do.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 124
“In evaluating leaders,” says Dick Menshel, “the central question has to be ‘Who made a difference?’ and on the criterion, Gus Levy stands out as a real innovator in developing the business of block trading.” Levy and his key lieutenants had that unstoppable drive to build a major, very profitable business, and they build the organization that would do it.
- Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs, p 144
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阿四，我記得你以前跟我說過，每天晚上只要一閉上眼，夢到的全是阿純，我閉上眼，是中國的明天。
昨天和同事聊到十月圍城，我說，最讓我感動的，就是上頭這段對話。對我來說，理想、堅持、犧牲，還有改變世界的格局，是有能之士存在的理由。
也許有人會說：陳少白這個角色很不負責任，真自私，文人專送別人去慷慨赴義。我則要說，歧視文人，才是現代社會最大的問題。追求實際，取笑理想，也是現代社會之所以平凡人充斥的原因。在太平盛事大家講求什麼？講求生活 (請稍歇會兒，跟著 Steve Jobs 一起歌頌 life style)、講求享樂，而給你們生活，給你們享樂的，就是商人。也就是說，現代社會講求重商主義，士農工商，很遺憾，請反過來寫。平民百姓的認知中，現代文人若不是窩在學校教書，就是在淌在政治圈裡搞利益輸送。前者是不經世事的井底之蛙，後者是掠奪民脂民膏的米蟲。
但，就算有一鍋老鼠屎，也無法抹滅一粒米的存在。想想一百年前，若沒有文人散布思想，起身號招，很多事情永遠不會有人去做。平凡百姓會繼續活在「夠好」的生活型態。而當革命已成歷史教材，壓力退去，文人也退縮了。時至今日，已沒有太多文人想改變世界。畢竟大平盛事，文人沒有舞台，沒有苦難百姓需要拯救。
若要替文人論斤兩，我們先捫心自問：這個世界，到底是 thinker 重要，還是 doer 重要？
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The Lehmans liked to described themselves as merchants of money, intermediaries between men who wanted to produce goods and men looking for something to do with their surplus funds.
- Charles Ellis, The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.18
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A truly professional firm has certain characteristics: The most capable professionals agree it is the best firm to work for and that it recruits and keeps the best people. The most discriminating and significant clients agree that the firm consistently delivers the best service value. And the great firms are, sometimes grudgingly, recognized by competitors as the real leaders in their field over many years. On occasion, challenger firms rise to prominence – usually on the strength of one existing and compelling service capability – but do not sustain excellence.
- Charles Ellis, The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, Introduction, p.10
Recruit the best people 是不夠的，keep the best people 才是關鍵。公司文化、獎勵制度、發展空間都要有辦法留下這些人。不然何必幫競爭對手養兵呢？
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I like the subscription model the FT has been using for some time now. I may get the exact details wrong but its the idea that’s important anyway. You can visit the ft.com domain something like nine times per month for free. They cookie you and when you stop by the tenth time in a month, they ask you to pay. And many do. (昨天 NT Times 也宣佈採用這種模式)
This model recognizes a few fundamental facts about the internet. First, you need to make your content available for search engines and social media linking….
The other thing I like about the FT’s model is that its an elegant implementation of freemium. The best freemium models allow anyone to use the service for free and then convert the most serious/frequent/power users to paying customers…. (source)
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馬雲表示，阿里巴巴堅持，客戶第一、員工第二、股東第三；上市前股東曾對他承諾，股票永遠不賣，但金融危機來，「跑得最快是股東，留在最後是我的同事」。
有趣，股東價值也的確是鞏固客戶和員工價值後「順便」創造出來的。
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John Doerr 史丹佛大學演講
Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 17th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
每年 Forbes 都會公佈一份 Midas List ，榜上列出當年 ”the best dealmakers in high-tech and life science venture capital.”。KPCB 的 John Doerr 拿下 2008 年第一名，07, 06 年則排名第二，僅次於 Sequoia Capital 的 Michael Moritz。John Doerr 目前也是 Google 和 Amazon 的董事會成員：
Eric Schmidt calls John "one of Google’s best board members." And Jeff Bezos says, "Doerr (and Kleiner) is the center of gravity in the Internet.(source)
2009 年 7 月他到 Standford 商學院演講，主題為“Entrepreneurs as ‘Missionaries’ 但內容其實是圍繞在 Green Tech / Health / Education。最後保留十分鐘和台下同學分享 career advise。說真的，這類勵志內容人人都會講，聽得人也常覺得順耳好理解，(因為你早就知道了)，不過我相信 John Doerr 還是會幫忙過濾幾個比較有用的 practical wisdom。
身為一名 arguably the best VC in silicon valley， John Doerr 仍不忘和台下的 Standford MBAs 建立關係。最後一張 slide，他推薦了四本書，還表示：如果有任何 idea，或畢業後想到 start-up / venture-backed companies 工作，歡迎寫信給我。如果你也在信裡面分享三本你最喜歡的書，我會把這份投影片寄給你。
其中 Startup. A Silicon Valley Adventure 這本書是由 GO Corp. 創辦人親自撰寫，講的是這間紅及一時的公司，由盛而衰最終失敗的歷史。GO Corp. 在 1987 年就提出了手持式平板電腦的願景，比 Apple 的 Newton 還早。只是中間經歷過大大小小的問題 (too early? poor execution? too much money? 看了才知道)，最後還是於 1994 年走上關門一途。有趣的是，John Doerr 也自嘲說這也是一本關於他投資失敗的故事。
再過一個多月，平板電腦就要被媒體拿來炒作了。屆時搭配這本書服用正是時候。
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Google：不自由，吾自宮
Posted in Google, Investment, Quote on Jan 12th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
Google 想當烈士，你也拿它沒辦法。
今早看到新聞，Google 表示為了人權和言論自由 (a.k.a. no more search results censoring / filtering)，「考慮」終止在中國的營運。「激活點」是上個月源自中國的駭客攻擊事件，駭客鎖定的目標又恰好是中國人權鬥士們的帳號。無獨有偶，美國其他大企業也遭到類似攻擊。
In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google.
…we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted.
…we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
每個人看待這件事的角度不同。人權對我來說還好，我更關心如果 Google 真的 shutdown 中國 office，會對投資人造成何種程度的信心衝擊，及其後對財報的影響。記得李開復老師在自傳中提到，2006 年創建 Google.cn，過了很長一段時間才損益兩平，在他離開前，已經開始獲利。照「只賺一點點錢」來看，如果結束中國營運，清算掉資產，說不定短期還能提高 EPS？不過長期來看，少了中國市場，總是醜事一樁。畢竟流失人才，鞏固 Baidu 獨大的局面，都不是 Google 願意面對的。
相信高盛的 James Mitchell 會在這兩天為我們帶來深入的 financial implication analysis。
ps. 這篇 PR 看起來也像是想藉由網路輿論，引發外界重視，來產生和中國談判的籌碼 (over the next few weeks)。時間點選得也不錯。保留空間讓 Nexus-one 新聞燒一陣子。
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The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs
Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 10th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
我準備來好好研究 Goldman Sachs 的 corporate history。研讀的磚塊書叫做: The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs 。這類書籍的作者通常是記者或學者居多，遇到不用功的，怎麼看都不覺得有搔到癢處。好在本書作者 Charles D. Ellis 是位貨真價值的內線人事，他為 GS 提供顧問服務的資歷超過 30 年，也和歷代重要合夥人有不錯的交情。我想內容的 insight 應該是掛保證了，如果還能以中立的眼光來看待 GS 曾經做對和做錯的事，那就值得真情推薦。
我看書通常不喜歡先看書評，總覺得會減低閱讀樂趣。然而路過 NY Times 的 Sunday Book Review，還是給它喵了幾眼。我試著努力滑過 spoiler ，但其中這段讓我停了幾秒：
… as he explains in his preface, he started out believing that Goldman Sachs had become Wall Street’s strongest and most enduring player because it had a better way of doing things.
His mission: to figure out Goldman’s edge. Success, he concludes, started with hiring ambitious people from working-class backgrounds. If their parents were postal clerks or groundskeepers, they were likely to work relentlessly to secure a better life — and help Goldman amass profits in the process. (source)
酷。
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The Gladiator
Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 9th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
我想去一個自由市場，而非以種族這類膚淺理由，或其他因素來判斷個人能力的地方。我覺得已上市公開市場可以不帶偏見地評估我的專業技能。我尤其希望能以買方的身份進入，因為相關的瑣碎事情比較少。
- Cleveland Christophe, Venture Capitalist Tell their Stories
沒錯，這也是我認為投資是 noble activity 的原因。放馬過來吧，這是一個不能用經歷、用年資、用學歷、用性別、用成見、用關係、用官僚來壓制任何一個人的競技場。這是一個純粹較量智力、心理、情緒的競技場。這是一個崇尚個人主義，不需要臣服於無效率團隊主義的競技場，人人為自己的每一次決策負最高責任，你不必為完成別人的目標而奉獻，別人無須為完成你的目標而奉獻。這是一個人才得以完全自主的競技場。
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Nexus One 為 GOOG 帶來 9% 營收成長 0% – 2% EBIT 成長
Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 7th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
高盛 James Mitchell 燒燙燙的報告又出爐了。本回和同事 Robert Chen ( following HTC ) 討論後，認為 2010 全年 GOOG 能賣出 3 百 50 萬支 Nexus One，為營收帶來 9% 挹注， 0 – 2% EBIT 成長，但平均每支 Nexus One 和 HTC 拆帳後，恐怕只賺 55 元美金左右，大約是 10% 毛利率。所以跳進硬體遊戲，短期會衝擊到財報 margin。長期來看，則還是有助於 mobile ads/apps 策略布局。
VOLUME: We estimate Google may sell 3.5 mn Nexus Ones in 2010, based on first-year sales for other HTC Android models of 1.5-4.0 mn; we adjust up for Google’s brand and down for limited availability in retail outlets.
REVENUE: 3.5 mn units at $530 per unit add $1.9 bn, or 9%, to Google’s 2010 net revenue. Google will book the full unit sales price (including carrier subsidy on locked phones) to its “licensing and other” line item.
MARGIN: We estimate HTC’s component cost at $300 per unit, boosted by the OLED screen and CPU. We assume HTC bears warranty, after-sale service, & R&D expenses of $50, and retains a $75 profit. We estimate Google’s R&D & marketing expenses at $50 or more, for a margin to Google of up to $55 per unit, or up to 10%, and a boost to Google’s EBIT of up to $190 mn, or 0%-2%.
- James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
目標價一樣是 $670 不變，24 倍 2010E 本益比。
那華爾街怎麼看呢？GOOG 錯了嗎？GOOG 錯了嗎？
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one third, one third, one third VC strategy
Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 7th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
…like to talk about the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 model in which 1/3 of the investments are wipeouts, 1/3 return capital but are underperformers, and 1/3 are winners that produce all of the returns. When you have an investment flow dynamic where the early rounds require very small amounts of capital but the later rounds in the winners can require a lot of capital (which is very much the case in the internet/web sector), then it behooves you to make lots of small investments, see which ones become the big winners, and then go "all in" on the winners.
The challenge all of this presents is how a VC should allocate his/her time. You can spend the majority of time hunting for deals (planting seeds) or you can spend the majority of your time working with the portfolio companies (tending the crop). Not all of the portfolio companies need a VC’s help. Many entrepreneurs are highly self sufficient. That’s a good thing. But every entrepreneur can use some help now and then and some need a lot. And the best VCs make it a point to be there when the entrepreneur needs you. And that is time consuming. It’s very time consuming if you have ten or more portfolio companies and you make it a point to be a "valued added" VC. (source)
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不管路人怎麼解讀，我還是相當喜歡這句：
“We don’t do things that where we don’t aim to be the No.1.”
– Steve Ballmer
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這篇文章講到 GOOG 抱持著「開放」的態度，即便 Chrome Extension Gallery 裡頭出現 AdThwart、AdBlocker 這類檔廣告外掛，她們也是一概接受。
我承認之前倒是沒評估過，如果有一天，安裝瀏覽器檔廣告外掛一夕間蔚為風潮，那對 GOOG 與 publisher 的營收衝擊有多大？
現在 Google Ads 在使用者心目中就是「有點干擾，又不會太干擾」的平衡狀態。所以動手安裝外掛的心理成本仍然高於維持現狀。
所以就如同原文結尾說的；
Extensions like his, he said, will make “every one else change their ways, to make ads more useful. Everyone wins, that’s competition. The ideal result would be to retire this extension because the entire Web was covered with ads that people loved and no one wanted to block them.”
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又一次集中投資寡占避險的價值體現。你無法預測未來市場走向，但你知道 mobile ads will be the next big thing。那怎麼辦？只好把市場上可能的 player 都撿到籃子裡。不管他們怎麼戰，你只需要搬張折凳泡杯茶，好好欣賞台上的 M&A 戲碼，因為，不論結局如何，你都會是贏家。
APPL 大概是看到 GOOG 收購 AdMob，手癢也想來介入 mobile ads network。這兩家目前都有完整的 app store，自己跳下去搞 ads 也挺說得過去。app developer 當下的主要收入來源還是付費下載，但未來也可能變成透過加入廣告聯播計畫來賺錢。消費者的接受度呢？我是覺得 ok，本身也用過一些 ads sponsored free app，廣告經過精美設計的話，不太會對瀏覽經驗造成影響 (way to go! ads innovation!)。例如 AdMob 提供的 banner 廣告常出現在螢幕最上方或最下方，設計感也會盡量和 iPhone 的 UI 一致，輪播時還會有 3D 翻轉效果。記得第一次看到時，不但不覺得煩，反倒是內心發出了讚嘆：啊，that’s it!
有時候，趨勢不是說了就算，還要有天時地利人和。天時就是 2010 年人人都想買智慧型手機，地利就是日趨成熟的 infra (app store + payment system + ads network)，人和嘛…人和就是常常亂調高目標價的分析師。
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為什麼 MBA 不應該簽署 HBS Oath
Posted in Investment, Quote on Jan 4th, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
昨天晚上 MSN 彈出一個提示視窗，說我收到一封 INSEAD Knowledge 的信，說真的，我還從來沒打開過這些高級學府寄來的「廣告信」。昨天大概是起了念，就決定開來看看。嗯，還不錯，這是篇類似電子報的信件，裡面收錄上一季 INSEAD Knowledge top 10 文章精選。這些文章都是由 INSEAD 的學者教授們發表。我點了其中一篇 “why MBAs should not sign the HBS oath”，講得是為了不要讓金童們再搞出一波金融海嘯，前陣子哈佛商學院發起了一個簽署運動，鼓吹優球全球頂尖 MBA 學生都要簽署這份「I’ll do no evil」誓言書。而 INSEAD 這位教授發表了一篇論述，站在反對立場。先講幾個發現這封信的感想：
1. 讓大學加入市場競爭機制果真是好事
2. 連 INSEAD 這種等級的學校都要發電子報來吸引一流學生了，台灣的頂尖學校在幹嘛
3. 教授沒有想像中那麼沒料，至少比成天「見微知著」的部落客好多了
The MBA Oath 原文如下
THE MBA OATH
As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing people and resources together to create value that no single individual can create alone. Therefore I will seek a course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over the long term. I recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that affect the well-being of individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in the future. As I reconcile the interests of different constituencies, I will face choices that are not easy for me and others.
Therefore I promise:
- I will act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner.
- I will safeguard the interests of my shareholders, co-workers, customers and the society in which we operate.
- I will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and the societies it serves.
- I will understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own conduct and that of my enterprise.
- I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will represent the performance and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly.
- I will develop both myself and other managers under my supervision so that the profession continues to grow and contribute to the well-being of society.
- I will strive to create sustainable economic, social, and environmental prosperity worldwide.
- I will be accountable to my peers and they will be accountable to me for living by this oath.
This oath I make freely, and upon my honor.
INSEAD 教授 Theo Vermaelen 反對的立論有三點：
1. Some parts of the pledge are inconsistent with fiduciary duties and ethical standards.
2. The oath is a misplaced response to the financial crisis.
3. I don’t believe in pledges as an instrument to guide people’s behaviour.
雖然有幾個論點我不太認同，例如強調這份 pledge 和經理人的使命 — 保障股東利益，為股東負責衝突，但如果過度重視股東權益，因此卻犧牲客戶利益，最後還是會再度釀災。或是採用太薄弱、太果斷的事實來支持論點，例如拿報告指出，經理人買給自己的 MBS 中，有 81% 也屬於 AAA 評等，最後經理人自己也成為金融海嘯受害者。或是拿另一份報告指出，德過受傷最深的幾家金融機構，其董事會成員的財務背景知識是同一批調查中最薄弱的，因此操守不佳的 (前) MBA 學生不是釀災的主因。這兩個例子老實說都不太能說服我。然而其中還是有幾個支持論點值得參考，教授的論述結構也值得學習。
In many countries, board members and, as a consequence, managers have a fiduciary duty to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Even in countries where the corporate governance code is promoting maximising stakeholder value, none of these codes would accept that managers promote “social and environmental prosperity worldwide” as the HBS oath does.
I believe it is unethical to raise money from shareholders without telling them in advance that you are going to pursue causes that are destroying shareholder value. If you want to pursue other objectives, then you should tell them in advance, so that investors can incorporate these goals into stock prices, or simply refuse to buy the company stock.
First, Rene Stulz and Rudiger Fahlenbrach (“Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis” working paper, Ohio State University, 2009) show that banks where the CEO held a lot of stock were also the banks with the biggest losses. So they were not losing other people’s money, they lost their own money. They apparently believed in their strategy.
People are not driven by pledges, but they are driven by incentives.
Signing the oath doesn’t cost anything and therefore not a credible commitment.
The current debate should focus on how to improve corporate governance and how to design compensation contracts that are maximising shareholder value, rather than profits, earnings per share, return on equity or other non risk-adjusted short-term measures of performance.
The HBS school oath aims to achieve exactly the opposite. It pushes the stakeholder value maximisation idea to its extreme by including the whole world as a stakeholder.
I would propose the following:
“I pledge to maximise the wealth of the people who pay my salary, i.e. the shareholders, unless the shareholders tell me in advance that they want me to do something else. I will do my best to learn how to do this by taking the relevant courses”
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巴菲特與蓋茲同台與哥倫比亞大學學生對談
Posted in Bill Gates, Quote on Jan 3rd, 2010 繼續閱讀 »
2009 年 11 月 12 日，巴菲特與蓋茲二度同台演講，地點在哥倫比亞大學，整場直接與 Wharton 的學生進行 Q&A 。若這場演講開放全球售票，我那時一定是在台下…
(開場的 standing ovation 熱血度百分之百！)
好在這個世界上有 broadband Inetnet + video streaming technology。當然，對我來說，沒有佳句摘要，就不算是吸收了一場完整的演講：
Announcer: …wealth is not about the money you amass, but the number of lives you enrich.
Gates: I was a huge beneficiary of this country’s unique willingness to take risk on a young person. And, you know, I got to hire people who were older. I got to sell to people who were older. And it was kind of a dream come true.
Buffett: Last September, only the government could have saved things. The whole world wanted to deleverage. And they were deleveraging under conditions of extreme haste and with guns to their head in some cases. And the only entity that could possibly leverage up at the same time that everybody else wanted to deleverage was the Federal government.
Gates: And business schools play a role in training people to think about value, leadership. There’s wonderful skills that are taught at great schools like this. And so the fact that, yes, we have had a crisis and we have dropped back, maybe we wasted two or three years net because of the things that were done wrong, that doesn’t say that business schools aren’t performing a great service, you know. The case studies of this crisis will be taught here for decades to come.
Buffett: The wonderful thing about it is in this country, is you can succeed magnificently with ethics. It’s not a hindrance. It’s a help sometimes. It’s a neutral sometimes. But it’s not a hindrance at all. And to cut corners, you know, everybody here has a wonderful future. I mean, this is an economy you’re going into that is so much — [APPLAUSE] If you look back on the 19th Century, we had seven great bank panics. If you look back at the 20th Century, we had the Great Depression and world wars and flu epidemics. This country doesn’t avoid problems. It just solves them. And in the next 100 years, our machine will sputter again, you know. Maybe 15 years will be so-so years, but there will be 85 great years. And during the 20th Century the Dow went from 66 to 11,400, so this is fertile soil that you’re working in and there’s no reasons to cut corners.
Buffett: I had a professor, Ben Graham, I offered to go to work for him for nothing. He said, "You’re overpriced." Nonetheless, I went into the business. [APPLAUSE] I will guarantee, you will do well at whatever turns you on.
Buffett: I don’t like to sound, you know, like a mortician during an epidemic or anything, but last fall was really quite exciting for me. [LAUGHTER] I don’t wish it on anybody, but there were things being offered. There are opportunities for us to do things that didn’t exist a year or two earlier. So I really don’t — I don’t want to be in a position where I am leveraged or something of the sort that does keep me up at night. I did not worry about the ultimate survival of our economic system. We were messed up. Wasn’t any question about that. But the plants haven’t gone away. The cornfields haven’t gone away. The talent of the American people hasn’t gone away. The innovativeness of the next Bill Gates hasn’t gone away. This country was going to do fine. I knew that. We just had to get things straightened out. And we’re well on the way to having that happen.
Buffett: …if you had a wonderful farm and you knew the next 50 years there would be five droughts but there would be 45 good years, I mean, you would not become paralyzed thinking about the five drought years. You would recognize that you’ve got a system that works very well over time, and that’s our American economic system.
Buffett: Let me give you an illustration. I bought my first stock in 1942. I was 11. I had been dillydallying up until then. I got serious. [LAUGHTER] What do you think the best year for the market has been since 1942? Best calendar year from 1942 to the present time. Well, there’s no reason for you to know the answer. The answer is 1954. In 1954, the Dow … dividends was up 50%. Now if you look at 1954, we were in a recession a good bit of that time. The recession started in July of ‘53. Unemployment peaked in September of ‘54. So until November of ‘54 you hadn’t seen an uptick in the employment figure. And the unemployment figure more than doubled during that period. It was the best year there was for the market. So it’s a terrible mistake to look at what’s going on in the economy today and then decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on it. You should decide whether to buy or sell stocks based on how much you’re getting for your money, long-term value you’re getting for your money at any given time. And next week doesn’t make any difference because next week, next week is going to be a week further away. And the important thing is to have the right long-term outlook, evaluate the businesses you are buying. And then a terrible market or a terrible economy is your friend. I don’t care, in making a purchase of the Burlington Northern, I don’t care whether next week, or next month or even next year there is a big revival in car loadings or any of that sort of thing. A period like this gives me a chance to do things. It’s silly to wait. I wrote an article. If you wait until you see the robin, spring will be over.
Buffett: [APPLAUSE] But let me add one point because — to the MBA situation. Right now, I would pay $100,000 for 10% of the future earnings of any of you. So anybody that wants to see me after this is over — [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] If that’s true, you are a million-dollar asset right now, right, if 10% of you is worth 100,000? You could improve — many of you, and I certainly could have when I got out, just in terms of learning communication skills. You know, it’s not something that is taught. I actually went to a Dale Carnegie course later on in terms of public speaking. But if you improve your value 50% by having better communication skills, that’s another $500,000 in terms of capital value. See me after the class and I’ll pay you 150-thousand. [APPLAUSE]
Gates: But I think I’d pick his desire to teach, his desire to teach things that are complex and put them in a simple form so that people can understand and get the benefit of all his experience, all his models of how the world works. He loves to teach. And he does it meeting with students. He does it in his annual newsletter. He does it when he’s talking to me on the phone. It’s a real gift that I admire incredibly.
Buffett: First of all, I’d say marry the right person. [LAUGHTER] And I’m serious about that. [APPLAUSE] It will make more difference in your life. It will change your aspiration, all kind of things. It’s enormously important who you marry. … And then also go to work, if possible, for an organization or an individual that you admire. I mean I offered to go to work for Ben Graham because there was nobody I admired more in the business than him. I didn’t care what he paid me. When he finally did hire me in 1954, I moved from Omaha to New York and I didn’t know what I was getting paid until I got my first paycheck. But I knew I wanted to work for Ben Graham. And I knew I would jump out of bed every morning and be excited about what I would do and I would go home at night smarter than I was in the morning. Go to work at a job that turns you on and a person that turns you on and institution. [APPLAUSE]
Buffett: The one thing I will tell you is the worst investment you can have is cash. Everybody is talking about cash being king and all that sort of thing. Most of you don’t look like you are overburdened with cash anyway. [LAUGHTER] Cash is going to become worth less over time. But good businesses are going to become worth more over time. And you don’t want to pay too much for them so you have to have some discipline about what you pay. But the thing to do is find a good business and stick with it.
Buffett: Don’t pass up something that’s attractive today because you think you will find something way more attractive tomorrow.
Buffett: But every year don’t measure it by the earnings in the quarter that year. Measure it by whether the moat around that business, what gives it competitive advantage over time has widened or narrowed. If you keep doing that for 100 years, it’s going to work out very well. Then I tell them basically if the reason for doing something is everybody else is doing it, it’s not good enough. If you have to use that as a reason, forget it. You don’t have a good reason for doing something. Never use that.
Buffett: It’s always interesting when Bill and I appear together, they don’t figure they can do what Bill does, but they know they can do what I do. [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] …
Buffett: And then basically I didn’t listen to anybody else. I just look in the mirror every morning and the mirror always agrees with me. And I go out and do what I believe I should be doing. And I’m not influenced by what other people think.
Gates: Well, we talked about some of the basics, having great people around you, reading a lot, thinking long-term. I also think, though, there become a few magic moments where you have to have confidence in yourself. You know, Warren when he set off on his own, he could have gone and taken a job as an analyst somewhere. But he knew that he had the skill, that he was going to raise money and have his own partnership. When I dropped out of Harvard and said to my friends, ‘Come work for me,’ there was a certain kind of brass self-confidence in that. You have a few moments like that where trusting yourself and saying yes, this can come together — you have to seize on those because not many come along.
Gates: Well, they [Google] have some of the same problems we had. [LAUGHTER] [APPLAUSE] It’s another fine competitor. They are hiring a lot of smart people. They have gotten into the lead position in search, which is incredibly profitable to be number one in that. They may get a little competition as time goes forward. But they are a great example of what can happen, you know, two young guys who got together, pursued an idea and created a success that’s absolutely gigantic. And we all, you know, hopefully use search engines, maybe a variety. [LAUGHTER] And we benefit from that.
Buffett: … Well, that’s 50 years of preparation and five (minutes) of decision making. [APPLAUSE]
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"The people, who were trying to make this world worse… are not taking a day off. How can I?”
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My friend Mark Pincus told me when he was first starting Zynga that social networks had to become like cocktail parties. You needed things for people to do in them so they would stick around and engage. (source)
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高盛又調高 GOOG 目標價了
Posted in Investment, Quote on Dec 29th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
這回主要理由是今年 11 月起， GOOG 在北美和英國地區試驗 Product Listing and Extension Ads，有機會帶來新的營收注益。但不論怎麼看，都有點像是眼見 GOOG 每股市價即將超越之前的目標價 ($635)，所以趕快塞個理由來調高營收展望和 EPS？
Based on economic trends, discussions with ad agencies, and uptake of
Product Listing Ads, we raise 4Q2009, 2010, and 2011 revenue and EPS by 2%-4%, and forecast 15% qoq consolidated gross revenue growth in 4Q (3% faster than consensus) and 2% qoq in 1Q (2% faster than consensus).
– James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
Product Listing and Extension Ads 圖解
We estimate that:
• The average AdWords CPC in the US is around $0.50, so 100 AdWords clicks on the average listing would generate revenue of $50.
• If the average item listed on Product Ads has a unit price of $40 (matching eBay’s average selling price, excluding automobiles) then at a 10% revenue share, Google would generate $4 per transaction.
• If the conversion rate from clicks to transactions is 10%, then Google would generate revenue of $40 from 100 Product Ads clicks, 20% lower than the $50 it might generate from 100 AdWords clicks.
• However, we assume that the appeal of photographs, plus their novelty in nonimage queries, may encourage users to click at twice the rate of traditional text ads, so that Google could generate $80 from 200 Product Ads clicks in the same space where it would otherwise generate $50 from 100 AdWords clicks. Put another way, 25% more clicks could generate a neutral revenue outcome if CPC is 20% lower for Product Ads than for AdWords, and we believe that Product Ads should generate an uplift in clicks substantially greater than 25%.
– James Mitchell, Goldman Sachs
ps.這 estimation 的假設也太粗糙了吧…我不相信堂堂高盛會端出這麼像在玩模擬城市的 model…請告訴我這是庶民版分析報告才會這樣…
GOOG 做了很多好事，但是特別去注意它「做了哪些能產生直接賺錢機會」的事更加有趣。像這回的 Product Listing Ads 和之前的 Music Search。
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Don’t you know that most people take most things because that’s what’s given them, and they have no opinion whatever? Do you wish to be guided by what they expect you to think they think or your own judgment?
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“ What’s the real me?” She asked. For the first time, she looked attentive; not compassionate; but at least, attentive.
“ What’s the real anyone?” He said, encouraged. “It’s not just the body. It’s…the soul.”
“ What is the soul? ”
“ It’s – you. The thing inside you. ”
“ The thing that thinks and values and makes decisions? ”
“ Yes, yes, that’s it. And the thing that feels. You’ve – you’ve given it up. ”
“ So there are two things that one can’t give up: One’s thoughts and one’s desires? ”
***
“ You’re beginning to see. aren’t you, Peter? Shall I make it clear. You’ve never wanted me to be real. You never wanted anyone to be. But you didn’t want to show it. You wanted an act to help your act. – a beautiful act, complicated act, all twists, trimmings and words. All words. You didn’t like what I said about Vincent Knowlton. You liked it when I said the same thing under cover of virtuous sentiment. You didn’t want me to believe. You only wanted me to convince you that I believed. My real soul, Peter? It’s real only when it’s independent – you’ve discovered that, haven’t you? It’s real when it chooses curtains and desserts – you’re right about that – curtains, desserts and religions, Peter, and the shape of buildings. But you’ve never wanted that. You wanted a mirror. People want nothing but mirrors around them. To reflect them while they’re reflecting too. You know, like the senseless infinity you get from two mirrors facing each other across a narrow passage. Usually in the more vulgar kind of hotels. Reflections of reflections and echoes of echoes. No beginning and no end. No center and no purpose. I gave you what you wanted. I became what you are, what your friends are, what most of humanity is so busy being – only with the trimmings. I didn’t go around spouting book reviews to hide my emptiness of judgment – I said I had no judgment. I didn’t borrow designs to hide my creative impotence – I created nothing. I didn’t say that equality is a noble conception and unity the chief goal of mankind – I just agree with everybody. You call it death, Peter? That kind of death – I’ve imposed on you and on everyone around us. But you – you haven’t done that. People are comfortable with you, they like you, they enjoy your presence. You’ve spared them the blank death. Because you’ve imposed it – on yourself. “
- Ayn Rand
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“Rules?” Said Roark. “Here are my rules: what can be done with one substance must never be done with another. No two materials are alike. No two sites on earth are alike. No two buildings have the same purpose. The purpose, the site, the material determine the shape. Nothing can be reasonable or beautiful unless it’s made by one central idea, and the idea sets every detail. A building is alive, like a man. it’s integrity is to follow it’s own truth, its’ one single theme, and to serve it’s own single purpose. A man doesn’t borrow pieces of his body. A building doesn’t borrow hunks of it’s soul. It’s maker gives it the soul and every wall, window and stairway to express it.
– Ayn Rand
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“Don’t you see?” Roark was saying. ”It’s a monument you want to build, but not to yourself. Not to your own life or your won achievement. To other people. To their supremacy over you. You’re not challenging that supremacy. You’re immortalizing it. You haven’t thrown it off – you’re putting it up forever. Will you be happy if you seal yourself for the rest of your life in that borrowed shape? Or if you strike free, for once, and build a new house, your own? You don’t want the Randolph place. You want what it stood for. But what it stood for is what you’ve fought all your life.”
– Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead
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本日佳句 - Hammer
Posted in Marketing Thought, Quote on Nov 26th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
When the market changes, you may be seeing all the new opportunities and problems the wrong way because of the solutions you’re used to. The reason so many organizations have trouble using social media is that they are using precisely the wrong hammer. And odds are, they will continue to do so until their organization fails. PR firms try to use the new tools to send press releases, because, you guessed it, that’s their hammer. (source)
Bonus Quote
Instead, you gain converts by winning at something the existing provider didn’t think was so important. (source)
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…The problem with being an amateur scientist is precisely the reason that marketers relish the opportunity to sell to us, the amateurs: we make stupid decisions, easily manipulated by those who might choose to do the manipulation (on their behalf or on ours). …
…The news here is not that people are irrational, giving too much credence to the dramatic and the local and the short-term (that’s not news), but that people have added a veneer of scientific rationality to their irrational decisions. …
…This is one of the problems with breast cancer screening. It appears to give information, really good information, but in practice, it doesn’t. Since the information is vivid, we give it too much credence. … (source)
1. 這世界上每天有數以千百億計位元的新資訊產出，但對少數來說， 99% (?) 都是 noise。
2. 為什麼 insight 這麼少？因為大眾不喜歡思考。insight 沒有市場。
3. 吸收資訊原本就不是人類為了生存而演畫出來的能力，那是為了社交所演化出來的能力。
4. 我們應不應該繼續餵大眾簡單的東西？應該。不然人類社會賴以運行的主從關係會瓦解。
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Subscriptions are well-honed tools used by the soft world of magazines and theater, among others. Could subscriptions really apply to old order physical products, like say, food? The idea of subscribing to food is not so outlandish. Forty years ago subscriptions to milk were quite common. There were also subscriptions to bread and beer and other staples. Subscriptions tend to emphasize and charge for intangible values: regularity, reliability, first to be served, and authenticity, and work well in the arena of "as if free." (source)
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Instant gratification is a very powerful force, for both consumers and developers. The web is full of success stories that have embraced the power of instant gratification and also full of failures that made people wait too long. (source)
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I said that there are two kinds of api failures that I’ve noticed. The first is when the web app itself is not very popular and therefore developers aren’t compelled to build to its api. That is not an issue with the api itself. The second is when the web app itself is very popular but the api is not so much. (source)
I’ve been thinking about applying the concept of API for content creation on social networking model.
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第二次世界大戰後，政經局勢丕變，車廠未來前途堪，照理來說，這家公司應該完蛋了。但是，他們沒有放棄…
為維持生計，車廠員工開始種植蔬菜，公司蓋了一座麵粉廠、麵包廠、和木炭廠，也設立陶瓷廠生產瓷器，而其他單位則開始生產鍋碗瓢盆。車廠老闆還派兒子到北方學做魚漿，因為很可能是一項商機。
現在，這個車廠正與美國通用汽車競逐全球最大汽車製造…
(source)
這段話讓我相當感動。聽起來像是封建時代才可能發生的動員令，在資本主義社會中也可能發生，前提是上位者必須像貴族一樣展現十足的領導威能，下位者 (佃農魂) 必須打從內心信服貴族的領導。從猿人到智能人，人天生就是需要領導，民主制度不過是被包裝得比較好的精英主義操縱。人天生就嚮往 “nobleness”，嚮往具有這樣特質的群體來領導、保護他們。
在資本社會的專業經理人制度之下，我們不容易看到退居幕後的貴族，只會看到媒體拼命哄抬的個人式英雄主義。然而貴族永遠都在，貴族體系形成，需要兩個元素：血脈和文化，一旦成型，就是一張八方延展的網，就算嫡系消失，旁系仍會將類似的文化基因傳承下去。
但最吸引我之處在於，翻開族譜，貴族的源頭都是庶民。
這代表任何世代，不論政經制度如何演變，永遠都會有像羅斯柴爾德、像摩根、 像洛克菲勒一樣的平民，透過努力，透過謀略，喚醒原本就屬於他們的天命。
成功的主產品是自己，副產品是自己的血脈。
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Plato describes five types of government in the Republic:
1. Aristocracy- Plato considered this the best form of government; aristocracy embodies wisdom of the philosopher king.
2. Timocracy- military government embodies virtues of honor and courage.
3. Oligarchy- rule by a rich elite, their vice is greed, the rich get richer, the poor get poorer.
4. Democracy- mob rule, and chaos, it represents akrasia people are slaves of their desires and have little self-control.
5. Tyranny- this is the worst form of government. The vice is selfishness, one power crazed person in control. (source)
這就是 social media 的本質。
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I therefore declare war against the world I used to rule,
against what being unfair, unfortunate, unrealistic,
against the past,
against those who don’t live up to what they deserve,
against those who live an easy life,
against those who want more by doing less,
against those who are skin deep but appear to be profound;
I therefore declare war again those whom I once loved,
in the name of my beloved moral statue.
- C. J. W.
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Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those who will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of men, and especially the princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the means. Let a prince therefore aim at conquering and maintaining the state, and the means will always be judged honourable and praised by every one, for the vulgar is always taken by appearances and the issue if the event; and the world consists only of the vulgar, and the few who are not vulgar are isolated when the many have a rally point in the prince.
- The Prince, p. 74
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Another thing that will never change is that art forms will always draw from the past, reflect on the present, and look to the future. That applies to everything from art and architecture to business.
and I still believe that making deals is an art form, just as business is an art form. As Andy Warhol said, “Making money is art and working is art and good business is the best art.”
I think it’s a good idea to review what constitutes an art. Creating art involves technique. The basics have to be learned and absorbed. Art is never created from a void. There is the past to consider, and how it can be made pertinent to the present, and then with an eye to the future, it can take us to new places. Just reviewing the progression of an artist such as Picasso makes this process very clear.
An indication of life is growth, and we cannot stagnate and expect to get anywhere. Studying the past is laying the foundation, but we cannot stay there. The foundation is merely the preparation for the great designs that will come. If you are a business student, remember that everything you do is laying the foundation for your future–so work carefully and thoughtfully. Artists are known for being meticulous and that applies to business as well. (source)
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Trump’s 4 Gs
Posted in Investment, Quote, Thought on Oct 27th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
- Get in
- Get it done
- Get it done right
- Get out
應用在投資，我想就是以下四個簡單流程。堅信簡單公式，能幫助你過濾外界噪音：
- 研究追蹤特定標的
- 進場
- 管控風險 (加碼或減碼)
- 出場
Bonus Quote: “know everything you can about what you’re doing.”
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The central task in a gift economy is to keep the gifts moving. By social debt, barter, and pure charity, gifts circulate and generate happiness and wealth.
(source)
禮物經濟，或是 Chris Anderson 喜歡說的免費經濟，在我看來是烏托邦，不可能實現。它無法 scale ，沒有價值衡量標準，沒有人需要為勞務或服務的提供負責，最重要的是，它太順從於人性，從歷史的經驗看來，凡是放縱人性的經濟體都無法長期存在。
活在貨幣堆起來的資本主義很辛苦，因為它懲罰懶惰。但它也給了我們最好的禮物 — 時間。它讓時間站在我們這邊，縱使金湯匙金叉子金牙籤現在不在你手上，只要你不鬆懈，擁抱資本主義，時間會幫助你，把整套餐具從沒有資格獲得的人手中奪過來。
有時候，禮物會收得心不安理不得，唯有靠自己努力得到的才是真的。
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One question to ask yourself is: what doesn’t exist that should? Do you see something that is lacking in your neighborhood, your city or in the world? Is there anything you can contribute? Is there a niche waiting to be discovered? There most likely is. If people spent less time complaining and more time in productive and creative thought, we’d all be the better for it. It’s sometimes as simple as going beyond the status quo and having the courage to do so. (source)
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本日佳句 - 海龜哲學
Posted in Investment, Quote on Oct 15th, 2009 繼續閱讀 »
偉大投資者對問題的概念形成方式，與其他投資者不同。這些投資者的成功並非來自取得更好的資訊，而是使用資訊的方式不同於其他人。 — 麥克.莫伯辛
理查.丹尼斯心中存著在對政治理想的理性判斷：「如果有件每個人都討厭，但你覺得是正確的事，那就是重要且應該做的事，因為沒有其他人會去做。」
「一個現在就全力執行的好計畫，好過下星期的完美計畫。」 — 喬治.巴頓將軍
順勢交易就像民主政體，有時它看起來沒那麼好，但它比世上其他東西都好。我們要依賴「買進並持有」嗎？我看那應該叫做「買進並祈禱」(buy and hope)。我們虧損時還要加碼攤平嗎？世界太大，實在難以分析，基本面太廣大了。我們必須積極、堅持地推廣順勢交易，並且說明它的真實面貌：能夠在正確時間進入正確市場，限制災難影響程度的風險管控系統。 — 傑瑞.帕克
「關鍵不在於獨一無二的想法，而在於你獨一無二的實踐能力。」 — 無名氏
(source)
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1.一個球棒和一顆球合計1.1美元，已知球棒比球貴1元，請問一個球幾元？
2.5台機器花五分鐘可以生產5個產品，100台機器生產100個產品需要多少分鐘？
3.有一個湖，湖中的水草覆蓋湖面的面積每天增加一倍，這個湖在第48天時被水草覆蓋滿，請問第幾天的時候湖面已經被水草覆蓋一半？(翻譯 by PJHuang)
這三題數學題來自 CRT (Cognitive Reflective Test)，聽說可以測試一個人願意長期投資的程度，以及承擔風險的程度。不過現在特別抽出來問已經有點不準了。原題目是置入在一連串難易摻雜的問卷中，請答題者盡量回答。在這樣的情境下，本質上衝動、過度自信的人，會比較傾向於快速答題，而得到「陷阱」版的答案。
可能是從前受到台灣數學教育的荼毒，我看到這三題就馬上用代數的方式下去解，答案果然是很有趣。
我還沒仔細看完原本的這份研究報告，不過大致上猜測 CRT 測驗可以拿來評斷一個人是否有耐心、思慮是否嚴謹、是否對眼前現狀有直接懷疑的能力等等。從此可延伸出承擔風險的能力。
美國各大學做出來結果如下圖，MIT 三題全對的人最多，佔 48%，第二名Princeton 三題都答對的人就只站 26%。
不過這些結論都不重要，重要的是可以來好好思考你真的敢把積蓄交給這些基金經理人嗎？
最後補上 Shane Frederick 教授 CRT 研究報告的引言，難得有學術報告看了第一段後，會讓人有繼續讀下去的衝動。
People with higher cognitive ability (or “IQ”) differ from those with lower
cognitive ability in a variety of important and unimportant ways. On
average, they live longer, earn more, have larger working memories, faster reaction times and are more susceptible to visual illusions (Jensen, 1998). Despite the diversity of phenomena related to IQ, few have attempted to understand—or even describe—its influences on judgment and decision making. Studies on time preference, risk preference, probability weighting, ambiguity aversion, endowment effects, anchoring and other widely researched topics rarely make any reference to the possible effects of cognitive abilities (or cognitive traits).
不過我相信決策的品質應該是經驗和智商的加總。
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The three current big megatrends in the web/tech sector are mobile, social, and real-time. (source)
Mobie: 中華電、台哥大、遠傳、宏達電、觸控面板、鍵盤、機殼、電池、組裝概念
Social: 接近沒有
Real-time: 真的沒有
ps. 最接近 social concept 的服務：無名(外商，無上市上櫃)、痞客邦 (網家)、Xuite (中華電)、其 他 web service provider 距離上市上櫃還很遙遠；最接近 real-time concept 的服務：巴布先生
我個人是看好逐漸增加的數據傳輸量 (3G, 3.5G, etc.) 能為電信業者帶來不錯的營收。可惜中華電前陣子被勒令調降 ADSL 費率，多少會有些抵銷這部份獲利。看來中華電最大的風險不是經濟情勢，不是競爭對手，是政府。
話說回來，從 mobile, social, real-time 金三角來看，台灣的科技產業除了硬體之外似乎真的不太行。好在未來不管科技發展到什麼程度，總是要有個載體裝著軟體 (你要說裝雲也是可以啦)，所以，老兵不死，只是凋零；硬體不死，只是毛利很低。
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一般人都能被歸類到：壟斷性大公司習慣性厭惡症後群。但不就是因為你們這些人孕育出壟斷性大公司嗎？在台灣，除了部份公共事業外，我看不出完全的壟斷。中華電信有競爭者，雅虎奇摩有競爭者，微軟有競爭者。而你有什麼？你有「選擇」的權利。但，是你懶惰，是你放棄選擇的權利。從中華電信換到台灣大哥大手續一堆，從雅虎奇摩換到 PCHome 要從新適應介面，從 MS Windows 換到 Linux 要重新學習功能。這些都是你選擇相信的理由。
也有一個理由，但你從不相信：這些壟斷事業提供的產品或服務都是”good enough”。而你，選擇停留在 good enough 的 status quo。
MSN 強制你升級到最新版真的不好嗎？除了未知的未來，你害怕什麼？你還有選擇，但你選擇繼續支持壟斷性大公司。不論你付錢，或是盜版，不論你忍氣吞聲，或是抱怨。你選擇繼續支持壟斷性大公司。
如果有一天，壟斷性大公司突然一個接著一個從地球上消失，中華電信被勒令停止經營數據傳輸？雅虎奇摩被勒令流量管制？微軟被勒令停止維護 MSN？你的目的達成了，你摧毀了壟斷者、掠奪者。然後，你的生活會過得比現在好嗎，你失去了抱怨的對象，你會比之前開心嗎？
你反對的到底是什麼？
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